

Radical Right Parties and their Welfare State Stances - Not so blurry after all?

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Abstract

Recent findings from the party competition literature have shown that radical right parties present inconclusive economic stances. Since their constituency is divided with regard to their economic preferences, taking centrist positions or even remaining blurry are promising strategies to prevent them from alienating one or the other part of their electorate. However, in this article we show that they face a divided electorate only with regard to one of the two main conflicts of contemporary welfare politics, namely on questions centring on the preferred size of the welfare state. Contrary, their constituency agrees over whether to prioritize social investment or consumption – thus on the goals, principles and needs the welfare state should meet. Hence, radical right parties are expected to take a clear stance in favour of prioritizing consumptive social policies over social investment. Using data from an original survey to map voters' preferences as well as party perceptions and a new and fine-grained coding of social policy stances in party manifestos in five Western European countries to assess parties' position-taking/blurring, we show that radical right parties do blur their position on the general welfare state size dimension. However, they indicate unambiguously what kind of a welfare state they prefer if any: of all party families, the radical right most clearly prioritizes consumptive social policies such as old age pensions, unemployment benefits or healthcare over social investment. Moreover, this clear stance is reflected in voters' perceptions of where radical right parties stand. Thus, our evidence suggests that radical right parties only blur how much welfare state they want but clearly communicate what they want from the welfare state. These findings have important implications both for party competition and partisan welfare politics.

1. Introduction

Radical right parties have emerged as a third pole in the party system of many West European countries (Kriesi *et al.* 2008; Oesch and Rennwald 2018). While it has been shown that they mobilize their voters primarily on non-economic sociocultural issues such as immigration (Ivarsflaten 2005, 2008), their economic positions are less clear. Some scholars have depicted their positions as inconclusive (Rathgeb 2019), moderate (de Lange 2007; Afonso and Rennwald 2018), and with high variation across time and space (Afonso 2015). Even more, Rovny (2013) in an influential article has argued that radical right parties deliberately engage in blurring their positions on the economic dimension of conflict. Since the radical right attracts core constituencies with diverging preferences on economic issues, they have an interest in downplaying these issues and in avoiding taking clear stances that might antagonize one or the other part of their electorate.

We challenge this predominant view on party competition in welfare politics that radical right parties blur all their economic positions. Recent arguments from the welfare state literature show that the prevailing conflict about the welfare state is no longer about its size only but rather about its goals, operating principles, and whose needs the welfare state should cater to (Beramendi *et al.* 2015b; Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2017; Häusermann *et al.* 2019b; Bremer and Bürgisser 2018). Should the welfare state prioritize investing in human skills to improve people's earnings capacity or should it primarily serve as a safety net? Hence, welfare politics and thus the economic dimension itself has become multi-dimensional (Häusermann 2010; Bonoli 2005; Cavallé and Trump 2015; Van Oorschot and Meuleman 2012; Roosma *et al.* 2013). Previous research has found that this new conflict dimension over social investment vs. consumption (also termed recalibration of the welfare state) cuts across the traditional dimension about more or less welfare state with different social and political groups occupying the poles of these dimensions. Most importantly, preferences on this new recalibration dimension of welfare politics are closely aligned with attitudes over universalism vs. particularism because of their joint socio-structural determinants and the distributive effects of investment or consumption policies (Beramendi *et al.* 2015b). Hence, while the constituency of radical right parties is divided when it comes to welfare state generosity, this does not hold for the newly emerged conflict over social investment vs. consumption. The culturally conservative electorate of the radical right, holding particularistic preferences, prioritizes consumptive policies. Note that the emphasis lies on prioritization: Undoubtedly, a majority of voters, regardless of partisanship, supports social policies whether they are of

consumptive or investing kind. However, in a realistically constrained scenario where expansion involves (opportunity) costs, we expect the conflict over social investment vs. consumption to intensify along the lines of universalistic and particularistic preferences. Hence, ambiguity in radical right parties' economic positioning should be restricted to questions about welfare state size or social policy generosity. Contrary, we expect radical right parties to take an explicit stance in favour of consumption over social investment since on this dimension they are not faced with a positional dilemma.

Our findings confirm these expectations. In line with previous research, looking at electoral manifestos we find that radical right parties do blur their position on the general welfare state size dimension (Rovny and Polk 2019). They do so, by de-emphasizing social policy issues overall. However, they indicate unambiguously what kind of a welfare state they prefer if any: of all party families, the radical right most clearly prioritizes consumptive social policies such as old age pensions, unemployment benefits or healthcare over social investment. Moreover, this consumption stance gets recognized by voters. In line with the evidence from the electoral manifestos, voters perceive radical right parties to favour consumption over social investment more than any other party. This suggests that welfare state positions of radical right parties are not so blurry after all.

Our article combines both individual-level data and quantitative data based on election manifestos from five West European countries, namely Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. We use individual-level data to measure the preferences of parties' electorates on both welfare politics dimensions to derive from that the strategic situation parties, in particular the radical right, see themselves confronted with. To measure party behaviour on the two dimensions, we draw on our own coding of electoral manifestos and on aggregated individual-level data from an original survey asking respondents about their perceptions of parties' stances on the investment-consumption priorities dimension.

In this article, we first review the literature about radical right parties and their economic stances, before arguing how changes in welfare politics have created new conflict lines that altered the strategic situations of (radical right) parties with regard to their welfare positions. Combining previous findings about class voting, social policy preferences of party electorates, and our own data about electorates' positions on the two welfare dimensions, we formulate hypotheses on how radical right parties might behave. After introducing our data, we present empirical results on how radical right parties position themselves and how they are perceived by voters. A concluding section discusses the implications of our findings.

2. Theory

2.1. Radical Right Parties and the Economy

The literature on radical right parties agrees that these parties have mobilized their voters and chalked up election victories mostly based on particularistic positions on socio-cultural issues and most prominently their anti-immigration stances. Still twenty years ago, some scientists and commentators even went as far as characterizing radical right parties as single issue parties. While this notion has been rejected decidedly in the meantime (see e.g. Mudde 1999) the positioning of radical right parties on economic issues such as taxation or the welfare state has for a long time received relatively little attention. One of the first and most influential accounts of radical right economic positioning was developed by Kitschelt and McGann (1997) who famously argued that radical right parties have adopted a “winning formula” by combining authoritarian positions (on socio-cultural issues) with neoliberal economic stances. According to Kitschelt and McGann this programmatic appeal allowed radical right parties to build cross-class support by the working class (on socio-cultural grounds) and the neoliberal small business owners (mostly on economic grounds).

In the past decade, though, academic interest in the economic and welfare stances of radical right parties has sparked and with that the “winning formula” argument has been disputed. The radical right’s increasing vote share and a concomitant “normalization” of these parties, their increased relevancy for government building (de Lange 2012) and their occasional participation in government (Afonso 2015) as well as the recent economic crisis might be reasons for the mounting interest in the radical right’s economic stances (Afonso and Rennwald 2018). This newer research shows that against the expectations of the “winning formula” radical right parties do no longer present distinctly right-wing economic positions and argue that radical right parties have very good reasons to refrain from advocating staunchly welfare critical stances. Rather a range of studies have placed radical right parties somewhere at the centre of the economic dimension (Kitschelt 2004; de Lange 2016; Afonso and Rennwald 2018; Ivaldi 2015) or have at least observed them moving to the centre (Lefkofridi and Michel 2014; Rovny and Polk 2019). As an alternative to the description of radical right parties’ economic stances as moderate, especially Jan Rovny (2013) has argued radical right parties to have an incentive to blur their economic positions, i.e. to not even take and communicate a clear position.

The concept of blurring is based on the idea that in a multi-dimensional setting, “political competition is not merely a struggle over where a party stands” (Rovny 2012: 272) but rather

a competition over the issues or the dimensions that shape politics (e.g. Hobolt and de Vries 2015). According to Rovny, parties are well-advised to take a more pronounced stance on issues which are usually shared unequivocally by a party's core constituency but to de-emphasize a dimension or blur their positions on issues where they face a divided electorate – as most prominently radical right parties are thought to do concerning the economy and the welfare state. Clearly, radical right parties attract voters on the basis of their particularistic stance on the socio-cultural axis of political competition. Hence, their electorate is united when it comes to issues such as opposition to immigration, integration, or globalization. However, their electoral strongholds of rather state-interventionist working class constituents and the more pro-market small business owners disagree strongly on the economic dimension (Oesch and Rennwald 2018; Ivarsflaten 2005b; Evans 2005). Unsurprisingly, Rovny (2013) and Rovny and Polk (2019), thus, find that indeed, radical right parties engage in position-blurring by deliberately avoiding precise economic placement. Thus, they either de-emphasize economic issues altogether or present “vague, contradictory, or ambiguous positions” (Rovny 2013; Elias *et al.* 2015). Furthermore, although they do not explicitly call it blurring, other authors show plenty of evidence that radical right parties hold ambiguous economic positions (Rathgeb 2019; Mudde 2007), or that radical right parties' welfare stances change over the election cycle (Afonso 2015). Summarizing, current literature tends to describe economic and welfare stances of radical right parties as either rather moderate or even as blurry.

2.2. The Second Dimension of Welfare Politics

Welfare state politics – traditionally seen as one of the main issues of the economic dimension – have fundamentally transformed over the last decades. Structural changes have had lasting effects on both citizens' demand for social protection and elites' leeway to provide the coverage demanded. These structural changes came in the form of the rise of the service sector, educational expansion, demographic changes, and altered family structures which in a highly interrelated way affected demand and supply side of social policy alike. The Great Recession further intensified and accelerated these impacts. The consequences for citizens' demand for social policy are two-fold. First, general support for the welfare state has risen. This is mainly due to altered preferences among the middle classes. The literature has proposed several mechanisms explaining this shift, ranging from positive feedback (Pierson 1993; Svallfors 1997) to more specific factors such as universalism (Korpi and Palme 1998), skill specificity (Iversen and Soskice 2001), specific risks the middle class is not being spared from (Häusermann *et al.* 2015; Jensen 2012; Rehm 2016), or the spread of egalitarian values among the new middle class (Beramendi *et al.* 2015a; Kitschelt 1994). Empirically, it has

been shown elsewhere that a majority of voters is principally sympathetic to social policy expansion while cutbacks face tremendous opposition (Busemeyer and Neimanns 2017; Kölln and Wlezien 2016; Garritzmann *et al.* 2018b; Häusermann *et al.* 2019b; Bremer 2018).

Second, due to structural changes and thereby the emergence of new social risks, needs for social policy has increased. This means, as we argue, that voters need to prioritize different types of welfare provision (Häusermann *et al.* 2019c), or in simpler terms, that voters prefer spending in some area over spending in another area. Moreover, increased financial constraints in times of "permanent austerity" (Pierson 1998) mean that expansions come either at the cost of cutbacks elsewhere, higher taxes, or public debt. Hence, trade-offs have become crucial in policy-making (Stephens *et al.* 1999; Häusermann *et al.* 2019b; Bremer 2018; Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2017, Bremer and Bürgisser 2018). This paradigm of austerity which started in the 1990s was reinforced by the Eurozone crisis culminating in 2010. As a consequence, even in European countries that were spared from undertaking massive fiscal consolidation, the context of distributive politics is constraint by budgetary limits. Welfare state politics have become a "zero-sum game" (Häusermann 2010) and voters are aware of these hard choices¹. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that people have different policy priorities and thus different preferences for the type of welfare state they support. This limited leeway is also precisely the reason why priorities become more important. Reforming the welfare state most likely happens within the welfare state, meaning that resources are rather reallocated than increased.

The most established way of thinking about the conflict concerning what the welfare state should do is the social investment paradigm (Beramendi *et al.* 2015a; Hemerijck 2013; Morel *et al.* 2012). The logic of social investment policies differs from "passive" or "consumptive" social policies in that they aim at "*creating, mobilizing, or preserving skills*" (Garritzmann *et al.* 2017: 37) in order to support citizens' earnings capacity. The most typical examples for social investment policies are childcare, tertiary education, and active labour market measures. Social consumption policies on the other hand include measures such as old age pensions or unemployment benefits. While variables such as left-right ideology, income, or gender may explain support for either of the two, it is a different set of variables that has explanatory power when investment comes at the cost of consumption, hence, when we include trade-offs. Busemeyer and Garritzmann (2017) show that being in education or not

¹ The "welfarepriorities"-data also used in parts of this paper reveals that two-thirds of a total sample of 12'500 respondents in eight Western European countries think that social policy improvements for some group come at the expense of other groups. And at the same time, no less than 80 per cent state that the limits of taxation have been reached.

being retired affect priorities in favour of investment. When it comes to social values, economic leftism predicts support for both consumption and investment, while traditional socio-cultural values are associated with consumption and progressive socio-cultural values point towards a more investment oriented focus (Garritzmann *et al.* 2018a). From this follows that, central for this paper, social investment policies not only differ in their logic, but also in the way that conflict around them is structured. While the middle class has partly moved towards the working class when it comes to general support for social policy, such convergence is clearly absent when we look at investment-consumption priorities where the higher educated and culturally more liberal middle class is more favourable to social investment (Häusermann *et al.* 2019c, 2019b; Garritzmann *et al.* 2018b).

Summarizing, the conflict over the recalibration of the welfare state is masked if we focus on general support for the welfare state only. Conflict over the size of the welfare state is different from conflict over social investment vs. consumption priorities. Therefore, when studying welfare politics, it is reasonable to capture social policy preferences also through actors' priorities (may it be individuals, class, or parties) rather than only through their positions. Only recently research has begun to focus on studying voters' priorities (Gallego and Marx 2017; Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2017; Häusermann *et al.* 2019c, 2019b; Bremer and Bürgisser 2018; Pinggera 2019) and its consequences for party politics (Häusermann 2018; Abou- Chadi and Immergut 2019; Green-Pedersen and Jensen 2019; Pinggera 2019).

2.3. Radical Right Voters in Two-dimensional Welfare-Politics

For many decades the working class has been the core constituency of the left and upper and middle classes have lent their support predominantly to conservative, liberal or Christian-democratic parties. However, it is uncontested that these traditional voter-party links and loyalties have loosened while a large amount of research argues that socio-structural transformations in post-industrial societies, the emergence of new party families and the increasing salience of issues such as immigration or supranational integration have led to the emergence of new ties between parties and classes. Most notably, the working class has become the backbone of support for the radical right (Rydgren 2012; Oesch 2008; Bornschieer and Kriesi 2012). In contrast, the well-educated, salaried middle class, especially professionals working in health, education, welfare or the media sector – so called sociocultural professionals – have become the preserve of Left parties in most West European countries (Oesch and Rennwald 2018). More traditional parts of the middle class, most prominently small business owners are, however, a “contested stronghold” of the centre-right

(due to their economic right-wing preferences) but are (mostly due to their scepticism of immigration and integration) also attracted to the radical right. Nevertheless, due to the limited class size of small business owners in most countries, the proletarianization of the radical right (Bornschiefer 2010) has resulted in their largest vote potential lying within the working class.

This proletarianization has implications for radical right parties' positioning on the economic dimension. As mentioned in Chapter 2.1 the increasing share of working class voters has led them to move towards the centre or "blur" their stances on economic issues. The preferences on this general economic dimension are closely intertwined with social policy preferences. Left-wing, state-interventionist economic preferences as mostly held by the working class are reflected in extensive support for social policy benefits and services. Right-wing, market-oriented economic preferences as typically found among small business owners are reflected in scepticism towards expansive social policy and concerns about public spending. Hence, the preference distribution of the constituency of radical right parties on the general economic dimension is mirrored on the more specific welfare state size dimension. Hence, in line with the literature reporting strategic blurring of radical right parties (Rovny 2013, Rovny and Polk 2019), the same is to be expected regarding welfare state generosity. In order to please the working classes' demand for protection without jeopardizing their middle-class voters' aversion of state-intervention, radical right parties are expected to strategically blur their position.

The situation is somewhat different for the second dimension of welfare politics, however. Rather than on the size or generosity of the welfare state, here, conflict is about whether it is more urgent to expand social investment or consumption policies. Put differently, how should the welfare state be recalibrated, towards whose needs should it be catered, and what goals should it pursue? The aforementioned proletarianization of the electorate of the radical right affects the median partisans' placement on this dimension as well. Support for consumption over social investment is particularly strong among the working class for multiple reasons. First, consumption policies such as old age pension or unemployment benefits materialize immediately whereas investments into education or childcare pay off only in the future. Hence, a lack of material resources makes prioritizing investment over consumption very unlikely since the investment comes at the cost of decreased immediate income. Second, the willingness to invest into the future may depend on the economic outlook and one's own economic or social opportunities (Häusermann *et al.* 2019c). If the chances of being in stable employment and having a secure, fulfilled life are considered to be low, investment may seem

pointless. Third, and closely related to the former point, despite their universal nature, social investment policies may rather benefit middle- and upper classes. It has been shown that such “Matthew effects” indeed exist: lower classes seem to know less well how to make use of investing policies such as childcare or labour market reintegration measures (Pavolini and Van Lancker 2018; Bonoli and Liechti 2018).

While the proletarianization of the radical right has increased the share of radical right voters who embrace consumptive social policy for self-interested reasons, we contend that even before that proletarianization and beyond self-interest reasons there exists a link between support for the radical right and preferences to prefer consumption over investment. Beramendi *et al.* (2015b), for instance, postulate the existence of a nexus between the second non-economic dimension of political conflict and emphasis on investment and consumption because of an inherent logical connection between universalism and social investment as well as particularism and consumption. First empirical examinations support such a correlation between particularistic and anti-investment attitudes among the electorate (Garritzmann *et al.* 2018a; Häusermann *et al.* 2019c). The radical right has positioned itself unmistakably as the clear pole on this second, non-economic dimension and has benefitted electorally from defending particularistic values. The existence of such a nexus between the non-economic and the welfare recalibration dimension would lend further credence to our argument that radical right electorates are situated at the consumptive pole of the recalibration dimension and that emphasizing these priorities might be a strategically sensible choice for radical right parties.

There exist good reasons why a prioritization of consumption over investment fits in with the particularistic positions of radical right parties and their voters. First, the stabilizing character of consumption-oriented social policies that promote rather than challenge traditional gender roles and the male breadwinner model should find an echo in culturally conservative attitudes. Second, consumption policies are much more easily targetable towards specific groups that are perceived as being most deserving of welfare benefits. Pension systems, for example, can be arranged in a way to reward “hard-working”, native men but to exclude labour-market outsiders or immigrants. Social investment policies such as education or childcare have the explicit goal to increase equality of opportunity and are therefore universal in nature and much harder to target. Rather are, on the one hand, the beneficiaries of social investment policies more difficult to detect since investment policies take some time to pay off. On the other hand, social investment policies tend to benefit groups over-proportionally which the radical right would like to exclude or at least reduce from the pool of welfare recipients such as non-traditional workers and immigrants (Fenger 2018; Ennser- Jedenastik 2018).

Lastly, previous research has highlighted the importance of trust in government and political institutions as a vital factor in predicting support for social investment. Since social investment measures can be expected to pay off only in the long-term and are fraught with considerably more uncertainties than known and existing consumption policies, trust in political agents is essential for supporting social investment measures (Garritzmann *et al.* 2018b). Radical right parties, which usually have a strong populist component, however, frequently campaign on an anti-establishment platform that subverts citizens' trust in politics and political elites. Concomitant with that, radical right parties are especially successful in mobilizing and attracting voters that have a low level of trust in politics, politicians and political institutions (Bélanger and Aarts 2006; Söderlund and Kestilä-Kekkonen 2009). Following from that, voters of radical right parties should be less likely to embrace social investment.

To summarize, there are several theoretical expectations that lead us to expect that there exists a relationship between particularistic attitudes and a prioritization of consumption over investment (that have been shown empirically in Häusermann *et al.* (2019c)). This leads us to expect that radical right voters take up a quite clear position on what they want the welfare state to do. This expectation is largely confirmed in our data. Figure 1 relies on data from the “welfarepriorities” project to show the aggregated welfare state preferences of voters of different party families within the two-dimensional space we propose as the accurate depiction of current welfare politics². The values indicate the aggregated position as deviation from the respective country mean on the welfare state size dimension³ and aggregated priorities as deviation from the country mean on the welfare state recalibration dimension⁴.

² Original online-survey among 12'500 respondents in Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, Ireland, Spain and Italy fielded in the fall of 2018. See “Data & Methods” section for detailed information on the survey.

³ Mean of answers given to: “The government should ...” (1) “... increase old age pension benefits”, (2) “... increase the availability of good-quality childcare services”, (3) “... expand access to good-quality university education for students from lower-income families”, (4) “... increase unemployment benefits”, (5) “... expand services that help reintegrate the long-term unemployed into the labour market” & “Social benefits and services in [COUNTRY] place too great a strain on the economy”.

⁴ “Now imagine that the government had the means to improve benefits in some social policy fields, but not in all of them. You can allocate 100 points. Give more points to those fields in which you consider benefit improvement more important, and fewer points to those areas in which you consider benefit improvement less important.”: (1) old age pensions, (2) childcare, (3) university education, (4) unemployment benefits, (5) labour market reintegration services. Mean of share of points given to 2+3+5.




Figure 1. Preferences of Party Electorates Regarding Welfare State Size and Welfare State Recalibration

On the welfare state size dimension, we find – as expected – a clear left-right divide. The voters of the three left party families demand a decidedly larger welfare state than voters of right parties. Within the left block, radical left voters are more staunchly in favour of welfare state expansion than green and especially social democratic voters. More interesting, though, is the differentiation within the right block. The most critical electorate of welfare expansion does not belong to the radical right – as was the assumption of the traditional “winning formula” argument (Kitschelt and McGann 1997) – but to voters of conservative and liberal parties. Rather our results point to the fact that aggregated radical right voters have rather centrist positions concerning welfare state size. Presumably, this centrist position results from diverging preferences of their two electoral strongholds: small-business owners as well as the working class (Oesch and Rennwald 2018). While these old middle-class constituencies are decidedly critical of further welfare expansion, the working class contains the most fervent supporters of further welfare expansion. The rather centrist aggregate position might be a result of these contrasting positions balancing out one another.

On the recalibration dimension which depicts what kind of a welfare state rather than how much welfare one prefers, the picture looks entirely different, thus, justifying distinguishing between the two dimensions. The pole prioritizing a recalibration from traditional

consumptive to a more investment-oriented welfare state is occupied by voters of green and liberal parties which might not be surprising in light of these parties' class basis in which the highly educated middle class is clearly overrepresented. Much more vague preferences (at least on average) display voters of conservative and the remaining left party families. These electorates that especially in the case of social democratic and radical left parties consists of both middle and working class voters are either very heterogeneous with respect to their prioritization of different social policies or have unclear priorities because in the case of the left voters they presumably want both investment and consumption without deciding against one or the other. Most important for this paper is the position of radical right voters. They constitute the clear and exclusive pole in favour of prioritizing consumption such as pensions over policies such as childcare or education. As illustrated by the confidence intervals, their preference for consumption policies is statistically distinct from the preferences of all other electorates. If the voters of radical right parties want any social policy at all, they clearly prefer traditional, insuring policies.

What do these positions of electorates mean for the behaviour and especially the positioning of parties? We would expect that parties try to position themselves in accordance with their actual and potential electorate in order to maximize their vote share. If their electorate has heterogeneous preferences, parties have incentives to blur their stances on this issue by being ambiguous, vague or by de-emphasizing the issue. We show that radical right electorates have a centrist position and we know from previous literature that this centrist position is a result from their heterogeneous electorate where the working class pulls them to the left while middle class constituents keep them on the right. Therefore, we expect radical right parties in accordance with previous literature, especially Rovny (2013) and Rovny and Polk (2019), to have incentives to blur their position on welfare state size that is an important part of the classic economic dimension.

Hypothesis 1: Radical right parties blur their position on welfare state size.

However, we contend that in light of radical right voters' clear position on the recalibration dimension, radical right parties have no incentive to conceal their recalibration priorities. While all other party families might fear to alienate substantial shares of their voters by clearly prioritizing consumption over investment, a pro-consumption stance might be a unique feature of the radical right and thereby a selling point to mobilize voters concerned simultaneously about a preservation of their pensions (among other consumption policies) but opposed to the expansion of social investment policies. Therefore, we expect radical right

parties to not at all blur their stances on the recalibration dimension and to be perceived as a clear force preserving the traditional, consumptive focus of the welfare state.

Hypothesis 2: Radical right parties take a clear pro-consumption stance on the recalibration dimension.

Hypothesis 3: Radical right parties' clear consumption stance resonates with voters' party perceptions.

3. Data & Methods

We use data from two sources to assess parties' blurring strategies, citizens' perceptions of these strategies and the social policy preferences of party electorates. Data for parties comes from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), while data for citizens and electorates is provided by the "welfarepriorities" project (Häusermann *et al.* 2019a). Thereby, we are able to combine data for 31 parties in 5 countries (Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and United Kingdom). Data on citizens were collected between October and December 2018, while the data for parties comes out of the latest national election manifestos available (2017 for Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, 2018 for Italy and Sweden)⁵. The case selection therefore consists of a diverse set of radical right parties situated in different welfare state regimes. While some of the radical right parties under study hold rather right-wing economic stances, such as the Alternative for Germany (AFD) or the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), others are characterized by more welfare-friendly positions, such as the Sweden Democrats (SD). Both the Italian League (LN) and the Dutch Party of Freedom (PVV) are to be found in-between. Hence, while they are unified in their attempt to limit access to benefits and services by taking welfare chauvinist stances, not all of them are a threat to welfare state generosity per se (Goerres *et al.* 2018; Otjes *et al.* 2018; Jungar and Jupskås 2014; Afonso 2015; Rydgren 2005; Nordensvard and Ketola 2015). Moreover, they considerably differ in their level of power or relevancy. While some have continuously been in opposition (AFD, SD, UKIP), others have been part of (centre-)right governments (LN, PVV). Nonetheless, despite differences all of these radical right parties face similar strategic considerations and, as we will show, come to very similar decisions in terms of position-taking and position-blurring.

⁵ There are four exceptions, though. The latest available manifestos of the Italian FDI and FI, the Dutch PVV, and the Green Party of England and Wales are very short and contain less than 300 quasi-sentences (compared to a median of about 1500 quasi-sentences among the other used manifestos). In order not to get biased results due to the brevity of these manifestos, for these four parties we use their second newest and longer manifesto (2013 for the FDI, 547 quasi-sentences; 2013 for the FI (PdL), 236 quasi-sentences; 2012 for the PVV, 927 quasi-sentences; 2015 for the Green Party of England and Wales, 2379 quasi-sentences).

In order to identify the degree to which radical right parties blur their position or take a clear stance when it comes to welfare politics, our dependent variable, we use data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens *et al.* 2018). The project provides easy access to election manifestos of political parties that have been split into single statements, so-called quasi-sentences. According to a coding scheme, each of these statements have been assigned to a CMP-category, such as, for instance, “Welfare State Expansion”. However, as we have outlined extensively in the preceding chapters, today’s welfare state politics is not only about the extent of expansion, but also about recalibration. Hence, we need to have a measure of parties’ claims for specific social investment and social consumption policies. Put differently, we need a more fine-grained measure of issue emphasis that allows us to disentangle statements in favour of (or against) welfare state expansion (or limitation) into more specific statements regarding social investment and social consumption. For this reason, we have created a coding scheme that was applied to a subset of the statements in party manifestos. This subset includes all manifesto categories that potentially include statements regarding social policy (“Welfare State Limitation”, “Education Expansion”, “Education Limitation”, “Equality: Positive”, “Technology and Infrastructure”, and “Labour Groups: Positive”). These categories were chosen because they have shown to be likely to include statements on social policy. More specifically, most statements on active labour market policies have been coded into “Labour Groups: Positive” and would therefore have been overlooked by only including the welfare state and education categories. On this subset, we then apply our coding scheme consisting of the following steps.

First, we ask whether a statement is actually about social policy. Although some statements may fall into the Manifesto project's welfare state categories, they do not necessarily mention or imply the need for social policy, but are rather vacuous phrases or general facts that we do not want to interpret as claims for welfare state expansion (or limitation). Moreover, for this type of analysis we were not interested in statements only addressing revenues but not expenditures (e.g. taxation). Hence, mentioning or implying social policy as well as addressing the expenditure side were the two necessary conditions for a statement to be considered further in our coding. Second, for each statement addressing social policy, we are interested in whether a statement mentions a specific policy (or reform proposal) or implies action in a clearly identifiable policy field. Thereafter, the third step specifies the respective policy field that is addressed in the statement. Each of those quasi-sentences was thus classified into one of the following policy fields: old age pensions, unemployment benefits, social assistance, (passive) family policy, healthcare, early childhood education and care

(ecec), tertiary education, education (neither ecec nor tertiary, including primary, secondary, vocational or further education), and active labour market policies (almp). Statements not referring to one of these policy fields were coded as other (e.g. housing, disability). Note that one statement can speak to as many as three policy fields. The statements can then be assigned to either social investment (ecec, education, tertiary education, almp) or social consumption (pension, unemployment benefits, social assistance, (passive) family policy, and healthcare) dependent on the policy field it speaks to. If a statement addresses exactly one investment and one consumption field, the category “ambiguous” can be assigned. Lastly, we code whether the direction of the statement is positive (i.e. expanding, increasing, spending more), negative (i.e. retrenching, decreasing, spending less), or neither.

On average the manifestos from 31 parties in five countries include 1584 statements in total, 479 (30%) are to be found in the subset that we applied our coding scheme on, and 173 (11%) statements actually mention or imply policy action in at least one specific social policy field and could therefore be classified as statements regarding social investment or social consumption. These numbers of course vary considerably between countries and parties.

Using this data, we operationalize blurring and position-taking respectively on the two dimensions of welfare politics in the following way. On the welfare state size dimension, we take a party’s share of positive statements towards the welfare state (as share of all statements). Note that our measure of blurring by radical right parties is a relative measure comparing the share of positive welfare statements by radical right parties to the share of positive statements by other parties. We include all statements that were coded as “social policy” in the first step of the coding procedure and that are formulated in a positive sentiment as coded in the last step of the procedure. We limit ourselves to positive sentiments, i.e. statements implying or demanding welfare state expansion since claims to retrench the welfare state feature only very rarely in election manifestos. The only of our 31 parties which speaks reasonably extensively about welfare retrenchment are the Swedish Moderates, which devote about 14% of their statements about the welfare state to cutbacks, making it about 3% of the manifesto in total. On average, however, merely 4% of all welfare statements refer to retrenchment with 87% referring to expansion (and the remaining 9% not clearly attributable). This is not very surprising since – although as we show differences exist in the degree – the level of public support for the welfare state in West European countries is generally high with opposition to retrenching existing benefits even greater. Therefore, even for parties which are rather opposed to generous social policy, it is not reasonable to campaign on a welfare retrenchment platform, especially since attracting attention to cutbacks is what makes

retrenchment electorally dangerous (Armingeon and Giger 2008). Rather, welfare sceptical parties broach retrenchment not directly but frame it in terms of the need for lower taxes. Therefore, the only option for parties to strategically blur their welfare state size position is to de-emphasize this issue. By keeping the salience of this dimension low, they limit the risks to alleviate parts of their electorate.

On the recalibration dimension, we are interested in whether radical right parties take a clear social consumption (as expected), a clear social investment profile, or whether they are more ambiguous and their position remains blurry. Ambiguity would thus result from a situation in which a party talks as much about investment as it talks about consumption. More specifically, we take the number of positive statements on social investment and negative statements on social consumption as a share of all (positive and negative) statements on either of the two. In order to bring this index on a scale from 0 to 1 where 0 stands for fully prioritizing consumption, 1 for fully prioritizing investment, and 0.5 for an ambiguous or blurred stance, our index for the recalibration profile is computed as follows:

$$\text{Recalibration Profile} = \frac{SI\ pos + CONS\ neg}{SI\ pos + SI\ neg + CONS\ pos + CONS\ neg}$$

A different set of data has been used to measure parties' recalibration profile through citizen's perceptions as well as for the positioning of party electorates as shown in Figure 1 above. We use original data from an online survey conducted in the context of the ERC-project "welfarepriorities". Data was collected between October and December 2018 in totally eight Western European countries (of which only the above-mentioned five countries were included here: Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, UK) with 1500 respondents in each country (see Häusermann *et al.* 2019c for more detailed information on the dataset).

Additionally, to a wide range of items capturing social policy positions as well as priorities (as used for figure 1 above), the survey includes questions that ask respondents to evaluate parties' welfare state recalibration profile. More specifically, respondents were asked how they think a given party X would prioritize social policy spending to different policy fields. To answer this question, they were given 100 points to distribute to six social policy fields in the way they would expect party X to prioritize these expenditures⁶. We have included the

⁶ In which of the following areas do you think the [party X] would prioritise improvements of social benefits? You can allocate 100 points. Give more points to those areas in which you think the [party X] would prioritise improvements and fewer points to those areas where you think the [party X] would deem improvements less important: A) Old age pensions, B) Childcare, C) University education, D) Unemployment benefits, E) Labour market reintegration services, F) Services for the social and labour market integration of immigrants.

most relevant and contested policies of both social investment (childcare, tertiary education, active labour market policies) and consumption (old age pensions, unemployment benefits). We then compute a recalibration score which is simply the number of points given to social investment fields as a share of the points given to all the five fields included. The higher the score, the more an individual perceives a given party to be pro-investment. For each party we then aggregate (by taking a weighted mean) the answers given. Again, parties with a higher mean are thus perceived as being pro-social investment, parties with a lower mean are perceived as being pro-social consumption. Parties with a mean somewhere in the middle are perceived to have an ambiguous and blurry investment-consumption profile. Note that while we measure blurring as a strategy when we look at manifestos, the analysis of voters' perceptions is rather a measure of the outcome of blurring, namely voters being unable to assign clear positions. We think that this is an interesting extension to the more straightforward operationalization that we apply using the manifestos.

4. Results

We first show how radical right parties position themselves relative to other party families on both the welfare state size and on the recalibration dimension in their election manifestos. Electoral manifestos do not only reflect unbiased communication by the party but are also written specifically for a public audience (Bräuninger and Giger 2018). Thus, what is written in the manifesto reflects how a party wants to present its positions and how it wants them to be perceived. In a second step we turn to how parties are actually perceived by the public.

Figures 2 and 3 show how the six party families under scrutiny position themselves on the welfare state size dimension (Figure 2) and the recalibration dimension (Figure 3). For these graphs we aggregate the positions from five radical right parties (AFD, LN, PVV, SD, and UKIP), six conservative parties (CDU/CSU, FI, FDI, CDA, M, UK Conservatives), six liberal parties (FDP, D66, VVD, C, L, LibDem), one green party in each country except Italy, four radical left parties (German Left, LeU, SP, V) and five social democratic parties (SPD, PD, PVDA, SAP, Labour UK)⁷. Since not all party families are represented with a reasonably strong and important party in each of the countries and since country differences are substantial (for example with parties in the UK devoting much more space to welfare politics than parties in Germany or the Netherlands), we aggregate differences to country means rather than absolute values in order to prevent a bias due to the different representation of party families in the countries. Therefore, values of 0 mean that a party family on average

⁷ Find a summary table on all included parties in the appendix.

occupies a position which corresponds to the country means on the welfare state dimension (Figure 2) or the investment/consumption dimension (Figure 3). Positive (negative) values indicate that a party family puts more (less) emphasis on a large welfare state (Figure 2) and prioritizes investment (consumption) more than the other parties (Figure 3).




Figure 2. Emphasis of the different party families on welfare expansion based on their election manifestos

As stated in hypothesis 1, we expect radical right parties to blur their emphasis on the welfare state size dimension which would mean that they de-emphasize the issue. Figure 2 confirms these expectations. Of all party families, the radical right parties in their election manifestos devote least attention to social policy. Evidently, they avoid speaking about social policy too much. Even parties with constituencies that are less dispersed and overall more sceptical of social policy expansion, such as the liberals or the conservatives, put more emphasis on social policy. However, we claim that the de-emphasizing of radical right parties is due to a very different reason than the de-emphasizing by centre-right parties. Centre-right parties do not face electoral trade-offs since their constituency is quite uniformly sceptical of social policy expansion (as shown in Figure 1), and therefore not emphasizing social policy is simply a reflection of rejecting further expansion. Contrary, de-emphasizing by radical right parties should be understood as strategically downplaying the relative importance of economic issues as a reaction to their constituency which is divided in their economic preferences. These considerations are backed by existing findings on position-blurring of the radical right (Rovny 2013, Rovny and Polk 2019).

Not surprisingly, on the other side of the spectrum we find social democratic and radical left parties devoting larger shares of their manifestos to issues of social policy. In line with their in this regard very homogenous electorate, they are the strongest proponents of a generous welfare state. Contrary, green parties usually counted as part of the left camp show substantially less enthusiasm about welfare state expansion in their electoral manifestos.

As figure A1 in the appendix shows, this finding holds for most countries. The AFD in Germany, the PVV in the Netherlands, and the UKIP in the UK each devote the lowest share of their electoral manifestos to social policy. Similarly, in Italy, the LN, together with the centre-right parties emphasize social policy issues much less than the centre-left parties. However, the Five Star Movement (M5S) de-emphasizes social policy even more, which is fairly surprising, since research has indicated that they represent the electorates' demand for social security and state intervention rather well (Conti and Memoli 2015). Somewhat different is the picture for Sweden. While also there we find the left on the strong emphasis pole and the centre-right on the opposite, the placement of the SD is located towards the centre. This confirms existing evidence that, contrary to other European radical right parties, they do not question the welfare state per se (Nordensvard and Ketola 2015) and that supporting a large welfare state has become a strategic policy tool in Scandinavian countries where a strong welfare state is deeply rooted in national identity (Kuisma and Nygard 2019).




Figure 3. Positioning of the different party families on recalibration dimension based on their election manifestos

In line with recent findings, radical right parties seem to blur their position with regard to typical economic issues such as welfare state generosity. However, we claim that even though

they avoid putting too much emphasis on social policy, radical right parties do take a very clear stance on what type of social policies they prefer, namely consumption policies. Figure 3 provides evidence in favour of this expectation. By far, radical right parties reveal the highest share of statements in favour of consumption (relative to social investment). This is very much in line with the preferences of their constituency which is united with regard to the types of social policies they prefer. Hence, even though the salience of social policy issues is strategically kept low, radical right parties present themselves as the strongest preservers of a traditional, consumptive welfare state and as the fiercest opponents of a recalibration of the welfare state. While previous research has convincingly shown that the economic position of radical right parties is ambiguous and that they blur their stances, our findings support these assertions with regard to the question how much welfare state they press for but not concerning what kind of a welfare state they prefer. Overall, this finding thus mitigates the “blurriness” of radical right parties’ economic position.

The opposite pro-investment pole is occupied by the parties that first and foremost cater to middle class voters which are in turn much more positive with regard to social investment, namely the liberals, the conservatives, and the greens. Faced with vertical cross-class coalitions, the social democrats and the radical left parties have to cater to groups in their constituency that have quite distinct preferences when it comes to social investment and consumption priorities. For social democratic parties, we find that they employ a broad appeal strategy: they promise to expand both social investment as well as consumption policies in their manifesto but do not make it clear – if in government and confronted with limited resources – which welfare policies they would promote. Social democratic parties, hence, engage in blurring their recalibration profile. The findings are similar but somewhat less pronounced for radical left parties. Rather than blurring whether they would prefer the social investment paradigm to prevail or not, radical left parties tend to somewhat prioritize consumption policies such as pensions and unemployment benefits. Thus, they cater more strongly to the wishes of their working-class than their middle-class constituency.




Figure 4. Positioning of parties on recalibration dimension based on their election manifestos, by country

To go deeper into the findings, Figure 4 disaggregates the evidence in Figure 3 by country. On the y-axis in Figure 4, the share of positive statements towards social investment and consumption (minus the few negative statements) is shown (thus a scale from 0 to 1) with the vertical line at the value 0.5 indicating that a party attributes as many positive statements to social investment as to consumption. Here, we see that in all countries there are both parties that prioritize investment and parties that prioritize consumption in their electoral manifesto. Moreover, the findings of the total sample replicate in all countries studied. Whether we look at the AFD in Germany, the LN in Italy, the PVV in the Netherlands, the SD in Sweden, or the UKIP in the UK, in every country it is the radical right party that constitutes the consumptive pole. They are represented with around a third or less of positive mentions about the welfare state directed towards social investment by each party. Likewise, the opposite pole is occupied by either green or liberal parties in all countries with the exception of Italy (where there are no relevant green or liberal parties). With regard to social democratic parties, the findings also hold within the individual countries. In all contexts, they devote about as much of their attention to social investment as to consumption, finding themselves in the middle of the spectrum with ambiguous priorities. Further, we see that the slight tendency towards the working class part of the constituency that we find for radical left parties on the aggregate level, is mainly driven by the German representative. Radical left parties in Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden have rather blurry profiles. One explanation for this is suggested by the evidence that voting for the radical left in Germany is very strongly linked to economic deprivation rather than education (which is the stronger predictor of social investment preferences) (Bowyer and Vail 2011), maybe more so than in other countries.

Electoral manifestos might be a particularly well-suited place for parties to blur their positions since they themselves can decide what they want to talk about and how. While we cannot directly observe their communication and behaviour in other situations, investigating how parties are perceived to position themselves on the recalibration dimension of welfare politics indirectly measures parties' behaviour. This supporting evidence allows us to confirm whether parties' statements in electoral manifestos are an accurate representation of their communication in general. Moreover, with regard to the radical right we have observed above that they indeed present a clear preference for consumption over social investment. However, we have also discovered that in order to de-emphasize the first dimension of welfare politics, radical right parties are rather reserved to talk about welfare politics in the first place. Therefore, the question begs whether their pronounced sympathy for consumption over investment is heard by voters and comes across to the public. Looking at voters' perceptions helps to assess this question




Figure 5. Perceptions of party positioning on the recalibration dimension (social investment vs. consumption), aggregated by party family

Looking at Figure 5 it appears like public perceptions of parties' positions conform surprisingly well to parties' communication in manifestos. It aggregates the positions on the recalibration dimension by party family and reinforces our findings from the manifestos. Again, the liberal, green, and more moderately conservative party families occupy the investment pole. For social democratic parties the voters are less sure whether they would advance a recalibration of the welfare state or preserve income-replacing schemes. This might very well be due to these parties presenting a welfare program that demands both investment and consumption equally thereby staying ambiguous on what they would prioritize if forced to do so, something that is supported by our analysis of election manifestos. Radical left

parties are perceived even more strongly to prioritize consumptive policies than they present themselves in election manifestos. Most importantly for our purposes, however, the consumption pole on the recalibration dimension is ascribed by voters to the radical right party family.

Figure A2 in the appendix shows in each of the five countries how parties' position on the investment-consumption recalibration dimension are assessed on average⁸. Comparing the order of parties on the investment-consumption dimension, these are similar between manifestos and perceptions of parties in at least some countries such as the Netherlands and Germany whereas they differ quite strongly, for example, in Italy. Remaining remarkably consistent across countries is, however, the perceived prioritization of consumptive over investing social policies of radical right parties. The German AFD, the Sweden Democrats and the Dutch PVV all occupy the most extreme position on the recalibration dimension in the perspective of their countries' voters. Only the Italian Lega is placed only second by voters in terms of their consumption profile behind the Five Star Movement which strangely enough has put a lot emphasis on especially education in its manifesto but is – together with its former coalition-partner – apprehended as a force to defend the consumption-oriented focus of the Italian welfare state. The analysis of perceptions shows that despite differences in the size, historical origin, institutional embeddedness in the party system and even certain differences in their social policy agendas (Fenger 2018), all radical right parties under scrutiny are clearly seen as opposing a modernization of the welfare state from consumption to social investment policies. This finding somewhat challenges the view that radical right parties' stances on economic and welfare issues are difficult to grasp for voters. This established view is indeed true concerning positioning on the preferred size of the welfare state. However, when it comes to the goals and operating principles of the welfare state, radical right parties do not only communicate most clearly but are even perceived by the public as communicating most unmistakably what kind of a welfare state they do and do not want.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

In this article we have argued that the welfare state stances of radical right parties are more multifaceted and clearer than previous research would assume. Our point ensues from the argument that the main conflict about welfare politics is no longer only about the size of the welfare state but also about what the welfare state should do (invest in human skills or

⁸ Note that not all parties of which we have coded the manifestos were presented to voters to be evaluated. Most importantly, we lack evaluations of UKIP which sank into near insignificance before we were conducting our survey in fall 2018.

substitute income). We propose based on recent arguments from the welfare state literature that preferences on this second (what we call recalibration) dimension of welfare politics are structured differently from preferences about welfare state size and redistribution. As a result of that, parties have very different incentives on how to behave and how to position themselves on this recalibration dimension, leading to an entirely different conflict structure than one might expect economic issues. Specifically, this dimension opposing priorities for investment and consumption complicates the position of especially social democratic parties that we find to not clearly state what kind of a welfare state they would prefer if forced to choose, potentially in order not to antagonize one of their core constituencies of working class voters and socio-cultural professionals that seem to agree on the need of a big welfare state but not on its primary goals and operating principles.

However, our findings of five West European countries based on original coding of electoral manifestos and on novel survey data about voters' perceptions of party positions in welfare politics show the most intriguing results for radical right parties. While radical right parties speak of all parties least about the welfare state in their electoral manifestos, thereby possibly attempting to de-emphasize the issue, they state clearly which social policies they like most or dislike least, namely consumptive policies such as most prominently pensions. Not only do radical right parties clearly state this priority but despite staying most silent on welfare issues, voters seem to know radical right parties' priorities and assess them correctly. This clear positioning of radical right parties on the recalibration dimension does not come out of nowhere and is less surprising in light of voters' attitudes. Also, on the demand side, radical right voters constitute the clear pole prioritizing consumption over investment. All in all, we affirm (although our measure with CMP data has the limitation that on the size dimension we cannot fully distinguish between de-emphasizing and opposition to the welfare state) the findings of previous research that radical right parties de-emphasize the issue of optimal welfare state size, presumably to neither alienate their more welfare-enthusiastic working class voters nor their more welfare-sceptic middle class constituencies. However, this current appreciation of radical right parties as presenting centrist or even blurry welfare positions in the literature is only half the story.

The finding of radical right voters and radical right parties having clear preferences and providing unambiguous and clearly discernible stances on whose needs the welfare state should cater to and how it should do it portends several implications. First of all, we show that a salience of economic issues in the political debate is not inevitably problematic for radical right parties and their strategic situation is less uncomfortable than previously assumed since

their electorate has unclear preferences only with regard to one dimension but not the other. This becomes even more important in times of fiscal austerity. If the predominant conflict is not (only) about the generosity and size of the welfare state but about which policies should be financed and which not, a high salience of welfare issues might harm rather social democratic parties that are bound to disappoint one part of their electorate – after promising both investment to their middle class and consumption to their working class constituency in electoral manifestos. Radical right parties, in contrast, might capitalize on such a discourse by rallying consumption-oriented voters behind them. This might also help to explain why the increased salience of welfare issues as recently observed during times of economic crises (Traber *et al.* 2018) did not harm radical right parties electorally as much as one could have expected. Second, the clear positioning of radical right parties on what kind of a welfare state they pursue and their increasing relevancy where in some countries they have been part of the government or lent their support to a minority government casts a different light on their role in welfare policy making. Radical right parties might, thus, help the left to expand or at least stabilize consumption policies such as pensions. At the same time, they can be expected to be the most notable opposition to expanding social investment policies such as childcare or tertiary education. Lastly, our article corroborates that the conflict over social investment vs. consumption and what is often termed the second, non-economic dimension is remarkably similar. Not only preferences on the demand side but also the conflict structure on the supply side seem to overlap with green and socially liberal parties at the universalist/social investment pole opposed to radical right parties at the particularistic/consumption pole with especially social democratic parties somehow trapped in the middle.

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7. Appendix

Table A1. Overview of included parties and party family classifications

Country	(English) Party Name	Abbreviation	Party Family
Germany	Alternative for Germany	AFD	Radical Right
	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	CDU/CSU	Conservative
	Free Democratic Party	FDP	Liberal
	Alliance '90/Greens	Greens	Green
	The Left	Left	Radical Left
	Social Democratic Party of Germany	SPD	Social Democratic
Italy	League	LN	Radical Right
	Go Italy	FI	Conservative
	Brothers of Italy	FDI	Conservative
	Free and Equal	LeU	Radical Left
	Democratic Party	PD	Social Democratic
	Five Star Movement	M5S	-
Netherlands	Party of Freedom	PVV	Radical Right
	Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA	Conservative
	Democrats '66	D66	Liberal
	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	VVD	Liberal
	Green Left	GL	Green
	Socialist Party	SP	Radical Left
	Labour Party	PVDA	Social Democratic
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	SD	Radical Right
	Moderate Coalition Party	M	Conservative
	Liberals	L	Liberal
	Centre Party	C	Liberal
	Green Ecology Party	MP	Green
	Left Party	V	Radical Left
	Social Democratic Labour Party	SAP	Social Democratic
United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP	Radical Right
	Conservative Party	Conservatives	Conservative
	Liberal Democrats	LibDem	Liberal
	Green Party of England and Wales	Green Party EW	Green
	Labour Party	Labour	Social Democratic




Figure A1. Emphasis of parties on welfare expansion based on their election manifestos, by country




Figure A2. Perceptions of party positioning on the recalibration dimension (social investment vs. consumption), by country