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How far does solidarity go? Trade union membership and welfare policies for vulnerable social groups

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Abstract:

This working paper addresses the question how trade union membership affects workers' solidarity towards the welfare needs of three vulnerable social groups: the unemployed, immigrants and working mothers. Accounting for the heterogeneity within the trade union movement, the focus is set on potential moderating effects of the membership composition and organizing principle of individual unions or union confederations. Building on the social capital literature as well as recent research by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017; 2020), it is argued that members of encompassing and low-income inclusive unions are more supportive of extending welfare benefits for the three groups than non-members. In contrast, no such effect is expected among members of unions with a more narrow membership base. Novel survey data from the ERC-project *welfarepriorities* allows me to go beyond country-level characteristic of trade union movements and investigate union membership effects more directly than previous research. The results of several binomial logistic regression models clearly confirm the expectations with regard to the unemployed, while the findings for the other two groups are less consistent. Even though the issue of self-selection cannot be solved with the cross-sectional data at hand, additional robustness checks strengthen trust in the findings. The implications of this study are twofold: On the one hand, the widespread membership decline in traditional, vertically organized industrial unions might reduce solidaristic preferences among union members. On the other hand, rising numbers of women among union members might lead to a different kind of solidarity directed at the needs and demands of new social risk groups.

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1. Introduction [1]

Since the 1990s, after the era of welfare expansion has come to an end, welfare politics is often characterized by trade-offs between improvements for some groups in some areas and cutbacks in others (e.g. Häusermann et al. 2019). In this context questions about perceptions of deservingness towards specific groups of beneficiaries and solidarity between social groups are more important than ever.

Solidarity between workers has always been a core value of the trade union movement (Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann 2019) and trade unions, as the core drivers behind the welfare state development of the last century, are generally expected to promote solidaristic, egalitarian preferences among their members (e.g. Macdonald 2019). But how far does solidarity go, which groups does it include and most importantly to what degree is it shaped by specific trade union characteristics? This working paper will try to address these questions by focusing on trade union members' preferences towards welfare policies targeting three different groups of recipients, namely the unemployed, immigrants and working mothers.

While a large number of studies in the field of welfare state research have included trade union membership as a control variable, research that explicitly investigates the effect of trade union membership on attitudes towards the welfare state and its recipients is relatively rare (some exceptions are Arndt 2018; Mosimann and Pontusson 2017, 2020; Yang and Kwon 2019). When it comes to preferences for welfare policies directed at specific vulnerable groups that do not belong to the core clientele of trade unions, existing literature is even harder to find.

Resulting from structural developments of the past decades there is a lot of heterogeneity within the trade union movement and not all unions and their members are necessarily strong supporters of redistributive policies, as traditional power resource theory would suggest. Instead, it seems crucial to take the organizational structure and membership distribution of unions into account since the distribution of factors like income, occupation or gender within the membership of a union is likely to affect its policy

[1] This research paper was submitted and accepted as a MA thesis in spring 2020 at the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich. Prof. Dr. Silja Häusermann acted as main supervisor.

positions and those of its members (see e.g. Arndt 2018; Gordon 2015; Mosimann and Pontusson 2017, 2020; Nijhuis 2009; Pontusson 2013; but also Putnam 2000).

Thus, this working paper will focus on potential moderating effects of membership in more or less encompassing and inclusive trade union confederations, which leads me to the following research question:

> *How is trade union membership related to preferences towards welfare policies targeted at different vulnerable social groups and how does the level of encompassingness and inclusiveness of trade unions affect these relationships?*

To answer this research question, the working paper relies on novel survey data from the ERC-project *welfarepriorities,* which allows me to go beyond country-level characteristic of trade union movements and investigate union membership effects more directly than previous studies. The results of several binomial logistic regression models confirm the core argument of the working paper with regard to the unemployed, while the hypotheses for the other two groups receive less consistent support. However, if inclusiveness is defined in terms of gender rather than income or occupation, the results confirm a solidarity effect for the group of working mothers.

The working paper is structured as follows: In a first step the core argument is developed based on previous literature on union membership effects, welfare preferences and the potential impact of membership distribution and organizing principle. In a second step the individual groups of interest and their relation to the trade union movement are introduced and the hypotheses presented. These steps are followed by the research design, which describes the data and the operationalization of the variables as well as the methodological approach. Finally, the results of the analysis are presented and discussed and some concluding remarks are given.

2. Literature and theory

Early on studies have found an equalizing effect of strong unions on the wage distribution (see e.g. Freeman and Medoff 1984). With this in mind, scholars have tried to learn more about the link between two widely discussed developments of the last decades: the decline of union membership across most of the developed world and the widespread growth in economic disparities. Most scholars agree that the former has been an important driver of the latter (see e.g. Ahlquist 2017). However, the findings of Pontusson

(2013) indicate that this relationship between union density and income inequality has become weaker since the mid-1990s due to changes in the membership composition of union movements. This points to the importance of considering the heterogeneity across trade unions, which will also be at the center of this working paper.

But what are the channels through which unions affect inequality? Essentially there seem to be three main mechanisms: collective bargaining, political mobilization and the promotion of egalitarian attitudes (see e.g. Macdonald 2019). It is the last channel, which has been explored to a lesser extent than the other two, which will be at the centre of this working paper.

2.1 Union membership effects

There is a relatively large strand of literature that has looked at effects of union membership on a variety of economic and to a lesser extent political outcomes. Among the former, especially the effect of union membership on wages and the existence of so-called *union wage premia* has received a lot of attention, particularly in the United States (see e.g. Freeman and Medoff 1984). However, the focus of this working paper will lie on the political effects of being a trade union member. A vast literature has looked at the relationship between trade union membership and political participation. Among others, Gray and Caul (2000) and Radcliff and Davis (2000) have linked the decline in political participation in many Western countries to declining unionization rates. At the micro-level this relationship has been confirmed by Kerrissey and Schofer (2013), who find positive and statistically significant effects of trade union membership on political participation controlling for a range of individual characteristics. These authors often refer to the work of Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) who have argued that union members are more exposed to political discussions and other political activities than non-members and thus develop more civic skills necessary for political participation. Importantly, by mobilizing voters that otherwise often lack the resources and motivation to participate, unions might also have an equalizing effect on political representation (see e.g. Ahlquist 2017).

Another line of research has looked at the effect of trade union membership on party choice. Among them are some studies by Freeman (2003), Leigh (2006) or Parsons (2015) and most recently Arndt and Rennwald (2016). Historically, particularly in Western Europe, trade unions have had close links with social-democratic parties. The

relationship between the two arms of the labor movement has been mutually beneficial with unions mobilizing voters for the parties and receiving political influence in return (Parsons 2015). However, in many countries these close ties have weakened over the past decades due to a number of factors. Most importantly, structural changes led to a decline of industrial work and thus a shrinking class of manual workers, which had been the main constituency of both trade unions and social-democratic parties. While the latter soon started to target their programs more and more to the emerging "new" middle class, unions did not develop in this direction at the same speed, which contributed to the divergence between the two (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2010: 321). In sum, we can expect these developments to affect the electoral choices of trade union members. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned studies show for different national contexts that trade union members still predominantly vote for left-wing social-democratic parties. Comparing trade union members and social-democratic voters over time, a recent study by Häusermann and Mosimann (2018) finds that the two constituencies reveal very similar trends both in terms of socio-demographics as well as attitudinal characteristics, which contradicts the assumption of increasing divergence. In a nutshell, both groups by now represent more middle-class than working-class members, prefer generous welfare policies and support liberal immigration policy to a very similar extent.

What all of the above-mentioned studies, with the exception of Arndt and Rennwald (2016), have in common is that they do not account for the heterogeneity that exists within the trade union movement. Besides the political distinction between communist, socialist, social-democratic and Christian unions, that has existed before, the structural developments mentioned above have led to the emergence of separate white-collar and professional unions alongside the traditional vertically organized blue-collar unions. Importantly, not all of these types of unions share the same ties to social democracy. Arndt and Rennwald (2016) take this diversity into account and do not only confirm trade union members' continued strong support for the left, but also the conditioning effect of union type and structure. Particularly the presence of strong academic/professional confederations, whose affiliates are organized horizontally along occupational lines, increases support for conservative or liberal parties as compared to social democracy. This is also confirmed at the subnational level for the case of Sweden: Members of the professional SACO confederation show less support for social democracy compared to other union members and even non-members.

In order to explain these patterns, Arndt and Rennwald (2016: 704) refer to a line of research that looks at the role of trade unions for redistributive preferences among their membership, which I will turn to now. In a nutshell, these authors argue that dependent trade union characteristics, being member of a union might generate a feeling of solidarity with individuals of different income levels (e.g. Mosimann and Pontusson 2017). This, in turn, should increase their support for parties advocating redistribution, which is the traditional position of left-wing parties.

2.2 Union membership and the welfare state

According the *power resource theory* (PRT), which has for a long time been the dominant explanation of welfare state development, trade unions have played a central role in this process. Based on the theory, mature welfare states as we know them today are largely the product of working-class mobilization by strong trade unions and left-wing parties. In other words, PRT argues that generous and universal welfare states emerged where the combined forces of the left were strong (Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979). However, both the original as well as the newer versions of PRT suggested by Huber and Stephens (2001) or Korpi and Palme (2003) have been criticized for simply assuming that all trade unions and their respective members are inherent proponents of redistribution (see e.g. Gordon 2015; Nijhuis 2009; Pontusson 2013; Yang and Kwon 2019). At the core of this criticism lies the failure of the theory to account for the heterogeneity that exists within the trade union movement.

Despite the criticism of PRT, the important role trade unions have played in the context of the welfare state remains unquestioned. This also becomes apparent when we switch the focus to the individual level. It has repeatedly been shown that trade union membership is an important predictor of individual welfare preferences. Gelissen (2000:14), for example, who defines trade union membership as an "*indicator of moral commitment to the welfare state*", shows that trade union members are clearly more in favor of both extensive (universal) and intensive (generous) welfare states than non-members controlling for relevant socio-demographic as well as attitudinal factors. Similarly, Kitschelt and Rehm (2006) show that union membership is associated with support for higher expenditures in various social policy areas, while several studies have found union members to be significantly more likely to support redistribution than non-members (see e.g. Checchi, Visser, and Van De Werfhorst 2010; Finseraas 2009).

However, more recent literature investigating the union effect on redistributive policies and preferences has come to agree that it is crucial to consider differences between union movements concerning the composition of their membership. Before delving into this literature and the mechanisms they suggest, it seems necessary to first address the two main explanations of welfare policy preferences identified in the literature and the channels through which unions might actually affect their members' welfare preferences.

2.2.1 Explaining welfare policy preferences

Research on the determinants of welfare preferences can be broadly separated into two strands of literature: one argues that material self-interest is the main (and sole) driver of social policy preferences and the other adds values, norms and ideology as important additional factors that need to be considered (see Margalit 2013 for a review of the literature). The former essentially argue that both potential and actual beneficiaries of welfare policies are the most supportive of these programs. These scholars typically focus on people's position in the labor market, their exposure to risks and their financial situation as the main determinants of welfare preferences (e.g. Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006; Rehm 2009, 2011). Rehm (2011), for example, finds strong support for the intuitive argument that unemployment risk and income together strongly predict preferences for the generosity of unemployment benefits. Among the latter line of thought, the emphasis lies on differences in ideological dispositions on issues like fairness, equality, and the role the government should take (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Breznau 2010; Linos and West 2003).[2] The latter approach also includes beliefs about the deservingness of welfare beneficiaries. In short, if a person perceives a group of welfare recipients as deserving, he or she is more likely to support social policies targeted at this group (see e.g. van Oorschot 2006).

Coming back to the context of trade unions, there is little doubt that also the preferences of trade union members are to a large extent self-interested. However, as mentioned above, controlling for income and other relevant factors, union members are still found to be significantly more likely to support redistribution than non-members, which is some evidence that other forces are at play too, which I will explore below.

[2] However, one can think of a number of interactive effects and thus the two explanations are most likely not mutually exclusive and hard to disentangle empirically (Margalit 2013: 81).

2.2.2 Union membership as a source of political preferences

Probably the most famous contribution to research on the effects of membership in associations has been written by Putnam (2000). He has argued that membership in voluntary organizations increases generalized trust, reciprocity and solidarity, or in other words social capital. While Putnam (2000) puts a strong emphasis on intense face-to-face contact and tends to focus on nonpolitical associations rather than social movements or trade unions, Wollebaek and Selle (2002) have found very similar effects for less active membership and membership in political associations. This is important in the context of this paper, since passive members constitute a relatively large share of trade union members. What are the implications of these findings? Most importantly, direct interaction between members might not be the main channel through which the membership effect runs. First, social networks are likely to spread beyond core activists and thus socialization nevertheless takes place. Second, in the words of Wollebaek and Selle (2002: 57): *"affiliations may foster a sense of affinity to a cause that the individual knows is not only important to himself or herself but also to others."* This commitment to or identification with a common cause does not necessarily rely on intense face-to-face interaction. This is very much in line with Anderson's (1991) idea of an "imagined community", which refers to social systems that are too large for regular face-to-face contact. Finally, associations may serve as "information systems", disseminating information about current topics and how the association relates to them to their members through newsletters or journals (Wollebaek and Selle 2002: 57).

In line with these arguments from the social capital literature recent research on trade union membership effects has argued that unions promote economically egalitarian norms and attitudes among their membership through two main mechanisms: information dissemination and socialization (Iversen and Soskice 2015; Macdonald 2019; Mosimann and Pontusson 2017). On the one hand, unions often provide their members with information about current political topics, emphasizing issues of economic inequality and fairness, via newsletters, social media or other channels. On the other hand, socialization processes take place among workers of different backgrounds in the context of workplace discussions or union meetings that might affect their political attitudes and preferences (Macdonald 2019).

Coming back to the social capital literature, a number of authors such as Stolle and Rochon (1998) or Coffé and Geys (2007) identified the level of inclusiveness and diversity within

an association as an important moderator of the connection between association membership and indicators of social capital. They essentially argue that if an association only represents a very narrow segment of society it cannot be effective in promoting generalized trust and norms of solidarity and reciprocity. In the words of Putnam (2000), more homogeneous associations can be expected to generate "bonding social capital" while more diverse associations should generate "bridging social capital". Importantly, the latter is more likely to generate desirable outcomes such as generalized trust. While Coffé and Geys (2007) exclude political associations from their analysis, Stolle and Rochon (1998) expect unions to generate "bridging social capital" because they are, generally speaking, highly diverse in terms of their membership.

Obviously, a central issue when looking at membership effects in general is self-selection. Since none of the above-mentioned papers conducted any sort of quasi-experiment no clear causal statements can be made, and it is very likely that at least part of the effects they found are results of unobserved differences between those who join associations and those who do not. However, I will discuss the issue of self-selection in more detail further below.

2.2.3 Union membership and the welfare state – heterogeneous effects

As mentioned above, among the more recent studies that have looked at the role of trade unions for political attitudes and welfare policy many have acknowledged that there is a lot of heterogeneity within the trade union movement. Nijhuis (2009), for example, stresses the importance of taking the organizing principle of unions into account when looking at their effect on welfare state outcomes. He emphasizes the distinction between occupational or craft unions that restrict their membership to specific occupations and thus only represent a specific group of privileged, skilled workers and general or industrial unions that organize across skill-levels and also represent more low-income and risk prone workers. Essentially, the distinction lies in the horizontal vs. vertical nature of the two kinds of unions or union movements, which entails a different risk distribution. In line with Rehm's (2011) argument about risks as core determinants of welfare preferences at the individual level, Nijhuis (2009) expects the horizontally organized unions to be much less likely to support policy initiatives that aim at redistributing risks than the vertically organized, since their members are likely to be losers of redistribution. Comparing the cases of the Netherlands, where industrial unionism dominates, and the United Kingdom, where occupational unionism is much

stronger, he finds confirmation for his hypothesis. In a similar vein, but directly mapping the distribution of union members across the income distribution by country, Becher and Pontusson (2011) show that the composition of union members is an important factor to consider if we want to understand the role of unions in redistributive politics.

Moving to the individual level, studies by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017, 2020) as well as Arndt (2018) and Yang and Kwon (2019) show that the organizational structure and membership composition of unions discussed above not only seems to moderate their ideological profile and the policies they endorse but also the redistributive preferences of their members. One core challenge for this research on heterogeneous union effects at the individual level is the lack of cross-national surveys that ask respondents to indicate the name of the union or union confederation they belong to. Consequently, most studies were unable to empirically disentangle effects of membership in different unions. Thus, scholars have either sticked to simple (yes/no) membership dummies, measured union characteristics at the national level, as Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) or Yang and Kwon (2019) did, or focused on specific countries or regions, for which such data was available (see e.g. Arndt 2018; Mosimann and Pontusson 2020).

In their study Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) show that among high-income individuals, the trade union membership effect on redistributive preferences is stronger if the national trade union movement is more inclusive and encompassing. By "inclusive" the authors refer to the share of union members with earnings below the median income. "Encompassing", on the other hand, captures the overall union density in a country. Combining the two indicators, the authors distinguish between three ideal-typical union movements: encompassing unionism, low-wage unionism and high-wage unionism. Confirming the expectations, the results suggest that low-wage unionism as well as encompassing unionism promote more support for redistribution among high-wage workers than high-wage unionism.

Concerning the causal mechanism, the authors essentially argue that the extent to which unions organize low-wage workers defines how strongly they pursue solidaristic wage policies. This, in turn, creates distributive norms which affect union members' conceptions of solidarity and consequently their preferences towards redistribution.

Following Putnam (2000) or Ahlquist and Levi (2013) the authors state that union membership might generate preferences that cut against material self-interest. Thus, in line with the social capital literature discussed above membership in encompassing and

inclusive unions is expected to generate solidaristic, other-regarding preferences. The suggested mechanism, however, primarily relies on the creation of norms through the policy positions unions take and communicate to their members rather than interactions among members.

Importantly, Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) distinguish between low-income and high-income workers in their analysis, since different mechanisms might be at play. Following Iversen and Soskice (2015), they argue that among low-income workers an "enlightenment" rather than the solidarity effect might drive the results. Iversen and Soskice (2015) essentially argue that through information disseminated by unions and political discussions at the workplace union members actually become more aware of their material self-interest rather than developing preferences that go beyond self-interest as suggested by the social capital literature. Since Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) find much stronger support for their hypothesis among high-income workers, the solidarity mechanisms is most likely the dominant effect.

In their comprehensive book, Ahlquist and Levi (2013) seek to explain why some unions engage in more solidaristic behaviour and advocate for policies that go beyond their members' immediate economic interests and why others do not. To explore the topic, the authors compare two ''social movement unions'' with long histories of political action on behalf of social justice to two so-called ''business unions'' that only very rarely engage in such actions. They identify a large number of factors such as participatory and deliberative governance structures and success in protecting the material welfare of their members that allow a politically committed leadership to commit to solidaristic, other-regarding actions and policies and ask the same from their members. At the individual level they find that members of those unions that seem to define the "community of fate" more broadly, have more progressive political values and even oppose policies that would benefit them individually in solidarity with other workers. While Ahlquist and Levi (2013) almost exclusively focus on top-down mechanisms I follow Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) in arguing that the membership composition of unions or union confederations is a crucial factor that Ahlquist and Levi (2013) largely neglect. In short, I expect the more solidaristic positions of "social movement" unions and their members to be at least partly resulting from their more encompassing and inclusive membership structure. More narrow and particularistic unions or union confederations, on the other hand, might even foster self-interest (see e.g. Arndt and Rennwald 2016).

Another aspect of trade union heterogeneity is the distinction between political and non-political unions. Although it is the membership structure that lies at the centre of the solidarity argument, we cannot expect apolitical unions to have a considerable impact on their members' political preferences and thus a certain level of political activity seems necessary. Based on Streeck and Hassel (2003: 343), who state that encompassing unions are necessarily also political to a certain extent, this condition seems to be fulfilled.

Similar to Mosimann and Pontusson's (2017) solidarity argument, Arndt (2018) hypothesises that white-collar and especially professional unions with a rather narrow membership base do not foster the same broad sense of solidarity among their members compared to the encompassing industrial trade unions, which organize across income and education levels. Relying on survey data from Sweden, Denmark and Norway, which allows to measure membership at the confederation level, the results indeed confirm that members of professional confederations in Scandinavia are not more supportive of egalitarian policies than non-members and clearly less than members of more traditional blue-collar unions. This becomes even more important considering the strong membership growth in white-collar and professional unions and their confederations in many European countries over the last decades, which often happened at the expense of traditional blue-collar union confederations (Kjellberg 2013).

Unlike Mosimann and Pontusson (2017), Arndt (2018) does not actually measure encompassingness but relies on the distinction between traditional blue-collar confederations and white-collar/professional confederations as a proxy. In most cases this distinction is reasonable, since it essentially pits vertically organized industrial or sectoral unions against horizontally organized occupational unions. However, in the case of the Swedish white-collar confederation TCO, whose affiliates, similar to the traditional blue-collar unions, are often organized on a sectoral basis, this distinction seems problematic. Indeed, results from Mosimann and Pontusson (2020) which are discussed below, confirm that TCO members are clearly less pro-redistribution compared to members of the professional confederation SACO.

Another study that builds on the solidarity argument by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) has been conducted by Yang and Kwon (2019). They, however, use yet another proxy for encompassingness, namely the predominant level of collective bargaining in a country. The authors distinguish between collective bargaining at the national, industry or company level and argue that unions bargaining at the national level (and to a lesser

extent industry level) are very heterogeneous, encompassing not only skilled professionals but also more disadvantaged workers, and thus prioritize universal welfare over protective policies targeted at specific groups of labor market insiders. The exact opposite, however, is expected from so-called "enterprise unions" in countries where company-level bargaining prevails. The results confirm that the union membership effect on redistributive preference is stronger in national-level wage bargaining systems compared to more decentralized collective bargaining systems (Yang and Kwon 2019). Unsurprisingly, there is a strong correlation between country-level measure of low-income inclusiveness calculated by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) and the level of collective bargaining, which makes it hard to disentangle the two. Thus, it seems necessary to also consider variation within countries when assessing the union membership effect, which Mosimann and Pontusson (2020) do in a very recent working paper.

Mosimann and Pontusson (2020) largely confirm their earlier cross-country findings in three country studies that focus on within-country variation in union inclusiveness or encompassingness. Among both low- as well as high-wage workers they find that membership in more inclusive unions is associated with stronger support for redistribution. In the first country study, focusing on the United Kingdom, Mosimann and Pontusson (2020) rely on the distinction between industrial/sectoral, general and occupational unions as a proxy for inclusiveness rather than survey-based measures to test their hypotheses. In line with the expectations, in comparison to sectoral unions and especially occupational unions, general unions seem to promote the strongest support for redistribution. Interestingly, and in contrast to Nijhuis (2009), Mosimann and Pontusson (2020) show that even in a country like the United Kingdom, where occupational unionism has dominated, there are large differences to be found if one takes a closer look. The second country study, which looks at white-collar employees in Sweden, again confirms that across all income levels, members of industrial/sectoral, TCO-affiliated unions are significantly more likely to support redistribution than members of occupational, SACO-affiliated unions and non-members. Finally, there is some evidence suggesting that the Ver.di merger in Germany, which obviously came hand in hand with an increase in encompassingness, has led to more redistributive preferences among its members.

In short, the arguments of the above-mentioned authors can be summarized as follows: More encompassing and inclusive unions with a broad membership base, which also organize more disadvantaged workers tend to support more egalitarian and universalistic policies compared to unions that only represent more specific (skilled) occupations. At the individual-level this has been shown to translate into stronger redistributive preferences among members of the former, which is likely the result of the egalitarian norms union members internalize through processes of socialization (see Mosimann and Pontusson 2017, 2020; but also Arndt 2018; Nijhuis 2009; Yang and Kwon 2019).

2.2.4 Filling the gap and extending existing research

This working paper aims to build on and extend research by these authors in two ways. First, instead of relying on national level characteristics of trade union movements, data from the *welfare priorities* project allows me to investigate membership effects more directly, also beyond single country studies. I will mainly focus on membership in union confederations but also go down to the level of individual trade unions where the data allows to do so. With union densities below 20 percent in some of the countries of interest, country samples of approximately 1500 respondents and only one cross-section, focusing on individual unions would leave me with very few cases per union in some countries. Additionally, particularly in Italy and Spain, many respondents directly referred to the confederation rather than the individual union. This indicates that especially in Southern European countries union members tend to identify with the union confederations, which is also the level where most of the political action happens and they get their information from (see e.g. Ebbinghaus 2003).

The second aspect, where I would like to go beyond existing research concerns the fact that all of the quantitative studies cited above focus on preferences towards redistribution as the dependent variable. This is very intuitive, since compressing wage differentials is known to be an important goal of union movements. However, what we can learn from these survey questions on redistributive preferences seems to be rather limited, since they are too abstract and general. In reality, however, voters have to develop an opinion about much more specific policies about extending or retrenching benefits in certain areas of the welfare state or for certain groups of beneficiaries. Thus, I would like to go beyond the very broad question of redistributive preferences and learn more about the preferences of union members towards welfare policies targeted at specific groups.

In other words, I will try to find out whether the solidarity argument developed by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) can be extended from the poor (very broadly defined) to other vulnerable groups in the labour market.

As elaborated on above, Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) focus on high-income workers in particular to test their solidarity argument in the context of redistributive preferences. Similarly, in order to test for solidarity towards each group of interest, the sample will consist of those who do not currently belong to the group and are unlikely to do so in the future. This should increase confidence that what we are measuring is actually a solidarity effect and not an enlightenment effect as suggested by Iversen and Soskice (2015).

It seems necessary to mention that the concepts of redistribution, as it is commonly defined, and welfare spending (for different social groups) are not the same. However, for analytical reasons, previous research has often treated them as equivalent (Margalit 2013). This has been justified by the fact that spending for social assistance to disadvantaged social groups and some, but not all, social insurance policies, have considerable redistributive consequences (see e.g. Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006). Essentially, as soon as a risk is correlated with income, social insurance (or protection) entails a redistribution of income. Thus, the dimensions are closely linked and often hard to distinguish empirically (Becher and Pontusson 2011). Overall, however, Becher and Pontusson (2011) argue that the inclusiveness of unions towards low-income union members tends to matter less for social insurance policies as compared to redistribution, since all workers tend to have a strong interest in the former.

Finally, despite the fact that social spending does not necessarily have to be progressive, it is highly progressive overall, and taxes (as a share of government revenue) have been shown to be clearly related to higher social spending and lower levels of inequality (see Margalit 2013: 82). Thus, while we can expect preferences towards redistribution in general and spending on welfare policies targeting specific vulnerable groups to be driven by similar factors including both self-interest and ideology, the relative importance of these factors might differ.

One way to distinguish between different aspects of what is often subsumed under the term redistributive preferences has been proposed by Cavaillé and Trump (2015), who argue and show in their paper that redistributive preferences are not unidimensional. The authors find support for the theoretical and empirical distinction between preferences for "redistribution from" (the rich) and "redistribution to" (disadvantaged social groups).

While the former appears to be mainly guided by considerations about the potential gains or losses one might make from redistribution (i.e. material self-interest), other-regarding concerns such as solidarity or affinity with the welfare recipients seem to be more important for the latter. Whereas Mosimann and Pontusson's (2017, 2020) as well as Arndt (2018) and Yang and Kwon's (2019) operationalization of redistributive preferences taps into the "redistribution from" dimension, my approach tries to capture support for redistribution to specific vulnerable groups in the labour market. Thus, following Cavaillé and Trump (2015) the norm of solidarity should play an even larger role in this context. In line with the expectations of the self-interest literature, Cavaillé and Trump (2015) find that support for "redistribution from" is stratified by income, which is in line with findings by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017). "Redistribution to", however, does not seem to be systematically related to income. Thus, unlike Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) I will not analyse low- and high-income individuals separately but look at both the pooled sample and samples of respondents that are unlikely to be personally affected by the particular policy under consideration in order to test the solidarity argument more directly.

Cavaillé and Trump's (2015) reasoning is in line with arguments by Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) who state that for preferences towards welfare policies targeted at specific groups considerations about distributive deservingness and positions on the cultural dimension more generally, play an important role. "Redistribution from" , as defined by Cavaillé and Trump (2015), however is more clearly a socio-economic issue and also tends to be perceived as such.

Overall, based on ideas from social capital theory, more recent studies on the effects of trade union characteristics on redistributive preferences and the work of Cavaillé and Trump (2015) I suggest the following background hypothesis before elaborating more on the individual groups that will be considered:

> *Members of encompassing and inclusive unions are more supportive of extending welfare benefits for different vulnerable social groups than non-members. In contrast, no such effect is expected among members of unions with a more narrow membership base.*

Figure 1 summarizes the assumed relations between the variables graphically, with the suggested causal path in grey. Although the causal mechanism will not be tested in-depth,

I will assess its credibility by looking at the effect of membership in more or less encompassing and inclusive unions on economic egalitarianism.



Figure 1: Graphical representation of relationships between core variables

Even though I will formulate expectations about the direct, unmoderated effects of trade union membership on welfare policies targeted at the three groups of interest, I do not expect to find very strong effects. Since the necessity to account for union heterogeneity and to differentiate between membership in more or less encompassing and inclusive unions lies at the core of my argument, potential null findings for these basic hypotheses would not run against the core idea of this working paper.

Finally, it seems crucial to come back to one of the core concepts of this working paper, namely solidarity. Solidarity, as it is commonly defined, refers to an awareness of common interests, goals or norms that creates a sense of unity among a certain group (Solidarity, n.d.) Following Mosimann and Pontussen (2017), I refer to the relevant group with the term "community of solidarity", which, in turn, is inspired by Ahlquist and Levi's concept of "communities of fate" (2013: 21). According to Ahlquist and Levi (2013) the inclusiveness of the definition of such a community is decisive for the scope of political actions and policy stances of unions and thus also those of their members. Based on the core argument of this paper, the definition of the community of solidarity becomes more

inclusive with increasing levels of encompassingness and inclusiveness of trade unions or trade union confederations.

Building on Lockwood (1966) Turner and D'Art (2003) distinguish between three levels of solidarity among workers. While the first refers to the actual community at the workplace and the second to solidarity between wage earners at the level of trade unions, the third is referred to as "political solidarity" and manifests in a more general support for a universal welfare system following the ideological principles of the labour movement. The third level is the most important one for the argument of this working paper, since the support of welfare policies for groups beyond one's own social group requires such a broad conception of solidarity and it seems plausible to expect that only union confederations which are encompassing, inclusive and to a certain level political will increase their members "political solidarity".

2.2.5 Three groups of interest

The groups of welfare recipients that will be discussed below are the unemployed, immigrants and working mothers. All three groups are in one way or another related to the labour market, tend to face diverse risks and have so far not been at the centre of attention of the trade union movement. Importantly, although I expect the solidarity argument to be relevant for all groups, they differ in many aspects and the policies targeted at them essentially cover all the dimensions of the economic distributive conflict, including redistribution, social insurance and social investment (see e.g. Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). Thus, expectations are often not straightforward. This is largely due to a lack of literature on union members' preferences towards welfare policies that go beyond general redistribution, overall generosity or typical social insurance fields such as old-age pension (see also Häusermann and Mosimann 2018). In other words, when it comes to policies that are more closely linked to the new cultural conflict line, such as social investment or welfare chauvinism, we only know very little so far. Thus, the following chapters will discuss the three groups and their different relationships with the union movement and how this might affect union members' preferences towards welfare policies targeted at them.

One important point of comparison between the three groups of welfare recipients relates to the literature on distributive deservingness (e.g. van Oorschot 2006; van der Waal et al. 2010). In his 2006 study, van Oorschot analysed the degree to which European citizens show different levels of solidarity towards different social groups that he defined as

"needy". Confirming previous findings, the results revealed that immigrants were consistently considered the least deserving, closely followed by the unemployed. On the other side of the spectrum, the elderly were seen as most deserving followed by the sick and disabled. Thus, at least two of the groups considered in this working paper can be found at the bottom of the rank order. The case for the group of working mothers seems less straightforward and more context dependent. In the US context, for example, single mothers are often mentioned in the same breath with so-called "welfare queens", who are perceived to be lazy and unreliable and thus undeserving (Rein 2001). However, this finding is characteristic to the US, where support for redistribution is generally low due to the fact that racial fragmentation tends to coincide with income differences or is at least perceived to do so (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). In Europe, and particularly in the Scandinavian context, deservingness perceptions towards this group are likely to be much more positive.

According to van Oorschot (2006) the criteria based on which citizens assess the deservingness of a social group include both the level of and the control over their "neediness" as well as factors like identity and reciprocity. The latter refer to how close a group is perceived and the extent to which they themselves have contributed to the system. But what are the factors that drive the degree to which an individual's solidarity is conditional on such characteristics of social groups? Besides conditionality being higher among the less educated, older people and women, one significant predictor is of particular interest for the present research: economic egalitarianism. The results show that respondents who are more in favor of social equality are significantly less conditional, independent of their ideological left-right position. Thus, if membership in inclusive and encompassing trade unions indeed lets workers internalize distributive norms of economic egalitarianism, we should expect to see increased support towards social policies directed at those groups that otherwise rank low on the deservingness scale.

In contrast to Alquist and Levi (2013) and other papers discussed above, findings by Schlozman, Verba and Brady (2012) paint a rather pessimistic picture when it comes to union solidarity with vulnerable groups. Analysing the websites of unions in the US, they find very little signs of solidarity, or surrogate advocacy as they call it, with disadvantaged groups such as the poor, racial minorities and women (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012: 386). However, a major drawback of the study is that they did not distinguish

between different types of unions and focused on the context of the US exclusively. Many European unions, in contrast, have been involved in or launched political campaigns on a wide array of issues not directly related to the core economic interests of their members (Streeck and Hassel 2003: 336), including issues that particularly matter for less advantaged groups.

Thus, as mentioned above, the next chapters will discuss the three groups of interest and how they relate to the union movement, not only today but also historically. This is necessary, since for the background hypothesis to hold, trade unions' positions towards the groups and their welfare demands have to be supportive overall.

2.3 The unemployed

The unemployed represent a very vulnerable group in the labour market. It has been shown that there is a clear lack of well-organized groups representing the unemployed and their interests. In line with that, the unemployed and atypically employed tend to have very low unionization rates (see e.g. Esping-Andersen 1999). Thus, from a pure membership perspective one would not expect trade unions to focus on the interests of the unemployed. This is in line with the depiction of unions suggested by Rueda (2006, 2007) in his *insider-outsider theory*. As an alternative to PRT, the theory focuses on the level of employment protection in a country as the main explanatory factor of cross-country differences in labour market policy (Rueda 2007). It is argued that among workers in stable, full-time employment, so-called labour market insiders, the demand for generous spending on the unemployed is reduced the more they are protected from becoming unemployed themselves (see Gordon 2015). Without being very explicit about it, Rueda (2007) essentially argues that unions represent the interests of these labour-market insiders, rather than the unemployed and atypically employed, which belong to the group of labour-market outsiders.

However, more recent studies on the insider-outsider divide (e.g. Palier and Thelen 2010; Pulignano, Meardi, and Doerflinger 2015) examine the role of unions more precisely and argue that they have rarely intentionally protected insiders only but in some cases were forced to accept reduced outsider protection because in their weakening position their main goal – protecting all workers with encompassing policies – could not be achieved (Pulignano, Meardi, and Doerflinger 2015: 809). In a comparison of Germany and Belguim, two coordinated market economies, Pulignano et al. (2015) show that labour-

market dualization between sheltered insiders and unprotected outsiders is not unavoidable and in certain conditions, which were met in Belgium, the unions can effectively reduce inequality between insiders and outsiders.

Other scholars, including Vlandas (2011), Gordon (2015) and Mosimann (2017) challenge the claims of the insider-outsider literature about the role of trade unions more generally. According to Mosimann (2017), unions cannot be equated with insider-oriented policy only and are, on average, more pro- rather than anti-outsiders. This is confirmed in her analysis of the positions of 18 German, British and Swiss unions in reforms relevant to outsiders (Mosimann 2017: 155). A series of country studies on the "*Unemployment benefit systems in Europe and North America*" edited by Lefresne (2010) further strengthen this finding. Across countries the tenor is the same: In most cases unions have opposed reforms that would have introduced cuts in unemployment benefits, stricter conditions or any other tightening measures (see e.g. DGB 1996 for Germany; Green-Pedersen 2001 for the Netherlands and Denmark).

More generally, following Gordon (2015) or Esping-Andersen (1992), unions have often been among the most important advocates of more generous unemployment benefits systems and without their support the unemployed would have experienced much less generous assistance and compensation rates. This is in line with standard PRT, which would expect unions to be in favour of expanding unemployment benefits as part of a strong, redistributive welfare state. Importantly, generous unemployment benefits not only provide insurance to workers in the event of job loss but also have a strong redistributive function (see e.g. Rehm 2011).

Apart from general preferences for welfare expansion and redistribution, there are other reasons why trade unions and their members should be in favor of generous benefits for the unemployed. First, although trade union members often belong to the group of labour market insiders, they nevertheless face the risk of unemployment, which unions take into account. Second, and more importantly, I expect the majority of unions to also focus on the interests of workers beyond their core membership. In light of declining unionization rates and changing labour-market structures unions may support labor market policies for outsiders in order to attract them as future members (Clegg, Graziano, and Wijnbergen 2010).

Thus, overall, and based on the norm of worker solidarity central to the trade union movement I expect the trade union discourse to be positive when it comes to expanding benefits for the unemployed.

As discussed above, we can expect the policy positions and rhetoric of trade unions to affect their members political preferences through socialization processes. Thus, I expect to find a positive effect of trade union membership on preferences towards expanding welfare benefits for the unemployed.

> *H1a) Trade union members are more supportive towards extending welfare benefits for the unemployed compared to similar non-members.*

While a basic level of union support towards generous unemployment benefits seems given, there is important variation in the degree to which trade unions take a clear policy stance towards extending benefits for the unemployed (see e.g. Clegg, Graziano, and Wijnbergen 2010; Mosimann 2017). What might account for this variation?

As Häusermann and Schwander (2012) show in their study, there is important cross-national variation when it comes to the representation of labour market outsiders in trade unions. Thus, outsiders, defined as those at high risk of becoming unemployed or atypically employed, are not necessarily underrepresented in all contexts. Additionally, unions are often involved in the management of unemployment schemes. In the so-called 'Ghent system' countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Belgium) trade unions even play a direct role in the payment of unemployment benefits. Especially if union membership entails unemployment benefits higher than those available for non-members or eases access to the benefits, there is obviously a strong incentive to join a union (e.g. Gordon 2015). Thus, it does not come as a surprise that in Ghent countries the unemployed are much better represented by trade unions compared to other countries. Kjellberg (2013) indeed shows that in Sweden unionization rates among the unemployed are very similar to those of employed workers.

In line with the argument that encompassing unions take a clearer stance in favour of general redistribution, Mosimann (2017), Gordon (2015) and Nelson (2006) have found some evidence that these unions might also be more strongly in favour of expanding welfare benefits for the unemployed or labour-market outsiders more generally as compared to unions with a more narrow membership.

Gordon (2015: 88) presents an index of "inclusive unionism" consisting of three main factors that he expects to affect unions' support for generous unemployment policy: involvement in the administration of unemployment benefits, union centralization and union density. The first refers to the Ghent countries discussed above and the reasoning behind the second is that the authority of the confederations and the democratic principle within centralized union movements will push the movement to call for more generous unemployment benefits, since weaker segments of the labour market with higher unemployment rates will be empowered (Gordon 2015: 90).

The most important one, in the context of this working paper, concerns union density. Similar to Mosimann and Pontusson (2017), Gordon (2015) argues that the income distribution within union movements is an important factor to consider. The larger the share of low-income members within a union movement, the higher is the risk of unemployment the average member faces, which in turn should affect the policy position unions take. Since, according to Pontusson (2013) the union density difference between the bottom income quintiles and the rest is strongly correlated to the overall union density, Gordon (2015) uses the latter for his inclusiveness index. Similarly, Mosimann (2017) relies on the size of union confederations to capture their encompassingness. Conducting a fuzzy-set QCA, she finds that irrespective of the presence of other factors, encompassing unions consistently represent outsider interests.

While union density or union size are undoubtedly important factors to consider, it remains relatively unclear what they actually measure (see e.g. Gordon 2015; Nelson 2006: 22). Thus, unlike Gordon (2015) or Mosimann (2017) but in line with Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) I will look at both size and inclusiveness and focus on membership at the level of union confederations, which allows me to get more precise results.

Thus, I expect encompassing and inclusive unions representing a broad group of workers to be more supportive of expanding unemployed benefits and consequently promote these preferences and norms of solidarity and economic egalitarianism among their members.

Overall, I suggest the following hypothesis:

> *H1b) The effect suggested in H1a) is stronger for members of encompassing and inclusive trade unions and goes towards zero for members of more narrow high-income unions.*

2.4 Immigrants[3]

Immigrants are highly overrepresented among the unemployed and precariously employed and thus represent a group that faces high labour market risks and welfare dependency. The question of whether social benefits for immigrants should be on the same level and based on the same conditions as those provided to non-immigrants has become a highly debated topic on the political agenda of many European countries. In line with that, recent research has shown that voters have very strong opinions about whether welfare benefits for immigrants should be expanded or retrenched (Enggist 2019). *Welfare chauvinism* is a concept that is used in the literature to capture perceptions of (un-) deservingness towards immigrants in terms of welfare benefits. It was first defined by Kitschelt (1997: 22) as preferences for a "*system of social protection [only] for those who belong to the ethnically defined community and who have contributed to it*." Thus, in short, individuals with welfare chauvinistic attitudes want to narrow down welfare entitlements to nationals, who are seen as more "deserving" than immigrants (e.g. van der Waal et al. 2010).

Two important findings in this context are, on the one hand, that welfare chauvinism is mainly found among the lower classes and, on the other hand, that welfare chauvinistic attitudes are more closely linked to the cultural rather than the economic conflict line (see e.g. Eger and Breznau 2017; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; van der Waal et al. 2010). Eger and Breznau (2017) demonstrate that welfare chauvinism is more closely related to attitudes towards immigrants than towards redistribution or welfare generosity. But what does the literature say about the role of trade union membership in this context? The one study by Eger and Breznau (2017) that has included trade union membership as a control variable has found that being member of a trade union is negatively related to welfare chauvinism.

The relationship between trade unions and immigration policy has been ambiguous (Penninx and Roosblad 2000). On the one hand, there are fears about the effect of immigration on the wages and jobs of native workers, which might lead to a rather restrictive position on immigration among some trade unions (e.g. Waterman 1998). Additionally, based on ethnic competition theory, unions might fear that the pressure

[3] This subchapter is partly based on a seminar paper I wrote for the Seminar "The New Politics of Class" taught by Dr. Macarena Ares in autumn semester 2018.

immigration puts on the welfare system could lead to a "welfare state backlash" (Van der Waal 2010). Thus, in order to protect the welfare of their core members, unions might prefer to restrict immigrants' rights for social benefits.

On the other hand, however, the norm of solidarity among workers, irrespective of factors like race or nationality has been one of the core principles of trade unions; and this has been internalized by their members (Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann 2018). Additionally, despite the fact that immigrants are still underrepresented among trade union members in most countries (Kranendonk and de Beer 2016) in order to strengthen their position and adapt to the changing composition of the workforce, trade unions have increasingly included migrants and also other groups apart from their traditional core constituency of male industrial workers (Harcourt et al. 2008). Analysing the positions of union leaders, Donnelly (2016) has found that by now trade unions are on average clearly pro-immigration. A core aspect of their pro-immigrant rhetoric is that immigrants are mostly framed as fellow working-class members and thus members of an in-group rather than an out-group that might take something away from them (see also Donnelly 2016). As a consequence, trade union members, influenced by their leaders' positions and rhetoric might perceive immigrants as more entitled to welfare compared to similar non-members. Thus, I suggest the following hypothesis:

> *H2a) Trade union members are less welfare chauvinistic compared to similar non-members.*

While Donnelly (2016) has shown that most unions have become pro-immigration over time, there is nevertheless reason to expect variation across unions. On the one hand, it has been argued that intergroup competition, be it for jobs or welfare benefits, is most severe if two groups hold similar social positions, which is the case for immigrants and low-skilled native workers (Van der Waal 2010). This might suggest that unions which represent a large share of low-income/low-skilled workers take a more restrictive stance towards immigration in general but also in regard to immigrants' social rights.

On the other hand, Donnelly (2016: 690f.) argues that more ideologically driven unions, which tend to be exactly those social democratic or socialist unions that organize a relatively large share of low-income workers, focus more on class rather than other differences, and so do their members. Thus, with class as the relevant framework, immigrants are seen as fellow working-class members rather than an economic or cultural threat and the solidarity effect comes into play. The main argument, however,

rests upon the encompassingness and inclusiveness of unions or union confederations. As elaborated on above, I expect large, inclusive union confederations that represent a diverse share of the working population rather than specific occupational groups to be more solidaristic towards the welfare demands and needs of economically vulnerable groups that are not well represented within unions, such as immigrants.

Es elaborated on above, one important factor in the assumed causal pathway is economic egalitarianism. There are, however, different arguments when it comes to the relation between (economic) egalitarianism and preferences concerning immigrants. Van der Waal (2010), on the one hand, argues that economic egalitarianism actually increases welfare chauvinism among the lower educated, while the two factors go hand in hand among the highly educated. This would speak against my argument, at least for the lower educated groups. Emmenegger and Klemmensen (2013), on the other hand, argue that egalitarianism attenuates the tension between preferences for redistribution and attitudes towards immigrants and their social rights. Their results indeed show that among highly egalitarian individuals redistributive preferences predict more positive attitudes towards immigrants.

Despite some opposing voices I thus suggest the following hypothesis:

> *H2b) The effect suggested in H2a) is stronger for members of encompassing and inclusive trade unions and goes towards zero for members of more narrow high-income unions.*

2.5 Working mothers

Working mothers represent another group in the labour market that can be termed as vulnerable since they face a very high risk of being in part-time employment, the most common form of atypical employment.

There are, however, some important differences in comparison to the two groups discussed before. Most importantly, working mothers are a so-called "new social risk" group. With the transition to a post-industrial society, new social risks and needs have emerged through two main processes: the mass entry of women into the labour market as a result of changing family structures and the transition from an industrial to a service economy (Bonoli 2005; Häusermann 2010). The new risks include, among others, the reconciliation of work and family life and single parenthood. Both are mainly

concentrated among women with children. Often these new risks have been addressed with so-called *modernizing compromises*, combining specific expansive elements with retrenchment in the area of "old risks" (Bonoli 2005; Häusermann 2010).

What is the role of trade unions in this context? Historically, trade unions had been dominated by older, male workers and their interests. This is exemplified by the fact that for a long time trade union confederations opposed part-time work in their official positions, arguing that it would undermine union control of working conditions (Klausen 1999: 275). This, in turn, clearly limited the unions' capacity to organize women and represent their interests.

Tellingly, Cook et al. (1992) have referred to the promotion of female participation in union movements with the title "The most difficult revolution". However, over the last few decades the share of women among union members has increased in all European countries (Ebbinghaus 2002). In line with that, there has been an overall increase in union responsiveness to the interests of women (Klausen 1999). While in some countries, such as Sweden or the Netherlands, trade unions unions have been campaigning for modernizing reforms targeted working mothers or the reconciliation of work and family life more generally for a long time, this reorientation has been weaker and more recent in other contexts, especially in Southern and Continental Europe (Gustafsson and Kenjoh 2004; Klausen 1999).

But what are these modernizing policies? One of the core welfare policies targeted at working mothers in particular and working parents more generally is the expansion of childcare, which allows for reconciliation of work and family life. Unlike expanding social assistance for immigrants or expanding unemployment benefits, which are the policies I will focus on for the social groups discussed previously, childcare is a typical *social investment policy*. Social investment policies, as compared to passive transfer-oriented consumption policies aim at actively "*creating, mobilizing, and preserving*" skills (Garritzmann et al. 2017: 36). Recent findings have shown that the groups supporting social investment differ from those supporting more traditional, transfer-oriented welfare policies in important ways (e.g. Garritzmann, Busemeyer, and Neimanns 2018; Häusermann 2018). According to these authors, social investment policies are most strongly supported by highly educated individuals with left-libertarian views, while passive transfer policies get most support among low-educated, low-income individuals

which position themselves as economically left but tend towards the traditional, authoritarian pole of the cultural conflict line.

It has often been argued that trade union members tend to fall into the second group and could be expected to prefer classic consumption policies over social investment if the two are offered in direct comparison and so are unions themselves. In other words, it has been argued that unions tend to put less emphasis on social investment and the new social risks these policies often try to address, as compared to more classic welfare policies (see e.g. Häusermann 2010). This does not mean, however, that unions and their members oppose social investment, on the contrary. A very recent paper by Häusermann and Mosimann (2018) shows that trade union members on average clearly support the provision of childcare services by the government. These preferences are very much in line with those of social democratic voters, which have often been thought as more culturally progressive. Thus, there are no signs of conservative, male breadwinner preferences among union members. In comparison to non-members the results also show that across welfare regimes union members are on average more supportive of social investment. Similarly, Busemeyer and Neimanns (2017) find that union members prefer more government responsibility in the provision of both unemployment benefits and childcare, using union membership as a control variable.

Overall, I expect to find a positive effect of trade union membership on preferences towards expanding welfare services for working mothers.

> *H3a) Trade union members are more positive towards expanding welfare services for working mothers compared to similar non-members.*

However, once again, we can expect to find a lot of variance between different welfare regimes, countries and unions. As already indicated above, trade unions in continental and southern Europe still mobilize rather weakly among women and other post-industrial risk groups, while women in the Scandinavian countries the UK and Ireland are even more likely to be union members than men (Bonoli 2005). Thus, following a pure membership logic, we would expect trade unions in liberal and Scandinavian countries to be more in favour of modernizing reforms targeted at working mothers than those in continental Europe (see also Häusermann 2010). This, in turn, can be expected to also affect the positions of their members towards such policies.

Apart from that, Guo and Gilbert (2014) found economic egalitarianism to be the most important individual-level determinant of preferences towards the public provision of childcare, even more important than self-interest variables and support for gender equality. Based on the literature discussed in the previous chapters, I expect encompassing and inclusive union to promote such egalitarian norms. Thus, I also expect their members' support for policies aiming at the expansion of childcare to be stronger compared to non-members and members of unions with a more narrow membership base.

Thus, I suggest the following hypothesis:

> *H3b) The effect suggested in H3a) is stronger for members of encompassing and inclusive trade unions and goes towards zero for members of more narrow high-income unions.*

However, one might also put this hypothesis into question since the support of a social investment policy targeting a new social risk group seems to stretch the solidarity argument the furthest, compared to the other two groups discussed in the previous chapters and consequently the expectations seem less straightforward. Although, as discussed above, working mothers do face a number of risks in the labor market, support for this group and the associated policy seems to require a slightly different kind of solidarity as compared to immigrants or the unemployed, which are mostly to be found at the lower end of the income distribution. Essentially, inclusiveness as defined and operationalized by Nijhuis (2009) or Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) is a vertically rather than a horizontally defined concept. The latter might be better captured with the term diversity. In other words, unions that are more inclusive in terms of the empirically closely related "vertical" socioeconomic factors income, education or class do not necessarily generate more solidarity with a group that is not mainly concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution and a corresponding policy proposal that is often perceived as a middle class policy.

Thus, one might expect the diversity rather than the low-income inclusiveness of unions or union confederations to moderate the membership effect on preferences towards expanding childcare services, a policy targeting working parents and working mothers in particular. To capture diversity, I will focus on the gender distribution among the membership of the different unions.

Consequently, I suggest the following alternative hypothesis:

> *H3c) The effect suggested in H3a) is stronger for members of unions with a high share of women and goes towards zero for members of male-dominated unions.*

2.6 Alternative Explanations

Something that needs to be addressed when looking at trade union membership effects on political preferences is self-selection. According to Kim and Margalit (2017) and Alquist et al. (2014) the assumption that unions exert substantial influence on their members political preferences has for a long time not been well substantiated empirically. This can be attributed both to data availability issues and potential self-selection effects. Essentially, it has been challenging to disentangle the actual effect of participating in a union from pre-existing differences between those who decide to join a union and those who do not (see e.g. Kim and Margalit 2017). In their recent study, however, Kim and Margalit (2017) took advantage of legal differences in selection mechanisms into unions across US states to identify the causal effect of union membership on trade preferences. Their findings clearly support the assumption that unions do influence their members' policy preferences and that self-selection, at most, accounts for a very small part of the effect. Together with findings from other recent papers discussed in this working paper that conducted a large number of robustness checks and additional analyses to account for potential self-selection effects (see e.g. Arndt and Rennwald 2016; Donnelly 2016; Mosimann and Pontusson 2017) we can be confident about the existence of "union-effects" on political preferences in different areas, including the welfare state.

However, pre-existing political preferences certainly have some effect on the decision to join a union and also which union a worker choses to join. Unfortunately, the cross-sectional data this working paper relies on does not allow to solve the issue of self-selection, which would either require panel data or a quasi-experimental research design as conducted by Kim and Margalit (2017). One approach to address the issue of self-selection with the data at hand is controlling for ideological predispositions. If controlling for left-right self-placement, a characteristic that is assumed to be rather stable, doesn't make the union effect go away, we can be surer about the existence of an actual union membership effect (see also Mosimann and Pontusson 2017). However, since ideological self-placement might well be affected by union membership itself, this approach is not unproblematic since it might introduce post-treatment bias (see e.g. Gelman and Hill

2007). Thus, I will only control for ideological predispositions as a robustness check and not in the main models.

Beyond controlling for relevant factors, an additional test will be conducted to address the issue of self-selection. As already mentioned above, it is argued that in so-called "Ghent-countries" self-interest rather than ideological predispositions is the main driver for joining a union. In other words, if union membership eases access to benefits in case of unemployment, even if differences to non-members are small, this creates rational, material incentives for union membership (see e.g. Gordon 2015). Thus, the claim made by Ahlquist et al. (2014) that workers join unions for reasons of employment and do not sort into them for political reasons seems to hold the most in these countries, which can serve as a useful robustness check. Consequently, if the hypothesized effects remain significant in a subset of Ghent countries, we can be more confident about the existence of a (causal) union membership effect (see also Mosimann and Pontusson 2017). Sweden in particular seems interesting, because in the context of its strongly class-segmented union landscape, union choice almost exclusively follows the employment sector of a person, rather than ideological factors (see Arndt 2018; Kjellberg 2005).

3. Research design

3.1 Data

This working paper will mainly rely on novel data from a survey fielded in 2018 in the context of the ERC-project "welfarepriorities" (Häusermann 2017). The aim of the project is to gain more knowledge about the welfare state preferences and priorities of European citizens and the underlying mechanisms that drive them. The survey draws on data from 12'501 respondents in eight Western European countries, including Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Italy and Spain. Thus, all four European welfare state regimes are covered with two countries each.

The survey contains relevant questions that ask about the preferences of respondents towards the welfare demands and needs of different social groups and is thus well suited for the present project. Additionally, and most importantly, respondents are not only asked whether or not they are or have been member of a trade union, but they also have to indicate the name of the respective union in an open-ended question. This allows me

to go beyond analysing the effects of country-level averages of different trade union characteristics.

In a first step, the individual unions mentioned by the respondents are recoded and assigned to the confederations they belong to. For unions, which are not affiliated to any of the established confederations, a category *other/independent* is created. Although the latter are interesting in their own right, they will not be the focus in this working paper. Among the sources consulted for the coding is a comprehensive handbook on European trade unions by Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000), the website *worker-participation.eu* run by the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) and various official websites of trade unions and trade union confederations in Europe.

For all the main models the sample of respondents is reduced to those that are not currently part of the target group and unlikely to do so in the future. In other words, only those respondents that are unlikely to be direct beneficiaries of the suggested policy are included in the respective models. As elaborated in previous sections, this should increase confidence that what we are measuring is actually a solidarity effect and not an enlightenment effect (see Mosimann and Pontusson 2017). While Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) focus on high-income respondents in order to test the solidarity argument on redistributive preferences, I will focus on three different samples for each set of hypotheses. For hypotheses H1 this includes respondents that are not currently unemployed and have occupational unemployment rates below the mean[4] (see Rehm 2009) as well as pensioners. For hypotheses H2 I will focus on citizens only and finally for hypotheses H3 men as well as women above the age of 50 will be considered.

Additional data on union characteristics is drawn from the *ICTWSS database Version 6.1* (Visser 2019). Data for further country-level control variables is taken from the *Comparative Political Dataset* (CPDS) (Armingeon et al. 2019) and the online databases *OECD.stat* (OECD 2020b)*, OECD family database* (OECD 2020a) and *Eurostat* (Eurostat 2020).

[4] I received the data on occupational unemployment rates (OUR) by occupation (ISCO-08, 1-digit) and gender from Phillip Rehm by email. His measures are based on Data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU LFS).

3.2 Operationalization

3.2.1 Independent variables

On the individual level, the main independent variable is trade union membership. The welfare priorities dataset contains an item that asks whether a respondent has ever been a member of a trade union or a similar organization. The answer categories include 1 (yes, currently), 2 (yes, previously) and 3 (no). While in theory the socialization argument could be applied to both present and previous trade union members I will focus on the former, since I lack information on the time that has passed since a respondent has left a trade union. Thus, in order to test the basic hypotheses H1a, H2a and H3a the trade union membership variable will be recoded into a dummy which takes the value 1 if a respondent is a current trade union member and 0 if he/she is a non-member. Previous members will not be considered.

In order to test the main hypotheses H1b, H2b and H3b the simple dummy variable will be substituted by more detailed measures of the type of union or union confederation one belongs to. In a first step the country-level measure of the encompassingness/inclusiveness of trade union movements suggested by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) will be adapted and applied to the confederation level. Essentially, instead of calculating the ratio of union density in the bottom five income deciles to the top five deciles per country, I computed the share of members of each confederation below the median income of country x to get a measure of low-income inclusiveness per confederation. In order to assess encompassingness, I divide the membership of each confederation by the total labor force of the corresponding country using data from Visser (2019). Resulting descriptive information is shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 below. Figure 2 shows the low-income inclusiveness score of each union confederation with more than 20 current members in the survey.[5] Figure 3 pits the low-income inclusiveness score against the level of encompassingness of each confederation. Similar to Mosimann and Pontusson (2017), but at the level of union confederations, I distinguish between three ideal-types: encompassing confederations, low-wage confederations and high-wage confederations. In Figure 3 the first group is represented by the top area, the second by

[5] Small trade union confederations, which are represented by less than 20 respondents are not included in the analysis, since the level of low-income inclusiveness cannot be meaningfully computed. The average number of respondents per confederation is 117.

the bottom-right area and the third by the bottom-left area. The vertical and horizontal lines separate the three areas by the means of the two measurements.



Figure 2: Low-income inclusiveness by confederation.



Figure 3: Scatterplot: low-income inclusiveness & encompassingness.

These cut-offs are then used to build a variable that distinguishes between members of encompassing, low-income and high-income confederations and non-members.

Despite these admittedly quite arbitrary cut-offs and the small number of trade union members the inclusiveness score is built upon in some confederations, the resulting groups are largely in line with the expectations from the literature. However, the inclusiveness measure suggested by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) is exclusively based on income and does not consider class or occupation more generally, which might be relevant in the context of my hypotheses.

Thus, in a second step, I rely on existing literature to group the confederations and trade unions according to their organizing principle into three groups: industrial/sectoral, occupational/professional and general unions. Industrial or sectoral unions organize vertically within one industry or sector, occupational or professional unions organize horizontally within a specific occupation and general unions organize very broadly across sectoral or occupational boundaries following a "catch-all" principle (see e.g. Visser 2012). Thus, industrial/sectoral and general unions are naturally more inclusive towards lower class and lower income members than occupational/professional unions. Obviously, based on the "catch-all" principle they follow, general unions are the most encompassing of the three.

Following Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000), most unions affiliated to one confederation adhere to the same organizing principle. Thus, in a first step confederations are grouped into the following categories: industrial/sectoral, occupational/professional and mixed (general, industrial, occupational). This grouping is largely based on Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000: 42), who distinguish between "all grades 'industrial' unions", "special peak associations" (civil servants/public sector, academics/professionals) and mixed systems. Among the mixed systems are the confederations TUC (United Kingdom), ICTU (Ireland), LO (Denmark) and TCO (Sweden).[6] The different colors in Figure 4 indicate the organizing principle of each confederation.

[6] Ebbinghaus (2000) does not classify the Swedish TCO as a mixed system. However, based on Kjellberg (2013) the affiliates of TCO consist both of vertical (industrial/sectoral) and occupational/professional unions.



Figure 4: Scatterplot low-income inclusiveness & encompassingness, colored by organizing principle.

Overall, the two measurements align as expected: The group of occupational and professional unions is perfectly concentrated in the bottom-left quadrant of high-income, non-encompassing unions. Industrial/sectoral unions are mostly found among the low-income inclusive side of the plot, some more encompassing, others less. Only the German DGB and the Italian CGIL seem to be outliers. The fact that the German DGB seems to be less inclusive than expected based on its organizing principle, might be explained by its dominant position, which reduces competition at the confederation level and thus the need to focus on the mobilization of low-income members. Finally, the mixed confederations tend to be among the largest and thus the most encompassing ones. However, in these cases it is necessary to focus on the trade union level and classify the affiliated unions separately. Table 5 in the appendix shows the classification of all TUC, ICTU, TCO and LO (Denmark) affiliated unions indicated by respondents. Finally, the resulting variable distinguishes between members of general, occupational/professional and industrial/sectoral unions and non-members.

Table 1 shows some descriptive information for the two classification approaches. At first sight the marked differences in the number of respondents per category seems puzzling. However, it has to be kept in mind that the large union confederations TUC, ICTU, TCO and LO Denmark, which make up a large part of trade union members in the sample, are disaggregated in the second classification approach. The NAs result from the fact that many respondents, who indicate to be a member of a trade union did not provide sufficient information that would have allowed me to assign them to a trade union or

union confederation. Additionally, respondents who referred to more than one trade union and could not be classified unambiguously were excluded from the analysis.[7]

Table 1: Descriptive information on the two classification approaches, numbers in brackets include previous union members.

1st measure: Data-based classification (Mosimann and Pontusson 2017)	Encompassing	Low-income	High-income	Non-members	NA	total
Number of respondents	1395 (3077)	246 (656)	250 (452)	7195	467 (1121)	9553 (12501)
2nd measure: Classification based on organizing principle	General	Industrial/ Sectoral	Occupational/ Professional	Non-members	NA	total
Number of respondents	507 (1060)	990 (2206)	398 (717)	7195	463 (1323)	9553 (12501)

Finally, concerning hypothesis H3c), gender diversity within unions and union confederations is operationalized by the share of women among their membership, collected from a number of different sources shown in Table 6 in the appendix. [8]

Figure 5 shows the descriptive results at the level of trade union confederations. With values ranging between 30 and 70 percent there is clear variation between confederations. As expected by the literature discussed in chapter 2.5, female representation tends to be the highest in the countries of the North, including liberal as well as social-democratic welfare states. Female shares in union confederations of Southern European and particularly continental welfare states, on the other hand, are consistently below 50 percent.

[7] The difference in the number of NAs between the two classifications is explained by the fact that for some unions, such as the student union *NUS* (TUC), the organizing principle could not be identified. On the other hand, some smaller union confederations such as the Danish *LH*, that were not included in the first classification because low-income inclusiveness could not be meaningfully computed, are classified in the second approach.

[8] A potential alternative would have been to compute the share of women based on the survey data itself. However, based on the fact that for some confederations we only have slightly above 20 respondents this approach seemed less reliable.

Where information was available, I additionally collected data on the share of women at the level of the affiliated trade unions. This was the case for the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Thus, for these countries Figure 6 shows the share of female members for all affiliated unions with more than five members among the survey respondents. Additionally, data was available for the two largest unions of the Irish ICTU. For Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, however, I had to stick to the level of union confederations, since, as mentioned before, respondents generally did not indicate the specific union they belong to. Figure 6 shows the impressive variation that exists not only across but also within union confederations. Overall, female shares range from less than 1 to more than 90 percent. Also among the Nordic confederations there are various affiliates with less than 25 percent female members. Thus, in order to measure the effect of female membership correctly it seems important to focus on the level of individual trade unions wherever data availability allows. Consequently, the level of measurement of the variable is defined as shown in Figure 6.



Figure 5: Share of female members in union confederations [0-1].



Figure 6: Share of female members in trade unions [0-1], dashed lines indicate terciles.

The dashed vertical lines in Figure 6 divide the unions and union confederations into three groups based on terciles. Thus, the resulting variable distinguishes between members of trade unions with a high, medium or low share of women and non-members. I am aware that these rather arbitrary cutoffs lead to a loss of information. However, based on the structure of the data it is not possible to include the share of women as a moderator. I will turn back to this issue in the methods section.

3.2.3 Dependent variables

In order to capture support for "redistribution to" the three groups discussed above (Cavaillé and Trump 2015), I will focus on preferences towards specific policy proposals targeting members of these groups. The survey data contains symmetric questions for both extension and retrenchment of benefits. Although I am aware that the answers to the extension and retrenchment questions are not necessarily symmetric, since there might be slightly different factors driving policy preferences related to gains or losses, I will focus on extension in this analysis. Since, people might react more strongly if a policy

suggests to take something away from them (or others) (e.g. Chapman et al. 2017), focusing on extension can be seen as a more conservative test.

The operationalization of the dependent variables is based on the following survey question:

To what extent do you agree with the following policy reform proposals?

… increase unemployment benefits

… expand social assistance benefits for [country x] nationals only

… increase the availability of good-quality childcare services

The answer categories include *disagree strongly, disagree, agree* and *agree strongly.* For computational reasons and for the sake of interpretability I will recode the variables to dummies, which equal 1 if respondents agree or agree strongly and 0 if they disagree or disagree strongly. The direction of the second question on benefits for immigrants is switched around in order to match the direction of the other variables.

A core question concerning the suitability of the chosen survey items for testing my hypotheses is the extent to which the policies they suggest actually target the groups I am interested in.

The fit of the first item on unemployment benefits seems straightforward. However, a potential alternative would have been to focus on an item that captures preferences towards expanding labor market reintegration services for the long-term unemployed. While the former is a typical social transfer policy, the latter can be defined as an active labor market policy (ALMP), trying to bring the unemployed back into work (e.g. Bonoli 2013). Although union members' preferences towards active labor market policies are interesting in their own right, I will focus on unemployment benefits, which allows me to additionally compare union members' preferences towards a classical transfer policy with preferences towards a classical social investment policy, namely childcare services (e.g. Busemeyer and Neimanns 2017).

The second item asks respondents whether they want to exclude immigrants from a general extension of social assistance, which taps into the question of whether immigrants are perceived as less entitled to welfare benefits and services than natives. Unlike the other two items, the framing of the question is relational. In other words, respondents are not directly asked whether or not they want to expand benefits for

immigrants. Instead, the question is linked to a potential expansion of benefits for nationals. However, the item seems well-suited to measure welfare chauvinism, which is a core concept when it comes to immigrants and their social rights. This also holds in comparison to the dominant ESS item on welfare chauvinism, which asks about the point in time at which immigrants should receive the same rights to social benefits as natives. Although regularly included in studies due to a lack of alternatives, the latter has received a lot of criticism because the answer category "*Once they have become a [country] citizen*" has different meanings across countries and does not fit into the answer pattern (e.g. Mewes and Mau 2012).

Finally, the fit of the third item might not be as straightforward. One might argue that a policy extending childcare services targets working parents in general rather than working mothers in particular. However, since the aim of this policy is the reconciliation of work and family, which is still mostly seen as the responsibility of women, working mothers can be seen as the main target of such policies (e.g. Bonoli 2005).

Overall, since these items ask about *extending* benefits and services for certain groups and do not simply ask about whether or not the government is responsible for providing benefits and services for these groups, it has to be kept in mind that the current level of welfare provision in that specific area is an important factor that respondents consider.

Descriptive information on the distribution of the resulting variables is shown in Figure 21, Figure 22 and Figure 23 in the appendix. The very unequal distribution of preferences for childcare extension deserves some additional consideration. Figure 23 reveals that only about one out of six respondents disagrees to increase the availability of childcare services. This does not come as a surprise though, since Busemeyer and Neimanns (2017), Garritzmann et al. (2018) and Häusermann et al. (2019) have shown that expanding social investment policies including childcare services is highly popular because these policies appeal to a large part of the electorate, including high-skilled individuals. Since the survey question used to operationalize the dependent variables in this working paper asks about simple *positions* rather than *priorities* regarding welfare policies, support is unsurprisingly quite high, since there are no constraints attached. (see Häusermann et al. 2019).

3.2.4 Control variables

A series of individual-level control variables, which are expected to influence the relationships postulated in the hypotheses are included in the analysis. First, the standard sociodemographic variables *age*, *gender*, *education* and *income* are considered. These are included in most research on welfare preferences since they are related to both self-interest and ideological concerns. Controlling for these variables is also necessary because they are associated with the likelihood of being member of a trade union and the particular union one belongs to. Union members are for example older than the average survey respondent while highly educated and high-income union members are more likely to belong to occupational and professional unions rather than industrial or general unions (see e.g. Arndt 2018).

Age is operationalized as a continuous variable, *gender* as a dummy, where 0 stands for male and 1 for female and *education* as a quasi-continuous variable indicating the highest level of education a person has completed, ranging from 1 (less than primary) to 8 (Master's and Doctoral level). *Income* is operationalized with total household income after tax and compulsory deductions adjusted by household size. In the survey, respondents were asked to place themselves in one of ten country-specific income bands (deciles). In order to adjust this measure to household size, following a procedure suggested by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017), the midpoints of the reported income bands were assigned to each respondent, the resulting number was adjusted to household size and finally, the adjusted income was assigned to deciles again to allow for cross-national comparisons.[9] Thus, the resulting variable ranges from 1 to 10.

Besides the sociodemographic variables a number of work-related variables need to be controlled for, since they are directly related to the likelihood of being a trade union member as well as the type of union one belongs to. Additionally, the work status largely defines the extent and type of labor-market risks a person is exposed to, which in turn affects welfare policy preferences (e.g. Rehm 2011). Individuals with fixed-term contracts, for example, have been shown to be both less likely to join unions and to be

[9] In order to adjust household income to household size, household income is divided by the square root of the number of household members. However, since the survey does not contain an item on household size, I calculated an approximation of household size by adding the partner/spouse living in the same household and the number of a respondent's underage children. This measure is admittedly quite crude, but seems to be the best solution with the data available.

more at risk of becoming unemployed compared to workers with permanent contracts (see Mosimann and Pontusson 2017). The *employment situation* is operationalized with a series of dummies indicating whether a respondent is: a) employed with a permanent contract (reference category), b) employed with a fixed-term contract, c) in education, d) a pensioner, e) unemployed and f) other/ambiguous. The last category also includes the self-employed, housewives and househusbands, as well as those respondents who indicated several categories. Additionally, I control for *work time,* which is operationalized with the categories full-time (reference category), part-time and other. Finally, the *sector of employment* is operationalized with the categories public (reference category), private and other.

As mentioned above, I will also control for respondents' *ideological self-placement* as a robustness check. The variable is operationalized with a survey item that asks respondent to indicate whether they perceive themselves as "left" or "right" on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right). It is worth noting that the validity of this item as a measure of ideology has been questioned, because respondents tend to associate different things with left and right. Although it has been argued that respondents generally perceive the left-right question in socio-economic terms (e.g. Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009), positions on the cultural conflict dimension certainly play into it. However, for my purpose of controlling for the ideological position very broadly defined, these concerns seem less problematic.

Besides the individual-level controls, a number of country-level variables will be included in those models without country fixed-effects. The factors that need to be controlled for vary between the different hypotheses and essentially try to control for the current level of welfare provision in the relevant area and other country-level factors that the literature considers to be important. One macro factor I will include for all models that do not include fixed effects is *inequality*, operationalized with the Gini coefficient taken from Eurostat (2020). As elaborated by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017), countries with high union density, where the level of encompassingness among the major union confederations is high, are often characterized by low levels of income inequality. Without controlling for income inequality, encompassingnesss might appear to be associated with weaker preferences for redistributive social policies.

For hypothesis H1b) I will include a dummy for *Ghent system* countries, taking the value 1 for Sweden and Denmark and 0 otherwise. It seems crucial to include this variable, since

Ghent systems affect unions' strategic motivation to support generous benefit systems (Gordon 2015). Similarly, Gordon (2015) as well as Yang and Kwon (2019) argue for the importance of considering union *centralization* when it comes to the policy preferences of different union movements. The variable is taken from the ICTWSS *database Version 6.1* (Visser 2019) and is a summary measure of centralization of wage bargaining ranging from 0 to 2. Additionally, I will include controls for the national *unemployment rates* and *unemployment replacement rates.* The former needs to be controlled for because the level of unemployment in a country might both affect citizens' preferences regarding unemployment benefits as well as unions priorities and positions regarding policies targeting the unemployed. The numbers are drawn from Eurostat (2020) and capture the number of unemployed people as a percentage of the active labor force. The latter is included in order to control for the generosity, or more precisely the level of de-commodification of the current unemployment benefit system, which again might affect both citizens and unions' preferences. The variable is drawn from OECD.Stat (OECD 2020b) and measures the share of the previous income replaced by benefits for a standard worker after two months [0-100%]. Finally, Mosimann's (2017) research suggests that the strictness of the *national unemployment protection legislation* (EPL) might affect the degree to which unions support policies targeting labor market outsiders. Thus, I include a measure of EPL drawn from OECD.Stat (OECD 2020b) assessing the strictness of employment protection with regard to individual and collective dismissals.

For hypothesis H2b) I will control for the *share of non-EU immigrants* in the population, as suggested by Van der Waal et al. (2013). This variable serves as a proxy for the share of immigrants that are perceived to be culturally different and thus might be perceived as a cultural threat to the native population. At the same time, this variable also proxies the share of low-skilled immigrants, which might capture the economic threat perceived by low-skilled native workers in particular (e.g. van der Waal et al. 2010). This, in turn, might affect unions' positions when it comes to immigrants and their social rights. The resulting variable, measuring the share of non-EU immigrant per 1000 inhabitants, is calculated based on data from Eurostat (2020). Another variable that I will consider is the *strength of radical right parties (RRP).* Including this variable seems necessary since it is often part of the strategy of these parties to try to undermine worker solidarity with their anti-immigration agenda (Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann 2018). Additionally, the strength of these parties has been shown to also affect the positions and strategies of

other political actors (see e.g. Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018; Han 2015), potentially including trade unions. Data for this variable is drawn from the CPDS dataset (Armingeon et al. 2019). Essentially, the vote-shares of parties coded as RRP in the CPDS dataset (right1-right5) are added up to get the total RRP vote-share for each country. Excluded are parties that did not cross the threshold of 2 percent.

Finally, for hypotheses H3b) and H3c) I will control for the current provision of childcare with two variables: *public spending on childcare* and the current *costs of childcare*. The former is drawn from the OECD Family Database (OECD 2020a) and measures public expenditure on early childhood education and care as a % of GDP. The latter is taken from OECD.Stat (OECD 2020b) and measures childcare costs as a % of the household income of a couple earning 67% of the national average wage.

All country-level data corresponds to the years 2017 or 2018 depending on availability, in order to match or slightly precede the survey data. The only exception is the variable on public spending on childcare, which was only available for 2015.

3.3 Method

Based on the hierarchical structure of the data for my main hypotheses, I considered computing multi-level models with cross-level interactions. However, since the number of units at the macro level is rather low (less than 20 confederations depending on the measurement) we are left with a very limited number of degrees of freedom, which would hardly allow to introduce random slopes and cross-level interactions (see also Möhring 2012).

Additionally, including any measure at the level of trade union confederations as a moderator, such as inclusiveness scores or the share of women does not work computationally because there are no corresponding values for non-members. Thus, I would need to calculate regressions with interactions but without the main effects, which is not recommended. Alternatively, one could impute zeros for the non-existent values of non-members. However, this does not necessarily make sense conceptually.

Thus, the most straightforward approach is to create categorical trade union membership variables as described above, use non-members as the reference category and test my hypotheses with simple binomial logistic regression models. In order to control for any unobserved country-level heterogeneity, the inclusion of country fixed effects is a

standard approach. However, based on the limited variation within countries, a lot of information will be lost when it comes to hypotheses H1b, H2b, H3b and H3c. A potential alternative would be to include fixed effects at the level of welfare state regimes[10], which would allowed me to control for the structure of the welfare state and its effects on the way different groups of welfare recipients are perceived by the public (Larsen 2008). However, besides the fact this approach would still require me to control some country-level factors not captured by regime type, it would also not leave much more variation to exploit, since the problem remains the same: Among the Southern European and liberal welfare states included in the survey, variation at the level of trade union confederations is almost non-existent. Thus, for the main hypotheses I will set the focus on models without fixed effects but compare the results to models that include country fixed effects.

Quotas on age and sex and education should ensure the representativity of the survey sample. To further address any remaining over- or underrepresentation of certain groups I will apply weights.

4. Results

4.1 Simple union membership effects: H1a, H2a and H3a

In a first step I will discuss the results for the basic hypotheses H1a, H2a and H3a. Table 8 in the appendix presents the results for the corresponding binomial logistic regression models. In regression outputs of logit models only the direction and statistical significance of the coefficients can be directly interpreted, while interpreting the sizes of the effects is less straightforward, since the output is given in log odds. Thus, based on Table 8, Figure 7 visually presents the predicted probabilities of supporting the three suggested policies depending on whether one is a member of a trade union or not. Starting with H1a, represented by the top left quadrant in Figure 7, we can see that being a trade union member indeed increases the probability of supporting an expansion of unemployment benefits from approximately 45 to 55 percent, controlling for various sociodemographic and work-related factors displayed in Table 8. The effect is both statistically as well as

[10] According to Esping-Anderson (1990, 1999) European welfare states cluster into different regime types based on how norms of social solidarity, justice, and the relationship between the state, the market and the citizens are institutionalized. One can distinguish between social-democratic (northern), liberal (anglo-saxon), conservative (continental) and southern European welfare regimes.

substantively significant which confirms H1a. Moving to hypothesis H2a, the effect of trade union membership on the probability of opposing welfare chauvinistic policies is shown in the top right quadrant of Figure 7. The direction of the effect is in line with the expectations but does not reach statistical significance as one can see from the overlapping confidence intervals. Thus, H2a cannot be confirmed. Finally, focusing on hypothesis H3a, the effect of trade union membership on the probability of supporting an expansion of childcare benefits is presented in the bottom left quadrant of Figure 7. As before, the hypothesized effect does not reach statistical significance. However, this time the effect even tends towards the opposite direction with trade union members being less likely to support childcare expansion compared to similar non-members. Thus, H3a does not receive support from the data.



Figure 7: Marginal effects for H1a, H2a and H3a; adjusted for income, education, age, sex, sector of employment, employment situation and work time; country fixed effects included.

The fact that only the first of the basic hypothesis is supported by the data is a little surprising but not entirely unexpected, since it is part of my argument that one needs to consider the type and characteristics of the union a person belongs to. Marked differences between unions affecting their members preferences that were not considered in this analysis may well explain these weak effects. It also does not come as a surprise that the

policy targeted at the unemployed is the one that receives support, since it is a typical transfer policy with a clear redistributive impact that trade unions have fought for historically as compared to the more recent commitment to policies targeting the other two groups.

In terms of direction and statistical significance, the results remain the same if the whole sample is considered instead of the one reduced to respondents that do not personally belong to the target groups, or are unlikely to do so in the future (see Table 9 in the appendix). Substantively, the size of the effect of trade union membership on support for extending unemployment benefits is smaller for the whole sample (see Figure 24 in the appendix).

4.2 Union membership and economic egalitarianism

Before delving into the presentation and discussion of the results for the main hypotheses, I would like to present some evidence for the assumed causal mechanism. While there are no survey items available that would allow to directly test the solidarity argument, I will focus on whether membership in more encompassing and inclusive unions is associated with an increase in economic egalitarianism. Economic egalitarianism is operationalized with a survey item that asks respondents whether they agree to the following statement: *For a society to be fair, income differences should be small.*[11] This item should capture respondents' ideas about fairness and equality, or in the words of Mosimann and Pontusson (2017), the distributive norms they have internalized. These, in turn, are crucial factors in the assumed causal mechanism.

As mentioned before, economic egalitarianism has been shown to be a core determinant of support for many welfare policies (e.g. Guo and Gilbert 2014), although this has been questioned in the context of welfare chauvinism (see van der Waal et al. 2010). Empirically and also conceptually economic egalitarianism is closely related to preferences for a redistributive welfare state and often similar survey items are used to measure the two concepts. The latter has been thoroughly investigated by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017, 2020) as well as Arndt (2018) or Yang and Kwon (2019) and I will not replicate their analyses. Nevertheless, it seems important to get an idea of whether the

[11] For easier interpretation the variable is dichotomized, taking the value 1 if respondents agree or agree strongly and 0 if they disagree or disagree strongly.

assumed effect of trade union membership in more or less encompassing and inclusive unions on economic egalitarianism is actually present in the data at hand.

Since the dependent variable has been recoded into a dummy variable, binomial logistic regression models are computed. Table 7 in the appendix show the resulting coefficients in log odds. To allow for an interpretation of effect sizes, the relevant coefficients are transformed into odds ratios and presented in Figure 8 below. [12]



Figure 8: Economic egalitarianism: coefficients in odds ratios; TU member (reference = non-member); CI = 0.9; additional controls not shown here: sociodemographics, work-related variables and several country-level variables (see Table 7).

Irrespective of the measurement approach, the results point in the expected direction: Members of more encompassing and low-income inclusive unions (general or industrial/sectoral unions) are more likely to have an economically egalitarian ideology than non-members, while no such effect can be found among members of (high-income) occupational/professional unions. As far as the first, survey-based measurement is concerned, however, members of low-income unions cannot be significantly distinguished from non-members in terms of economic egalitarianism.

4.3 Main hypotheses: H1b, H2b and H3b

1st measure: encompassingness and inclusiveness

The results for hypotheses H1b, H2b and H3b, based on the first, survey-based measurement approach of encompassingness and inclusiveness are presented in Table 2 and Figure 9. As for the basic hypotheses, I computed binomial logistic regression models,

[12] In Figure 8, as well as all subsequent forest plots presenting odds ratios, the colors distinguish between positive and negative effects. An odds ratio above one indicates a positive effect, while an odds ratio below one indicates a negative effect. Confidence intervals (CI=0.9) are indicated by whiskers around each coefficient. If they cross the vertical line at an odds ratio of one, the respective effect fails to reach statistical significance.

but this time no country fixed effects were added because of limited within-country variation. Instead, a number of country-level controls were introduced for each model (see Table 2). To allow for an interpretation of effect sizes the log odds presented in Table 2 have to be transformed to odds ratios. Thus, Figure 9 presents the odds ratios of supporting the three welfare policies discussed above based on the distinction between being member of an encompassing, low-income or high-income confederation. Non-members constitute the references category.

Table 2: Binomial logistic regression models for hypotheses H1b, H2b and H3b; 1st measure.

	Dependent variable:		
	Extension: unemployment benefits	Extension: social assistance for immigrants	Extension: childcare services
Union membership (Ref: non-member)			
Encompassing	0.41*** (0.09)	0.11 (0.07)	0.62*** (0.12)
Low-income	0.40** (0.19)	-0.12 (0.15)	-0.47*** (0.18)
High-income	0.15 (0.17)	0.15 (0.15)	-0.13 (0.20)
Adj. household income	-0.08*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Education	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Sex (Ref: male)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.09* (0.05)	0.26*** (0.10)
Age	0.004 (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01* (0.003)
Sector (Ref: public)			
Private	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.03 (0.09)
Other	0.10 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.08)	0.10 (0.13)
Work (Ref: permanent)			
Fixed term	0.28*** (0.11)	-0.17* (0.09)	0.07 (0.14)
Student		0.72*** (0.19)	-0.32 (0.31)
Pensioner	-0.56*** (0.21)	0.46*** (0.17)	-0.09 (0.25)
Unemployed		0.15 (0.18)	0.18 (0.29)
Other/ambiguous	-0.27 (0.18)	0.21 (0.14)	-0.24 (0.21)
Work time (Ref: full-time)			
Part-time	0.10 (0.10)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.33** (0.13)
Other	0.55*** (0.21)	-0.31* (0.16)	0.09 (0.25)
Ghent	-0.89*** (0.26)		
Unemployment rate	0.11*** (0.02)		
Unempl. replacement rate	0.04*** (0.01)		
Centralization	-4.36*** (0.97)		
EPL	-0.62*** (0.21)		
Exp childcare			-0.40*** (0.12)

Costs childcare			-0.02*** (0.003)
Inequality	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.10*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.02)
Non-EU immigration		-0.07*** (0.02)	
RRP strength		-0.65 (0.49)	
Constant	9.51*** (2.64)	2.52*** (0.48)	-2.09*** (0.56)
Observations	4,878	7,743	5,579
Log Likelihood	-3,270.87	-5,116.70	-2,476.42
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,583.74	10,273.39	4,992.83
Note:			*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01



Figure 9: Coefficients H1b, H2b, H3b in odds ratios; TU member (reference = non-member); CI = 0.9; additional controls not shown here: work-related variables and several country-level variables (see Table 2).

Once again, the results seem to be in line with the expectations when it comes to the unemployed. The first panel in Table 2 shows that both members of low-income as well as encompassing union confederations are significantly more in favour of expanding unemployment benefits compared to non-members while members of high-income union confederations cannot be distinguished from the latter. More precisely, Figure 9 (upper left quadrant) shows that the odds of members of encompassing or low-income inclusive union confederations to support an expansion of unemployment benefits are around 1.5 times the odds of non-members. Figure 25 in the appendix shows the same results in terms of predicted probabilities: being member of an encompassing or low-income inclusive union confederation increases the probability of supporting the suggested policy by 10 percentage points in comparison to non-members.

Directly comparing these substantive results to selected controls in Figure 9 we can see that although both education and income significantly reduce the odds of supporting the policy, their effects are much smaller than the trade union membership effects. Concerning the other control variables not displayed in Figure 9, Table 2 shows that working on a fixed-term contract significantly increases the likelihood of support in comparison with the permanently employed while being a pensioner significantly reduces it. This is in line with risk-related arguments made for example by Rehm (2011).

Moving to the second panel in Table 2, which shows the first results for hypothesis H2b, we can see that none of the union membership coefficients reaches statistical significance. This can also be seen in the upper right quadrant of Figure 9. These results indicate that even if trade union inclusiveness and encompassingness are taken into account, no significant relationship between membership in any type of union and (anti-) welfare chauvinistic policies can be detected. Talking about tendencies, being member of an encompassing or high-income union confederation seems to be associated with stronger opposition against welfare chauvinistic policies compared to non-members and members of low-income union confederations. This goes against the expectations of hypothesis H2b, in particular with regard to members of low-income inclusive unions. Having a look at the control variables we see that income and education, as well as being female and of young age increases support for extending benefits for immigrants. The fact that the effects of income and education go in the opposite direction in comparison to H2b, indicate that there might be different forces at play, which I will return to below.

Finally, the third panel in Table 2 presents the first results for hypothesis H3b. The coefficients indicate that being member of an encompassing union significantly increases support for childcare extension while belonging to a low-income inclusive union has the opposite effect. Focusing on the odds ratios displayed in the bottom left quadrant of Figure 9 we can see that these effects are quite sizable. In line with the expectations of H3b, belonging to an encompassing union confederation increases the odds of supporting childcare expansion by 1.85 in comparison to non-members. The non-overlapping confidence intervals indicate that the positive effect also remains significant if members of encompassing union confederations are directly compared to both members of low-income and high-income confederations. Although, as discussed above, the overall probability of supporting childcare extension is very high, there is nevertheless an impressive variation, ranging from around 77 percent among members of low-income

inclusive union confederations to more than 90 percent among those belonging to encompassing confederations (see Figure 25 in the appendix). Keeping in mind that no significant overall effect of trade union membership on support for childcare extension could be found, these results clearly confirm the importance of considering trade union heterogeneity. The substantive negative effect of belonging to low-income inclusive union confederations as compared to non-members is surprising. However, the fact that childcare policies are often perceived as policies for the middle class rather than the lower classes, might be one explanatory factor, which will be discussed below.

The control variables largely conform with the expectations. In line with arguments about self-interest, being female and working full-time increases the likelihood of supporting the suggested policy.

Overall, it can be concluded that only hypothesis H1b can be clearly entirely confirmed by the results based on the measurements of inclusiveness and encompassingness suggested by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017). However, in line with the expectations, the policy positions of members of high-income union confederations can never be significantly distinguished from those of non-members, while those belonging to encompassing confederations are consistently, and with the exception of H2b, significantly more supportive of the suggested extensions than non-members.

As shown in Table 10 and Figure 26 in the appendix, the results remain largely the same if country fixed effects are included. This indicates that the country-level factors included in the models displayed in Table 2 were successful in controlling for the most relevant differences between countries. The only noteworthy difference concerns the policy targeting working mothers, namely childcare extension. If country fixed effects are included, the rather surprising finding that members of low-income inclusive confederations are significantly less likely than non-members to support childcare expansion does not hold anymore. This indicates that the unexpected prior results might have been driven by omitted variable bias.

In a next step I will discuss the results for a more indirect approach to assessing unions' encompassingness and inclusiveness that does not rely on survey-based measures that are potentially affected by small-n issues.

2nd measure: organizing principle

Relying on unions' organizing principle as the main independent variable instead of the measures based on Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) yields very similar results when it comes to hypothesis H1b (first panel in Table 3 and top left quadrant in Figure 10).

Table 3: Binomial logistic regression models for hypotheses H1b, H2b and H3b; 2nd measure.

	Dependent variable:		
	Extension: unemployment benefits	Extension: social assistance for immigrants	Extension: childcare services
Union membership (Ref: non-member)			
Org. principle: General	0.39*** (0.14)	-0.05 (0.11)	0.24 (0.15)
Org. principle: Industrial/sectoral	0.44*** (0.10)	0.09 (0.09)	0.36*** (0.13)
Org. principle: Occup./prof.	0.12 (0.14)	0.30** (0.12)	0.07 (0.17)
Adj. household income	-0.08*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Education	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Sex (Ref: male)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.09* (0.05)	0.28*** (0.10)
Age	0.004 (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01* (0.003)
Sector (Ref: public)			
Private	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.02 (0.09)
Other	0.10 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.08)	0.12 (0.13)
Work (Ref: permanent)			
Fixed term	0.29*** (0.11)	-0.18** (0.09)	0.07 (0.14)
Student		0.72*** (0.19)	-0.33 (0.31)
Pensioner	-0.55** (0.21)	0.46*** (0.17)	-0.14 (0.25)
Unemployed		0.15 (0.18)	0.10 (0.29)
Other/ambiguous	-0.26 (0.18)	0.20 (0.14)	-0.28 (0.21)
Work time (Ref: full-time)			
Part-time	0.09 (0.10)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.37*** (0.13)
Other	0.54*** (0.21)	-0.31* (0.16)	0.09 (0.25)
Ghent	-0.88*** (0.27)		
Unemployment rate	0.11*** (0.02)		
Unempl. replacement rate	0.04*** (0.01)		
Centralization	-4.39*** (0.95)		
EPL	-0.63*** (0.23)		
Exp. childcare			-0.20* (0.12)
Costs childcare			-0.01*** (0.003)
inequality	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.10*** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.02)
Non-EU immigration		-0.08*** (0.02)	

RRP strength		-0.59 (0.49)	
Constant	9.58*** (2.64)	2.54*** (0.48)	-2.61*** (0.56)
Observations	4,880	7,752	5,583
Log Likelihood	-3,270.76	-5,121.35	-2,494.69
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,583.53	10,282.71	5,029.38
Note:			*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01



Figure 10: Coefficients H1b, H2b, H3b in odds ratios; TU member (reference = non-member); CI = 0.9; additional controls not shown here: work-related variables and several country-level variables (see Table 3).

Members of both general and industrial/sectoral unions are significantly more likely to support an extension of benefits for the unemployed compared to non-members. Also substantively the results remain very much the same: As shown in Figure 10, the odds of members of general and industrial/sectoral unions to support an expansion of unemployment benefits are around 1.5 times the odds of non-members. In terms of predicted probabilities this again corresponds to an increase of approximately 10 percentage points (see Figure 27 in the appendix). As above, members of occupational and professional unions cannot be significantly distinguished from non-members.

Thus, overall, hypothesis H1b receives a lot of support from the data, independent of whether inclusiveness and encompassingness are directly measured or the organizing principle is used as a proxy.

Moving on to hypothesis H2b, odds ratios presented in the top right quadrant in Figure 10 reveal some differences in comparison to the first measure which did not yield any significant results. While members of general and industrial/sectoral unions cannot be significantly distinguished from non-members, respondents belonging to occupational and professional unions are significantly more likely to support an extension of social benefits for immigrants compared to non-members. Thus, once again the results do not support hypothesis H2b, and now even point in the opposite direction. Consequently, H2b has to be rejected. In conclusion, the data indicates that the core argument of this paper cannot be applied to welfare policies targeting immigrants.

Finally, the results for hypothesis H3b also differ from those discussed above. While both members of general as well as industrial/sectorial union tend to be more supportive of extending childcare services than non-members, which is in line with the expectations, only the latter reaches statistical significance (second panel in Table 3 and bottom left quadrant in Figure 10). However, it was exactly this group of members of low-income confederations, which appeared to be even less likely to support the policy than non-members based on the first measurement approach. Overall, the results for H3b do not seem to be robust. As already mentioned above, this might be due to omitted variable bias. Indeed, if we compare the models, which include country fixed effects instead of a number of country level controls, the results of the two measurement approaches are much more in line concerning hypothesis H3b (see Figure 26 and Figure 28 in the appendix).

Omitted variable bias seems to be much less of a problem for the other two hypotheses. as shown in Table 11 and Figure 28 in the appendix, the results for H1b and H2b remain essentially the same if country fixed effects are included; be it in terms of direction, statistical significance or effect size. Relying on the AIC to compare the quality of the models with and without country fixed effects, we can see that the model fit is hardly improved by including country fixed effects for H1b and H2b, while there is a clear improvement when it comes to hypothesis H3b (see Table 3 above and Table 11 in the appendix).

4.4 Women's share: H3c

Since H3b did not receive consistent support from the data, it becomes even more interesting to discuss the results for the alternative hypothesis H3c. Table 4 shows that members of trade unions with a high share of women among their membership are

significantly more likely to support an extension of childcare services compared to non-members, whereas no such effect can be found for those belonging to unions with medium or low shares of women. Substantively, Figure 11 shows that the odds of members of unions with high female shares to support childcare extension are 2.5 times higher than those of non-members, which is quite impressive. This translates into an increase of approximately 10 percentage points in the probability of supporting the policy (see Figure 29 in the appendix).

As one can see from the non-overlapping confidence intervals in both Figure 11 below and Figure 29 in the appendix, members of unions with a high share of women are not only more likely to support an extension of childcare services than non-members but also significantly more likely to support the policy than members of unions with lower female shares. Thus, also the direct comparison yields significant results.

The confidence in these finding is further strengthened by the fact that the results remain the same if country fixed effects are included (see Figure 30 in the appendix).

Table 4: Binomial logistic regression model for hypothesis H3c.

	Dependent variable:
	Extension: childcare services
Union membership (Ref: non-member)	
Women's share: high	0.93*** (0.20)
Women's share: medium	0.01 (0.13)
Women's share: low	0.25 (0.16)
Adj. household income	-0.02 (0.01)
Education	0.01 (0.02)
Sex (Ref: male)	0.22** (0.10)
Age	-0.01* (0.003)
Sector (Ref: public)	
Private	0.06 (0.10)
Other	0.18 (0.13)
Work time (Ref: full-time)	
Part-time	-0.34** (0.14)
Other	0.13 (0.25)
Work (Ref: permanent)	
Fixed term	0.10 (0.14)
Student	-0.40 (0.31)
Pensioner	-0.13 (0.26)
Unemployed	0.14 (0.29)

Other/ambiguous	-0.29 (0.21)
Exp. childcare	-0.30** (0.12)
Costs childcare	-0.02*** (0.003)
Inequality	0.16*** (0.02)
Constant	-2.55*** (0.56)
Observations	5,421
Log Likelihood	-2,402.27
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,844.55
Note:	*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01



Figure 11: Coefficients H3c in odds ratios; TU member (reference = non-member); CI = 0.9; additional controls not shown here: work-related variables and several country-level variables (see Table 4).

4.5 Robustness checks – self-selection

In order to address the issue of self-selection with the cross-sectional survey data at hand, two additional robustness checks are conducted. While only the core coefficients are shown below, full regression tables are provided in the appendix. In a first step, despite potential post-treatment bias, an additional variable controlling for ideological predispositions is added to the main models discussed above. Figure 12 below shows the results for the first measurement approach, distinguishing between members of encompassing, low-income and high-income confederations. As expected by the literature, individuals who consider themselves as more right-wing (as opposed to left-wing) are significantly less likely to support increased benefits/services for all three groups of recipients. However, the inclusion of ideological self-placement into the models

does not alter any of the conclusions made above. The only difference concerns the size of the effects and the level of statistical significance.



Figure 12: Robustness Ideology: coefficients H1b, H2b, H3b in odds ratios; TU member (reference = non-member); CI = 0.9, additional controls not shown here: sociodemographics, work-related variables and several country-level variables (see Table 13).

Although the odds ratios are reduced from approximately 1.5 to 1.35 and 1.43 respectively, members of encompassing and low-income union confederations remain significantly more supportive of extending unemployment benefits than non-members, while no such effect can be found for members of high-income confederations (H1b). In contrast, the results for H2b remain insignificant not lending any support to the hypothesis. Also the results for H3b remain largely unchanged; only the effect of belonging to an encompassing union confederation is slightly reduced in terms of effect size with an odds ratio of 1.75 instead of 1.85.

The same picture emerges if trade unions' organizing principle is considered instead of measures of inclusiveness and encompassingness: adding ideological self-placement as a control variable does not change any of the main findings (see Table 14 in the appendix).

As shown in Figure 13 below, this also applies to hypothesis H3c. Apart from a slight reduction in effect size, controlling for ideological self-placement does not affect the finding discussed above: Belonging to a trade union with a high share of female members clearly increases the odds of supporting an extension of childcare services in comparison to non-members as well as members of more male-dominated trade unions.



Figure 13: Robustness Ideology: coefficients H3c in odds ratios; TU member (reference = non-member); CI = 0.9; additional controls not shown here: sociodemographics, work-related variables and several country-level variables (see Table 15).

As a second robustness check, the sample is reduced to respondents from so-called "Ghent-countries", namely Sweden and Denmark. As elaborated on above, the material incentives to join unions that exist in these countries provide allow for an interesting robustness check. Since the two countries belong to the same welfare state regime, which should control for any effects of welfare state structure I will not include any macro level variables for this robustness check, although I am aware that this might miss some potentially confounding factors.

Since, according to my first measurement all trade union confederations in Sweden and Denmark either belong to the encompassing or high-income category, I cannot test the robustness of previous finding when it comes to low-income confederations. However, as far as the other two categories are concerned, the odds ratios presented in Figure 14 confirm what I have found above (see Figure 9): members of encompassing union confederations are more likely to support an extension of both unemployment benefits and childcare services compared to non-members, while members of high-income confederations cannot be distinguished from the latter.



Figure 14: Robustness Ghent: coefficients H1b, H2b, H3b in odds ratios; TU member (reference = non-member); CI = 0.9; additional controls not shown here: sociodemographics, work-related variables (see Table 16).

Also if the organizing principle is used as a proxy for encompassingness and inclusiveness, the results for the two Ghent-countries are largely in line with those for all countries in the sample (see Figure 10 and Figure 15). The only difference, once again, concerns effect sizes. Interestingly, the relevant effects are larger for the subsample of Sweden and Denmark. For example, the odds of members of general unions to support an expansion of unemployment are around 2.3 instead of 1.5 times the odds of non-members.



Figure 15: Robustness Ghent: coefficients H1b, H2b, H3b in odds ratios; TU member (reference = non-member); CI = 0.9; additional controls not shown here: sociodemographics, work-related variables (see Table 17).

Finally, also the results for hypothesis H3c remain robust once the sample is reduced to Sweden and Denmark. Only trade union members who belong to unions with a high share of female members are significantly more likely to support an extension of childcare services compared to non-members (see Figure 16).

In sum, although the issue of self-selection cannot be definitely settled with the data at hand, the two robustness checks make it more credible that the effects found in the main models are not purely driven by self-selection but rather represent actual membership effects.



Figure 16: Robustness Ghent: coefficients H3c in odds ratios; TU member (reference = non-member); CI = 0.9; additional controls not shown here: sociodemographics, work-related variables (see Table 18).

4.6 Additional exploratory analyses

Until now, with the exception of hypothesis H3c for working mothers, encompassingness and inclusiveness have been very broadly defined with the extent to which unions organize across different occupations and income levels. Thus, in a last step I would like to go beyond this broad understanding of the concepts and conduct two additional exploratory analyses for solidarity towards the unemployed and immigrants. Both analyses will focus on Sweden as a case study. This choice is driven by both data availability considerations and the above-mentioned fact that union choice in Sweden almost exclusively follows the employment sector of a person, which reduces self-selection concerns.

First, I will address the group of the unemployed. Unfortunately, there is no consistent data available on the number of unemployed organized by different unions (see Kjellberg 2017). However, I will take advantage of the fact that trade unions and unemployment funds are closely linked in Sweden. According to Kjellberg (2009), Sweden has had state-supported, union-led unemployment funds since 1935. Although fund members do not necessarily have to be a member of the corresponding trade union and union members can also abstain from fund membership, there is a large overlap. In 2007, only 8 percent of union members abstained from fund membership and only 15 percent of fund members were not affiliated to the corresponding trade union (Kjellberg 2009: 487f.). Thus, I will look at the share of unemployed per union-led fund as a proxy for the share of

unemployed among union members. The data is drawn from the *Arbetsförmedlingen*, which is the Swedish Public Employment Service and the *Swedish Unemployment Insurance Inspectorate* (IAF) (Arbetsförmedlingen 2020; IAF 2020).

Figure 17 presents the unemployment shares assigned to Swedish trade unions based on data from the corresponding fund.[13] The colors indicate the confederations these unions are affiliated to. In line with the expectations, unions affiliated to those confederations that have been identified above as more encompassing and inclusive, are also those that tend to have a larger share of unemployed workers. The Swedish LO, an encompassing and low-income inclusive vertical organization tops the list, followed by TCO, whose affiliates are either vertically or horizontally organized, and finally SACO, which exclusively represents horizontally organized professional unions.



Figure 17: Share of unemployed per union-led fund; dashed lines indicate terciles.

The dashed vertical lines divide the unions into three groups based on terciles. Thus, the resulting independent variable distinguishes between members of Swedish trade unions with high, medium or low unemployment shares in their funds and non-members. Finally, a binomial logistic regression model is computed with support for an extension of unemployment benefits as the dependent variable (see Table 19 in the appendix). The

[13] Most unions share the same name with their unemployment fund, thus assignment was straightforward. The only exceptions were *FTF* and *Finansförbundet*, which both belong to the *Finans- och Försäkrigsbranschens* fund and *Vårdförbundet* and the SACO unions, which belong to the *Akademikernas* fund.

effects of interest are displayed in Figure 18, which shows that members of trade unions with a high or medium share of unemployed workers in their fund, are significantly more likely to support an extension of unemployment benefits compared to non-members, while no such effect is found for members of trade unions with low unemployment shares. In terms of effect size it is worth noting that the odds of members of unions with high unemployment shares to support an increase in unemployment benefits are 5.42 times higher compared to non-members, which is quite impressive.



Figure 18: Coefficients for unemployment share in odds ratios; TU member (reference = non-member); CI = 0.9; additional controls not shown here: sociodemographics, work-related variables (see Table 19).

To conclude, irrespective of whether a broad or more specific understanding of encompassingness and inclusiveness is applied with regard to the unemployed, the results remain robust.

Finally, in order to address the group of immigrants more specifically, I was looking for data on the share of immigrants per union or confederation. Unfortunately, no such data is available. As an alternative approach I matched data on the share of immigrant workers by sector (ISIC Rev. 3, 2-digit level) taken from the online database *OECD.stat* (OECD 2020b) [14] with information on the main sectors organized by Swedish trade unions provided by (Kjellberg 2017). This allows me to distinguish between trade unions, which organize sectors with high shares of immigrant workers and those which organize sectors with only few immigrant workers. This does not necessarily imply, however, that more immigrants are organized by these unions. Essentially, a high share of immigrant workers

[14] The data on immigrants by sector for Sweden is based on population registers from December 2003 (OECD 2020b). Unfortunately, more recent data is not available. Immigrant workers are defined as foreign-born workers.

in a sector organized by a union might have two opposite effects: On the one hand, it could imply that these unions organize more immigrants or perceive them as potential future members and thus take policy positions in favour of immigrants. On the other hand, however, a high share of immigrants in the sector might also be perceived as a threat to unions' native core workers, which might imply more negative stances on policies targeting immigrants (see Mosimann 2017 for similar arguments regarding the unemployed).

Despite these contradictory expectations it seems interesting to take a look at the data. Figure 19 presents the share of immigrant workers in sectors organized by each union.[15] Detailed information on the sectors matched to the unions is shown in Table 20 in the appendix.



Figure 19: Share of immigrant workers in sectors organized by union; dashed lines indicate terciles.

As above, the colors indicate the confederations these unions are affiliated to. Unlike above, however, no clear pattern can be identified and with the exception of the *Swedish Hotel and Restaurant Workers' Union,* variation is rather low. Once again, the dashed

[15] Some unions could not be considered, because OECD.Stat did not provide information on the share of immigrants working in the sectors they organize. This concerns the sectors *Public Administration and Defence* and *Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products, Including Furniture.* If unions organize more than one sector, the mean of immigrant shares is taken.

vertical lines split unions in three groups based on terciles. and the resulting variable distinguishes between members of trade unions which organize sectors with high, medium or low shares of immigrant workers. Non-members constitute the reference category.



Figure 20: Coefficients for immigrant share in odds ratios; TU member (reference = non-member); CI = 0.9; additional controls not shown here: sociodemographics, work-related variables (see Table 19).

The full results of the binomial logistic regression model are shown in the second panel of Table 19 in the appendix, but the main coefficients displayed in Figure 20 clearly show the lack of statistically significant effects. Either the share of immigrants in the sectors unions organize does not affect members' policy preferences regarding welfare benefits for immigrants at all, or the contradictory effects mentioned above, might have cancelled each-other out. However, further research is needed to disentangle these effects.

5. Discussion

Overall, the findings presented in the previous sections only partially confirm the background hypothesis of this working paper. While the results clearly emphasize the need to account for the heterogeneity that exists within the trade union movement, and show that the scope and level of solidaristic policy preferences among trade union members vary strongly across unions, the arguments advanced by this working paper do not seem to hold for all the groups and related policies considered. Based on that, the main question I will address in this discussion is why the core hypothesis could be confirmed for the unemployed but not for the other two groups. Arguably, the answer to this

question could either lie in the characteristics of the groups themselves or in the nature of the policies suggested to address the risks they are exposed to.

The unemployed

The only group, for which the core hypothesis is strongly supported by the data, are the unemployed. Irrespective of whether encompassingness and inclusiveness are measured with the data at hand, or the organizing principle is used as a proxy, the hypotheses concerning the unemployed receive consistent support. Additional robustness checks addressing the issue of self-selection further strengthen confidence in the results of the main models. Thus, both H1a and H1b are clearly confirmed: Membership in general or industrial/sectoral unions, which organize across occupations and income levels, is associated with support for extending unemployment benefits among those with low personal risks, while no such effect can be found for membership in occupational and professional unions, which mainly organize high-income members. Thus, when it comes to the unemployed, Mosimann and Pontusson's (2017) solidarity argument can indeed be extended from broad redistributive preferences (redistribution from) to support for particular social policies targeting vulnerable groups (redistribution to).

These results confirm ideas or expectations expressed in previous papers (e.g. Mosimann 2017; Gordon 2015) but never explicitly tested at the level of union confederations or individual trade unions. At the same time they raise further doubts about the validity of arguments made by Rueda (2007) concerning the role of trade unions in the context of outsider politics. The results of this paper would be hard to explain if trade unions could indeed be equated with insider-oriented policy only. However, to put the results of this paper to the test and challenge Rueda (2007) more directly, future studies should look at union members' preferences towards active labour market policies (ALMP) instead of unemployment benefits, since the former are more clearly outsider-oriented (see e.g. Häusermann and Schwander 2012). Related to that, the question remains whether the effects found for the unemployed can be fully attributed to solidarity with the group, or whether it is rather the nature of the policy that drove the results. As elaborated on above, unemployment benefits belong to the group of passive transfer policies, which have always been strongly supported by trade unions. This should apply to low-income unions in particular. At the same time, the policy has clear redistributive functions, since unemployment risks tend to be highly and negatively correlated to income and skill-level (see e.g. Rehm 2011) although this does not apply to the same extent to the different

welfare regimes (Häusermann and Schwander 2012). Thus, in contrast to arguments made by Becher and Pontusson (2011), my results indicate that the income distribution within unions also strongly matters for social insurance policies, as long as they entail a clear redistributive effect.

Immigrants

In contrast to the unemployed, the results do not support the hypotheses concerning immigrants, irrespective of the way encompassingness and inclusiveness are captured. The relevant coefficients remain insignificant or even point in the opposite direction of the hypotheses. These null findings might, at least partly, be the result of an argument discussed in chapter 2.4 that works against my hypothesized mechanism, suggesting that unions which represent a large share of low-income workers might take a more restrictive stance towards policies related to immigrants because their members are on average more threatened by immigration, both economically and culturally, than members of other union types.

In more general terms, the data indicates that the core argument of this paper cannot be applied to welfare policies targeting immigrants (i.e. welfare chauvinism). This might be the result of two related factors. First, as argued by Eger and Breznau (2017), Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) or van der Waal et al. (2010), welfare chauvinistic preferences do not seem to follow the same logic as preferences for redistribution or welfare generosity. Education, which tends to go hand in hand with cultural openness and progressiveness, has been shown to increase opposition to welfare chauvinistic policies (e.g. van der Waal et al. 2010), which could be confirmed in the present analysis. Similar to support for redistribution, however, preferences for extending unemployment benefits decrease with rising income and education, while no significant effects could be found in the context of childcare extension.

The second factor concerns the discussion on the relation between economic egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism. As shown by van der Waal et al. (2010), economic egalitarianism does not necessarily increase opposition to welfare chauvinism, at least among the lower educated. Even otherwise economically egalitarian individuals might oppose an extension of social assistance for immigrants based on concerns about a potential welfare state backlash. Essentially, the results of the present study seem to indicate that unions (even the encompassing and inclusive ones) fail to keep economic egalitarianism among the less educated from translating into welfare chauvinism.

However, to further address this issue, one would need to have a closer look at interaction effects with education.

Working mothers

Finally, the findings for hypothesis H3b are mixed, depend on the way encompassingness and inclusiveness are measured and seem to be affected by omitted variable bias. This lack of robustness particularly concerns the effect of belonging to low-income confederations or vertically organized industrial/sectoral unions. Being a member of an encompassing or general union, however, is consistently associated with an increased likelihood of supporting an extension of childcare services in comparison to non-members, although the coefficient is not statistically significant in all models.

Keeping in mind that the provision of childcare services is often perceived as a policy for the middle class rather than the lower classes, the non-robust findings for membership in low-income inclusive, vertically organized unions are not entirely unexpected. (see e.g. J. L. Garritzmann, Busemeyer, and Neimanns 2018). Some studies even show that social investment policies like universal childcare can have adverse redistributive effects, since highly educated citizens know better how to access and benefit from these policies (e.g. Pavolini and Van Lancker 2018). This clearly distinguishes childcare policy from unemployment policy and might account for the different results. Overall, the nature of the proposed policy definitely contributed to the results and conclusions about union members' general solidarity with working mothers are difficult to make, because the type of policy and the group it targets are closely linked.

An alternative way to capture the horizontal aspects of inclusiveness, more directly related to the group of interest, has been tested in hypothesis H3b, which receives strong support from the data. Among individuals, which are unlikely to be personally targeted by the policy, members of trade unions with a high share of women are significantly more likely to support an extension of childcare services compared to similar non-members, as well as members of unions with fewer female members.

These results hint at the existence of a more direct and less abstract solidarity effect for the group of working mothers. For the case of Sweden, an additional analysis has confirmed similar effects for the group of the unemployed: Members of unions with high unemployment rates among fund members are more supportive of extending

unemployment benefits than similar non-members, while no such effect is found for those belonging to unions with low unemployment rates among fund members.

Limitations

A core limitation of the present analysis, which has already been addressed in previous sections is the issue of self-selection. As mentioned before, the cross-sectional nature of the survey data used in this working paper does not allow to definitely settle the issue, which has to be kept in mind when interpreting the findings, although two robustness tests have strengthened confidence in the results.

More generally, omitted variable bias is definitely an issue. Maybe less so for the hypotheses concerning the unemployed but certainly for the hypotheses related to working mothers. The threat of post-treatment bias did not allow to include controls for ideological factors, like gender-equality attitudes, which definitely play an important role in this context.

A second major limitation concerns the low number of current members per confederation or trade union in the sample, which obviously affects the validity of the survey-based inclusiveness measure. A number of smaller union confederations had to be excluded from the analysis because they were only represented by a few respondents. This, in turn, leads to an overrepresentation of comparatively large confederations, which is problematic in itself but also reduces within-country variation in trade union characteristics. The lack of within-country variation is particularly problematic in the Southern European countries Italy and Spain, which drop out of the analysis in some models which include country fixed effects.

Low numbers of union members are obviously less of a problem for the Swedish and Danish samples, where union density is very high. This, however, leads to the related problem that the findings tend to be driven by the Scandinavian countries, which reduces their generalizability.

6. Conclusion

The aim of this working paper has been to learn more about how trade union membership affects solidarity with vulnerable social groups and their welfare needs. In particular, the goal has been to investigate potential moderating effects of the level of encompassingness

and inclusiveness of trade unions on their members' preferences for expansive welfare policies for three groups of interest: the unemployed, immigrants and working mothers.

Largely based on the social capital literature and work by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017; 2020) it has been argued that members of encompassing and low-income inclusive unions will be more supportive of extending welfare benefits for the three groups than non-members. In contrast, no such effect is expected among members of unions with a more narrow membership base.

Novel data from the ERC-project *welfarepriorities* allowed me to investigate union membership effects more directly than previous studies, since respondents were asked to indicate the name of the union they belong to, which is very rare in cross-country surveys. The results of the analysis confirm that relying on simple yes/no membership questions to learn more about union members' solidaristic preferences misses a lot of underlying variation, which is revealed once information about the membership distribution is taken into consideration. Overall, however, the core argument advanced by this working paper does not hold for all the groups and related policies considered. As far as the main models are concerned, the strongest and most robust results are found for the policy targeting the unemployed, while the findings for solidarity with immigrants and working mothers are either insignificant or lack consistency across different model specifications. I do not have a definite explanation as to why the core hypothesis has been confirmed for the unemployed but not for the other two groups, but it appears that the solidarity effect of belonging to a union that organizes across occupations and income levels is limited to policies that are clearly perceived as redistributive. Importantly, public perceptions might also differ from the actual distributive impact of a policy. Finally, if inclusiveness is defined in terms of gender rather than income, the results confirm a solidarity effect for the group of working mothers.

What are the implications of these findings for solidarity in times of declining membership in vertically organized industrial unions and increases in membership in white-collar and professional unions? On the one hand, the findings of this paper regarding unemployment policy lend support to the argument that these developments might decrease solidaristic preferences among union members. On the other hand, changes in the composition of the workforce, which forced unions to develop new strategies and mobilize new groups beyond their core constituencies, such as women or

part-time workers, can also increase solidarity effects for some vulnerable groups, as shown for policies targeting working mothers.

In a next step, the actual policy positions of trade unions with different membership compositions as well as the information they communicate to their members should be systematically analyzed in order to learn more about the causal pathway connecting the membership distribution and individual-level preferences.

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6. Appendix

Table 5: Coding: Organizing principle of unions affiliated to mixed union confederations (TUC, ICTU, TCO, LO Denmark).

country	Confederation	union	organizing principle	source
Ireland	ICTU	AHCPS	occupational/ professional	official website
Ireland	ICTU	ASTI	occupational/ professional	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Ireland	ICTU	Connect	occupational/ professional	official website
Ireland	ICTU	CPSU	occupational/ professional	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Ireland	ICTU	FORSA	general	official website
Ireland	ICTU	FSU	occupational/ professional	ICTU website
Ireland	ICTU	GMB	general	ICTU website
Ireland	ICTU	IBOA	occupational/ professional	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Ireland	ICTU	IFUT	occupational/ professional	official website
Ireland	ICTU	IMO	occupational/ professional	ICTU website
Ireland	ICTU	IMPACT	general	https://www.forsa.ie/about-forsa/who-we-are/
Ireland	ICTU	INMO	occupational/ professional	ICTU website
Ireland	ICTU	INTO	occupational/ professional	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Ireland	ICTU	ITGWU	general	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Ireland	ICTU	MANDATE	general	official website
Ireland	ICTU	National Union of Journalists	occupational/ professional	ICTU website
Ireland	ICTU	Prison Officers Association	occupational/ professional	official website
Ireland	ICTU	SIPTU	general	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Ireland	ICTU	TSSA	occupational/ professional	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Ireland	ICTU	TUI	occupational/ professional	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Ireland	ICTU	UNISON	general	Smale (2020)
Ireland	ICTU	Unite	general	ICTU website
Ireland	ICTU	WUI	general	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)

UK	TUC	Accord	occupational/ professional	official website
UK	TUC	Association of Educational Psychologists	occupational/ professional	official website
UK	TUC	BDA	occupational/ professional	official website
UK	TUC	Community	general	official website
UK	TUC	CPSA	occupational/ professional	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
UK	TUC	CWU	industrial/sectoral	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
UK	TUC	GMB	general	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
UK	TUC	NAHT	occupational/ professional	TUC website
UK	TUC	NASUWT	occupational/ professional	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
UK	TUC	National Education Union	occupational/ professional	Official website
UK	TUC	National Union of Journalists	occupational/ professional	ICTU website
UK	TUC	National Union of Teachers	occupational/ professional	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
UK	TUC	Nautilus International	occupational/ professional	official website
UK	TUC	PCS	industrial/sectoral	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
UK	TUC	POA	occupational/ professional	TUC website
UK	TUC	Prospect	occupational/ professional	official website
UK	TUC	RMT	industrial/sectoral	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
UK	TUC	TGWU	general	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
UK	TUC	UCW	industrial/sectoral	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) on successor
UK	TUC	UNISON	general	Smale (2020)
UK	TUC	Unite	general	ICTU website
UK	TUC	University and College Union	industrial/sectoral	TUC website
UK	TUC	USDAW	general	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Denmark	LO_D	3F	general	https://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Denmark/Trade-Unions
Denmark	LO_D	Dansk El-Forbund	general	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)

Denmark	LO_D	Dansk Jernbaneforbund	general	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Denmark	LO_D	Dansk Metal	general	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Denmark	LO_D	DOFK	occupational/ professional	official website
Denmark	LO_D	Fængselsforbundet	occupational/ professional	Ibsen (2012)
Denmark	LO_D	FOA	general	Ibsen (2012)
Denmark	LO_D	Fødevareforbundet	industrial/sectoral	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Denmark	LO_D	FPU	occupational/ professional	official website
Denmark	LO_D	HK	general	Ibsen (2012)
Denmark	LO_D	HKKF	occupational/ professional	Ibsen (2012)
Denmark	LO_D	Serviceforbundet	general	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Denmark	LO_D	Socialpædagogerne	occupational/ professional	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Denmark	LO_D	Teknisk Landsforbund	occupational/ professional	Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000)
Sweden	TCO	Fackförbundet ST	industrial/sectoral	Kjellberg (2013)
Sweden	TCO	Finansförbundet	industrial/sectoral	Kjellberg (2013)
Sweden	TCO	FTF	industrial/sectoral	Kjellberg (2013)
Sweden	TCO	Journalistförbundet	occupational/ professional	Kjellberg (2013)
Sweden	TCO	Lärarförbundet	occupational/ professional	Kjellberg (2013)
Sweden	TCO	Polisförbundet	occupational/ professional	Kjellberg (2013)
Sweden	TCO	Teaterförbundet	industrial/sectoral	Kjellberg (2013)
Sweden	TCO	Unionen	industrial/sectoral	Kjellberg (2013)
Sweden	TCO	Vårdförbundet	occupational/ professional	Kjellberg (2013)
Sweden	TCO	Vision	industrial/sectoral	Kjellberg (2013)

Table 6: Coding: Share of women in trade unions and union confederations..

country	union/ confederation	women share	year	source
Denmark	LH	0.31	2018	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	3F	0.26	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	Dansk Metal	0.04	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	FOA	0.86	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	Fødevareforbundet	0.30	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	HK	0.77	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	Socialpædagogerne	0.75	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	BUPL	0.85	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	Dansk Socialrådgiverforening	0.88	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	DLF	0.71	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	Finansforbundet	0.52	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	Dansk Magisterforening	0.64	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	DJØF	0.55	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Denmark	IDA	0.25	2017	Statistics Denmark (2020)
Sweden	Fackförbundet ST	0.62	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Lärarförbundet	0.84	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Unionen	0.44	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Vårdförbundet	0.90	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Vision	0.72	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	IF Metall	0.19	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	SEKO	0.25	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Handels	0.63	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Kommunal	0.78	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Transport	0.16	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	GS	0.17	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Byggnads	0.01	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Elektrikerförbundet	0.02	2017	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Sveriges Ingenjörer	0.27	2018	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Lärarnas Riksförbund	0.70	2018	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Jusek	0.59	2018	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	Akademikerförbundet SSR	0.82	2018	Kjellberg (2017)

Sweden	Civilekonomerna	0.56	2018	Kjellberg (2017)
Sweden	DIK	0.75	2018	Kjellberg (2017)
Germany	IG Metall	0.18	2018	DGB website
Germany	ver.di	0.52	2018	DGB website
Germany	GdP	0.25	2018	DGB website
Germany	GEW	0.72	2018	DGB website
Germany	IG Bau	0.27	2018	DGB website
Germany	IG BCE	0.22	2018	DGB Website
Germany	DBB	0.32	2017	DBB (2018)
UK	UNISON	0.77	2018	UK Certification Office (2019g)
UK	Unite	0.25	2018	UK Certification Office (2019h)
UK	GMB	0.50	2018	UK Certification Office (2019b)
UK	CWU	0.20	2018	UK Certification Office (2019a)
UK	NASUWT	0.73	2018	UK Certification Office (2019c)
UK	PCS	0.59	2018	UK Certification Office (2019d)
UK	Prospect	0.29	2018	UK Certification Office (2019e)
UK	RMT	0.16	2018	UK Certification Office (2019f)
UK	USDAW	0.55	2018	UK Certification Office (2019i)
Ireland	FORSA	0.69	2019	official website
Ireland	SIPTU	0.37	2012	Farrelly (2012)
Netherlands	FNV	0.38	2019	StatLine (2020)
Netherlands	CNV	0.39	2019	StatLine (2020)
Netherlands	MHP/VCP	0.36	2019	StatLine (2020)
Spain	CC.OO	0.44	2018	Fulton and Sechi (2018)
Spain	UGT	0.37	2018	Fulton and Sechi (2018)
Italy	CISL	0.48	2018	Fulton and Sechi (2018)
Italy	CGIL	0.48	2018	Fulton and Sechi (2018)
Italy	UIL	0.41	2018	Fulton and Sechi (2018)



Figure 21: Absolute frequencies, preferences unemployment benefits.



Figure 22: Absolute frequencies, preferences (anti) welfare chauvinism.



Figure 23: Absolute frequencies, preferences childcare services.

Table 7: Binomial logistic regression models: economic egalitarianism.

	Dependent variable:	
	Economic egalitarianism	
Union membership (Ref: non-member)		
Encompassing	0.32*** (0.10)	
Low-income	0.10 (0.23)	
High-income	-0.14 (0.17)	
General		0.31** (0.15)
Industrial/sectoral		0.35*** (0.12)
Occupational/professional		-0.12 (0.15)
Adj. household income	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.02)
Education	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Sex (Ref: male)	0.12* (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)
Age	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Sector (Ref: public)		
Private	-0.14 (0.08)	-0.16* (0.08)
Other	0.06 (0.13)	0.04 (0.13)
Work (Ref: permanent)		
Fixed term	0.31** (0.13)	0.31** (0.13)
Student	-0.05 (0.29)	-0.06 (0.29)
Pensioner	-0.0000 (0.25)	-0.004 (0.25)
Unemployed	0.41 (0.31)	0.39 (0.31)
Other/ambiguous	-0.02 (0.21)	-0.03 (0.21)
Work time (Ref: full-time)		
Part-time	0.32** (0.13)	0.33** (0.13)
Other	-0.11 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.24)
Centralization	1.76*** (0.48)	1.67*** (0.47)
EPL	0.14 (0.11)	0.12 (0.11)
Inequality	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)
Constant	-5.96*** (1.08)	-5.69*** (1.05)
Observations	4,147	4,150
Log Likelihood	-2,636.19	-2,636.11
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,312.37	5,312.23
Note:		*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01

Table 8: Binomial logistic regression models for hypotheses H1a, H2a and H3a.

	Dependent variable:		
	Extension: unemployment benefits	Extension: benefits for immigrants	Extension: childcare services
Union member	0.39*** (0.08)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.09)
Adj. household income	-0.08*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Education	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.001 (0.02)
Sex (Ref: male)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	0.22** (0.10)
Age	0.004 (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
Sector (Ref: public)			
Private	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.17*** (0.06)	-0.03 (0.09)
Other	0.11 (0.10)	-0.14* (0.08)	0.10 (0.13)
Work (Ref: permanent)			
Fixed term	0.27*** (0.10)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.13)
Student		0.70*** (0.19)	-0.24 (0.30)
Pensioner	-0.52** (0.21)	0.44*** (0.16)	-0.17 (0.24)
Unemployed		0.21 (0.18)	0.17 (0.28)
Other/ambiguous	-0.27 (0.17)	0.18 (0.14)	-0.24 (0.20)
Work time (Ref: full-time)			
Part-time	0.10 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.27** (0.13)
Other	0.51** (0.20)	-0.28* (0.16)	0.07 (0.24)
Constant	0.59*** (0.19)	-0.71*** (0.15)	0.93*** (0.23)
Country dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,088	8,169	5,882
Log Likelihood	-3,418.57	-5,396.10	-2,619.11
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,877.15	10,836.20	5,282.21
Note:			*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01

Table 9: Binomial logistic regression models for hypotheses H1a, H2a and H3a; whole samples.

	Dependent variable:		
	Extension: unemployment benefits	Extension: benefits for immigrants	Extension: childcare services
Union member	0.29*** (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.002 (0.08)
Adj. household income	-0.08*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Education	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Sex (Ref: male)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.30*** (0.06)
Age	0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01** (0.003)
Sector (Ref: public)			
Private	0.03 (0.06)	-0.14** (0.06)	0.01 (0.08)
Other	0.09 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)	0.11 (0.11)
Work (Ref: permanent)			
Fixed term	0.29*** (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.11)
Student	-0.50*** (0.18)	0.67*** (0.18)	-0.04 (0.24)
Pensioner	-0.44*** (0.16)	0.43*** (0.16)	0.12 (0.20)
Unemployed	0.79*** (0.18)	0.24 (0.17)	0.15 (0.22)
Other/ambiguous	-0.19 (0.13)	0.18 (0.13)	-0.19 (0.17)
Work time (Ref: full-time)			
Part-time	0.15* (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.10)
Other	0.46*** (0.15)	-0.30* (0.15)	-0.10 (0.19)
Constant	0.44*** (0.15)	-0.62*** (0.15)	1.09*** (0.19)
Country dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,564	8,564	8,564
Log Likelihood	-5,664.22	-5,717.91	-3,634.10
Akaike Inf. Crit.	11,372.44	11,479.83	7,312.20
Note:			*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01



Figure 24: Marginal effects for H1a, H2a and H3a (whole samples); adjusted for income, education, age, sex, sector of employment, employment situation and work time; country fixed effects included.



Figure 25: Marginal effects for H1b, H2b and H3b (1st measure), all controls held at their proportions, no fixed effects included.

Table 10: Binomial logistic regression models for hypotheses H1b, H2b and H3b; 1st measure; country fixed effects included.

	Dependent variable:		
	Extension: unemployment benefits	Extension: social assistance for immigrants	Extension: childcare services
Union membership (Ref: non-member)			
Encompassing	0.41*** (0.09)	0.07 (0.08)	0.37*** (0.13)
Low-income	0.38** (0.19)	0.04 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.19)
High-income	0.15 (0.17)	0.19 (0.15)	-0.20 (0.20)
Adj. household income	-0.08*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Education	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Sex (Ref: male)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.09* (0.05)	0.26*** (0.10)
Age	0.004 (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.005 (0.003)
Sector (Ref: public)			
Private	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.14** (0.06)	-0.06 (0.10)
Other	0.10 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.08)	0.10 (0.13)
Work (Ref: permanent)			
Fixed term	0.28*** (0.11)	-0.13 (0.09)	0.08 (0.14)
Student		0.71*** (0.20)	-0.20 (0.32)
Pensioner	-0.57*** (0.21)	0.45*** (0.17)	0.01 (0.26)
Unemployed		0.20 (0.18)	0.25 (0.30)
Other/ambiguous	-0.27 (0.18)	0.21 (0.14)	-0.13 (0.22)
Work time (Ref: full-time)			
Part-time	0.10 (0.10)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.30** (0.14)
Other	0.56*** (0.21)	-0.27 (0.16)	-0.01 (0.25)
Constant	0.69*** (0.20)	-0.76*** (0.16)	1.08*** (0.24)
Country dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,878	7,743	5,579
Log Likelihood	-3,270.20	-5,090.87	-2,411.31
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,584.41	10,229.73	4,870.62
Note:			*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01



Figure 26: Coefficients H1b, H2b, H3b; TU member (reference = non-member), CI = 0.9, additional controls not shown here: work-related variables and country fixed effects (see Table 10).



Figure 27: Marginal effects for H1b, H2b and H3b (2nd measure); all controls held at their proportions; no fixed effects included.

Table 11: Binomial logistic regression models for hypotheses H1b, H2b and H3b; 2nd measure; country fixed effects included.

	Dependent variable:		
	Extension: unemployment benefits	Extension: social assistance for immigrants	Extension: childcare services
Union membership (Ref: non-member)			
General	0.42*** (0.14)	-0.10 (0.12)	0.28 (0.17)
Industrial/sectoral	0.41*** (0.11)	0.12 (0.09)	0.20 (0.13)
Occupational/professional	0.12 (0.14)	0.32** (0.13)	0.01 (0.18)
Adj. household income	-0.08*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Education	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.0004 (0.02)
Sex (Ref: male)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)	0.28*** (0.10)
Age	0.004 (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)
Sector (Ref: public)			
Private	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.05 (0.10)
Other	0.09 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.08)	0.12 (0.13)
Work (Ref: permanent)			
Fixed term	0.29*** (0.11)	-0.13 (0.09)	0.09 (0.14)
Student		0.71*** (0.20)	-0.18 (0.32)
Pensioner	-0.55*** (0.21)	0.45*** (0.17)	-0.003 (0.26)
Unemployed		0.21 (0.18)	0.20 (0.29)
Other/ambiguous	-0.26 (0.18)	0.21 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.22)
Work time (Ref: full-time)			
Part-time	0.08 (0.10)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.33** (0.14)
Other	0.55*** (0.21)	-0.27 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.25)
Constant	0.66*** (0.20)	-0.68*** (0.16)	1.08*** (0.25)
Country dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,880	7,752	5,583
Log Likelihood	-3,270.15	-5,094.01	-2,415.90
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,584.31	10,236.03	4,879.80
Note:			*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01



Figure 28: Coefficients H1b, H2b, H3b; TU member (reference = non-member), CI = 0.9; additional controls not shown here: work-related variables and country fixed effects (see Table 11).



Figure 29: Marginal effects for H3c; all controls held at their proportions; no fixed effects included.

Table 12: Binomial logistic regression models for hypothesis H3c; country fixed effects included.

	Dependent variable:
	Extension: childcare services
Union membership (Ref: non-member)	
Women's share: high	0.80*** (0.20)
Women's share: medium	-0.03 (0.13)
Women's share: low	0.25 (0.17)
Adj. household income	-0.02 (0.01)
Education	-0.003 (0.02)
Sex (Ref: male)	0.22** (0.10)
Age	-0.005 (0.004)
Sector (Ref: public)	
Private	0.01 (0.10)
Other	0.16 (0.13)
Work time (Ref: full-time)	
Part-time	-0.30** (0.14)
Other	0.01 (0.26)
Work (Ref: permanent)	
Fixed term	0.12 (0.14)
Student	-0.22 (0.32)
Pensioner	0.02 (0.26)
Unemployed	0.26 (0.30)
Other/ambiguous	-0.14 (0.22)
Constant	0.97*** (0.25)
Country dummies?	Yes
Observations	5,421
Log Likelihood	-2,330.11
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,708.23
Note:	*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01



Figure 30: Coefficients H3c in odds ratios; TU member (reference = non-member); CI = 0.9; additional controls not shown here: work-related variables and country fixed effect.

Table 13: Binomial logistic regression models for hypotheses H1b, H2b and H3b; 1st measure; ideological self-placement included.

	Dependent variable:		
	Extension: unemployment benefits	Extension: social assistance for immigrants	Extension: childcare services
Union membership (Ref: non-member)			
Encompassing	0.30*** (0.10)	0.02 (0.08)	0.56*** (0.12)
Low-income	0.36* (0.19)	-0.21 (0.15)	-0.49*** (0.18)
High-income	0.05 (0.17)	0.10 (0.16)	-0.16 (0.20)
Adj. household income	-0.07*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Education	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Sex (Ref. male)	-0.12* (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)	0.23** (0.10)
Age	0.005* (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01* (0.003)
Sector (Ref: public)			
Private	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.01 (0.09)
Other	0.12 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.09)	0.11 (0.13)
Work (Ref: permanent)			
Fixed term	0.28** (0.11)	-0.19** (0.09)	0.07 (0.14)
Student		0.57*** (0.20)	-0.37 (0.31)
Pensioner	-0.56*** (0.22)	0.43** (0.18)	-0.09 (0.25)
Unemployed		0.11 (0.19)	0.18 (0.29)
Other/ambiguous	-0.28 (0.18)	0.19 (0.15)	-0.22 (0.21)
Work time (Ref: full-time)			
Part-time	0.06 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.37*** (0.13)
Other	0.54*** (0.21)	-0.32* (0.17)	0.07 (0.25)
Left-right ideology	-0.15*** (0.01)	-0.19*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Ghent	-0.59** (0.26)		
Unemployment rate	0.10*** (0.02)		
Unempl. replacement rate	0.03*** (0.01)		
Centralization	-3.30*** (0.99)		
EPL	-0.53** (0.22)		
Exp. childcare			-0.37*** (0.12)
Costs childcare			-0.01*** (0.003)
inequality	-0.19*** (0.07)	-0.12*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.02)
Non-EU immigration		-0.08*** (0.02)	
RRP strength		-1.02** (0.50)	
Constant	7.81*** (2.68)	4.31*** (0.50)	-1.61*** (0.57)
Observations	4,859	7,717	5,563
Log Likelihood	-3,197.59	-4,942.58	-2,460.64
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,439.17	9,927.17	4,963.27
Note:			*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01

Table 14: Binomial logistic regression models for hypotheses H1b, H2b and H3b; 2nd measure; ideological self-placement included.

	Dependent variable:		
	Extension: unemployment benefits	Extension: social assistance for immigrants	Extension: childcare services
Union membership (Ref: non-member)			
General	0.33** (0.14)	-0.16 (0.11)	0.19 (0.15)
Industrial/sectoral	0.33*** (0.11)	0.01 (0.09)	0.31** (0.13)
Occupational/professional	0.02 (0.15)	0.24* (0.13)	0.02 (0.17)
Adj. household income	-0.07*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Education	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Sex (Ref: male)	-0.12* (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)	0.25*** (0.10)
Age	0.005* (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01* (0.003)
Sector (Ref: public)			
Private	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.001 (0.09)
Other	0.11 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.13 (0.13)
Work (Ref: permanent)			
Fixed term	0.28*** (0.11)	-0.20** (0.09)	0.07 (0.14)
Student		0.58*** (0.20)	-0.37 (0.31)
Pensioner	-0.54** (0.21)	0.43** (0.17)	-0.14 (0.25)
Unemployed		0.12 (0.19)	0.09 (0.29)
Other/ambiguous	-0.26 (0.18)	0.19 (0.15)	-0.26 (0.21)
Work time (Ref: full-time)			
part-time	0.06 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.41*** (0.13)
other	0.53** (0.21)	-0.32* (0.17)	0.08 (0.25)
Left-right ideology	-0.15*** (0.01)	-0.19*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Ghent	-0.57** (0.27)		
Unemployment rate	0.10*** (0.02)		
Unempl. replacement rate	0.03*** (0.01)		
Centralization	-3.24*** (0.97)		
EPL	-0.51** (0.23)		
Exp. childcare			-0.18 (0.12)
Costs childcare			-0.01*** (0.003)
Inequality	-0.19*** (0.07)	-0.12*** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.02)
Non-EU immigration		-0.09*** (0.02)	
RRP strength		-0.94* (0.50)	
Constant	7.64*** (2.68)	4.33*** (0.50)	-2.09*** (0.57)
Observations	4,862	7,727	5,568
Log Likelihood	-3,200.15	-4,945.46	-2,478.09
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,444.31	9,932.93	4,998.19

Note: *p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01

Table 15: Binomial logistic regression models for hypothesis H3c; ideological self-placement included.

	Dependent variable:
	Extension: childcare services
Union membership (Ref: non-member)	
Women's share: high	0.86*** (0.20)
Women's share: medium	-0.01 (0.13)
Women's share: low	0.19 (0.16)
Adj. household income	-0.02 (0.01)
Education	0.01 (0.02)
Sex (Ref: male)	0.19* (0.10)
Age	-0.01* (0.004)
Sector (Ref: public)	
Private	0.08 (0.10)
Other	0.19 (0.13)
Work time (Ref: full-time)	
Part-time	-0.37*** (0.14)
Other	0.12 (0.25)
Work (Ref: permanent)	
Fixed term	0.10 (0.14)
Student	-0.43 (0.31)
Pensioner	-0.13 (0.26)
Unemployed	0.13 (0.29)
Other/ambiguous	-0.27 (0.21)
Left-right ideology	-0.08*** (0.02)
Exp. childcare	-0.27** (0.12)
Costs childcare	-0.01*** (0.003)
Inequality	0.16*** (0.02)
Constant	-2.07*** (0.57)
Observations	5,407
Log Likelihood	-2,387.96
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,817.92
Note:	*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01

Table 16: Binomial logistic regression models for hypotheses H1b, H2b and H3b; 1st measure; Ghent countries only.

	Dependent variable:		
	Extension: unemployment benefits	Extension: social assistance for immigrants	Extension: childcare services
Union membership (Ref: non-member)			
Encompassing	0.57*** (0.16)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.39** (0.18)
High-income	0.31 (0.22)	0.36* (0.19)	-0.15 (0.26)
Adj. household income	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.07** (0.03)
Education	-0.13*** (0.04)	0.07** (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
Sex (Ref: male)	0.16 (0.14)	0.14 (0.11)	0.48** (0.21)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.01)
Sector (Ref: public)			
Private	-0.25* (0.15)	0.09 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.17)
Other	0.24 (0.25)	-0.20 (0.20)	-0.16 (0.28)
Work (Ref: permanent)			
Fixed term	0.08 (0.25)	-0.07 (0.20)	-0.02 (0.27)
Student		0.99** (0.45)	0.18 (0.63)
Pensioner	-0.32 (0.51)	0.65 (0.42)	0.41 (0.57)
Unemployed		0.09 (0.45)	0.33 (0.61)
Other/ambiguous	-0.33 (0.34)	0.64** (0.29)	-0.53 (0.40)
Work time (full-time)			
part-time	0.15 (0.25)	0.04 (0.19)	0.05 (0.31)
other	0.11 (0.49)	-0.27 (0.41)	-0.35 (0.54)
Constant	0.59 (0.39)	-0.69** (0.31)	1.29*** (0.44)
Observations	1,014	1,579	1,096
Log Likelihood	-680.10	-1,077.23	-574.30
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,388.21	2,186.45	1,180.61
Note:			*p**p***p<0.01

Table 17: Binomial logistic regression models for hypotheses H1b, H2b and H3b; 2nd measure; Ghent countries only.

	Dependent variable:		
	Extension: unemployment benefits	Extension: social assistance for immigrants	Extension: childcare services
Union membership (Ref: non-member)			
General	0.84*** (0.21)	-0.16 (0.17)	-0.14 (0.22)
Industrial/sectoral	0.46** (0.18)	-0.03 (0.14)	0.70*** (0.21)
Occupational/professional	0.29 (0.20)	0.52*** (0.17)	0.04 (0.23)
Adj. household income	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.03)
Education	-0.11** (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)
Sex (Ref: male)	0.17 (0.14)	0.12 (0.11)	0.52** (0.21)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.002 (0.01)
Sector (Ref: public)			
Private	-0.27* (0.15)	0.15 (0.12)	-0.16 (0.18)
Other	0.27 (0.25)	-0.20 (0.20)	-0.26 (0.29)
Work (Ref: permanent)			
Fixed term	0.13 (0.25)	-0.10 (0.20)	-0.08 (0.28)
Student		0.92** (0.44)	0.19 (0.62)
Pensioner	-0.25 (0.50)	0.58 (0.42)	0.30 (0.56)
Unemployed		0.01 (0.45)	0.29 (0.60)
Other/ambiguous	-0.27 (0.34)	0.55* (0.28)	-0.45 (0.40)
Work time (Ref: full-time)			
Part-time	0.12 (0.25)	0.04 (0.19)	0.02 (0.31)
Other	0.08 (0.48)	-0.24 (0.40)	-0.33 (0.54)
Constant	0.50 (0.39)	-0.52* (0.31)	1.45*** (0.44)
Observations	1,024	1,592	1,107
Log Likelihood	-685.48	-1,082.88	-575.47
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,400.97	2,199.75	1,184.94
Note:			*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01

Table 18: Binomial logistic regression models for hypothesis H3c; Ghent countries only.

	Dependent variable:
	Extension: childcare services
Union membership (Ref: non-member)	
Women's share: high	0.64*** (0.24)
Women's share: medium	0.34 (0.26)
Women's share: low	0.03 (0.21)
Adj. household income	-0.07** (0.03)
Education	0.02 (0.05)
Sex (Ref: male)	0.37* (0.23)
Age	0.002 (0.01)
Sector (Ref: public)	
Private	0.02 (0.20)
Other	-0.05 (0.30)
Work time (Ref: full-time)	
Part-time	0.05 (0.32)
Other	-0.24 (0.56)
Work (Ref: permanent)	
Fixed term	0.02 (0.29)
Student	0.02 (0.64)
Pensioner	0.31 (0.59)
Unemployed	0.29 (0.63)
Other/ambiguous	-0.61 (0.41)
Constant	1.30*** (0.44)
Observations	1,016
Log Likelihood	-524.91
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,083.83
Note:	*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01

Table 19: Binomial logistic regression models for additional analyses.

	Dependent variable:	
	Extension: unemployment benefits	Extension: social assistance for immigrants
Union membership (Ref: non-member)		
Share of unemployed in fund: low	0.36 (0.29)	
Share of unemployed in fund: medium	0.64** (0.26)	
Share of unemployed in fund: high	1.69*** (0.59)	
Share of immigrants in sector: low		0.51 (0.40)
Share of immigrants in sector: medium		0.07 (0.24)
Share of immigrants in sector: high		0.17 (0.23)
Adj. household income	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)
Education	-0.12 (0.07)	0.06 (0.06)
Sex (Ref: male)	0.01 (0.21)	0.08 (0.18)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)
Sector (Ref: public)		
Private	-0.55** (0.22)	0.06 (0.22)
Other	-0.17 (0.39)	-0.35 (0.32)
Work (Ref: permanent)		
Fixed term	0.70* (0.38)	-0.29 (0.32)
Student		1.49** (0.76)
Pensioner	0.54 (0.81)	1.25* (0.70)
Unemployed		0.49 (0.74)
Other/ambiguous	0.13 (0.52)	0.92* (0.52)
Work time (Ref: full-time)		
Part-time	-0.31 (0.41)	0.47 (0.34)
Other	-0.74 (0.78)	-0.49 (0.67)
Constant	0.48 (0.64)	-0.70 (0.51)
Observations	470	598
Log Likelihood	-309.16	-395.27
Akaike Inf. Crit.	648.31	824.54
Note:		*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01

Table 20: Coding: Immigrant share by sector(s) organized by Swedish unions.

confederation	union	sector description	immigrant share

TCO	Fackförbundet ST	Public Administration and Defence	NA
TCO	Finansförbundet	Financial Institutions. Insurance	0.065
TCO	FTF	Financial Institutions. Insurance	0.065
TCO	Journalistförbundet	Manufacturing	0.076
TCO	Lärarförbundet	Education services	0.107
TCO	Polisförbundet	Public Administration and Defence	NA
TCO	Teaterförbundet	Other social and related community services. Recreational and Cultural Services. Motion picture and other entertainment services	0.094
TCO	Unionen	Manufacturing	0.144
TCO	Vårdförbundet	Medical, dental, other health and veterinary services	0.144
TCO	Vision	Public Administration and Defence	NA
LO	Facket för Service och Kommunikation	Transport and Storage	0.129
LO	Fastighetsanställdas Förbund	Real Estate and Business Services	0.135
LO	GS	Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products, Including Furniture	NA
LO	Handelsanställdas Förbund	Wholesale Trade. Retail Trade	0.096
LO	Hotell och Restaurang Facket	Restaurants and Hotels	0.375
LO	IF Metall	Basic Metal Industries. Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products. Machinery and Equipment. Other Manufacturing Industries	0.137
LO	Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet	Construction	0.057
LO	Svenska Elektrikerförbundet	Construction	0.057
LO	Svenska Kommunalarbetareförbundet	Public Administration and Defence	NA
LO	Svenska Livsmedelsarbetareförbundet	Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco	0.178
LO	Svenska Målareförbundet	Construction	0.057
LO	Svenska Musikerförbundet	Recreational and Cultural Services	0.094
LO	Svenska Pappersindustriarbetare-förbundet	Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing	0.088
LO	Svenska Transportarbetare-förbundet	Transport and Storage	0.129
SACO	Akademikerförbundet SSR	Welfare institutions	0.144
SACO	Civilekonomerna	Public Administration and Defence	NA
SACO	DIK	Recreational and Cultural Services	0.094
SACO	Jusek	Public Administration and Defence	NA
SACO	Läkarförbundet	Medical, dental, other health and veterinary services	0.144

SACO	Lärarnas Riksförbund	Education services	0.107
SACO	Naturvetarna	Research and scientific institutes	0.180
SACO	Officersförbundet	Public Administration and Defence	NA
SACO	SRAT	Public Administration and Defence	NA
SACO	Sveriges Arbetsterapeuter	Medical, dental, other health and veterinary services	0.144
SACO	Sveriges Arkitekter	Real Estate and Business Services	0.135
SACO	Sveriges Ingenjörer	Manufacturing	0.144
SACO	Sveriges Skolledarförbund	Education services	0.107
SACO	Sveriges universitetslärarförbund	Education services	0.107
SACO	Sveriges Veterinärförbund	Medical, dental, other health and veterinary services	0.144