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Social mobility and far-right support: the symmetric and asymmetric effects of perceived social mobility over different time dimensions

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Social mobility and far-right support: the symmetric and asymmetric effects of perceived social mobility over different time dimensions

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Abstract:

This working paper tries to go beyond the dichotomy of cultural vs economic factors of far-right party success and contributes to the existing literature by investigating how different perceptions of social mobility in two dimensions of time (perceptions of past and future social mobility) influence far-right party support. Understanding how individuals evaluate perceived social mobility with regard to the past (nostalgic deprivation) and the future (future opportunity) allows me to combine different features of the literature into one framework and might help detecting finer nuances of voting behaviour beyond the extremes of fully supporting and fully refusing far-right parties. Additionally, I focus on possible symmetric or asymmetric combinations of social mobility perceptions over time. I employ different methods (logistic regressions with country fixed effects as well as nearest neighbour and genetic matching) to evaluate the research question, implementing data from the *welfarepriorities*-dataset. The results indicate that perceptions of past and future downward social mobility are applicable predictors explaining far-right voting. Further, the combination of perceptions of past and future social mobility affects far-right voting and I could establish that many individuals have asymmetric perceptions with regard to social mobility. Yet, anti-immigration attitudes are a strong predictor of far-right party and the results suggest that perceived past social mobility (nostalgic deprivation) and anti-immigration attitudes are related.

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1 Introduction [1]

Alarmed by Donald Trump's presidency, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) pose the question whether the democracy in the United States of America is in danger. They describe in their now famous book "*How democracies die*" new forms of authoritarians emerging worldwide and investigate the consequences of policies and actions of far-right leaders for democracy and its institutions. Since the 1980s the support for the far right and most notably for populist radical right parties has significantly grown and since the beginning of the 21st century far-right parties have become in many countries an important political factor (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012: 548). For example, in Switzerland, Denmark and France far-right parties won more than a quarter of the national votes (Gest et al. 2018: 1695). In Britain, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) collected 27% of the British vote in the 2014 European elections and subsequently led the referendum campaign to leave the European Union (Gest et al. 2018: 1695). The consequences of Brexit for Britain and Europe are yet to be determined. It is also worth emphasizing that even though we here focus on far-right parties in Europe – increasing success of the far-right is a global phenomenon. For instance, three of the five most populous countries in the world have or just reasonably had a far-right leader, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Donald Trump in the Unites States of America, Narendra Modi in India and the biggest political party in the world is the populist radical right Indian People's Party (BJP) (Mudde 2019: 1-3).

The literature features many different explanations for the success of far-right parties in Western countries. A newer strand of studies conducted in recent years started to analyse explanations that go beyond the *absolute* or *objective* socio-economic status or socio-economic risks, with the ambition to break out of the cultural vs. economic debate.

[1] This working paper is a revised version of an MA thesis submitted in fall 2021 at the University of Zurich. Prof. Dr. Silja Häusermann acted as main supervisor

The factors to be taken into consideration are *relative* socio-economic positions of individuals (instead of absolute measures like income or unemployment rate), the influence of *'nostalgia'* and future opportunities on the vote decision making of individual and the effect of income inequality as well as social mobility.

The core argument of this working paper is inspired by a statement of Mudde (2019: 97-98) that the positions and results in many studies are not as fundamentally opposed to each other as their protagonists make them out to be and that some of the effects found in these investigations are actually interrelated, sometimes to an extent that they can barely be disentangled empirically, while others are complementary to each other. Thus, I try to combine several features of the literature and argue that they can be grouped into a conceptual framework containing two with each other related perceived time dimensions of social mobility: the perceived past view of social mobility and the perceived future view of social mobility. Under *past views* I analyse the effect of nostalgic deprivation on far-right voting, thus individual perception of social mobility based on the past and under *future views* I consider the effect of future opportunities, how individual expect their situation of social mobility will be in the future.

For the empirical part in this working paper, *I try to determine how different constellations of individual perceptions of social mobility in two time dimensions might affect far-right voting.* To this end, I construct models explaining the propensity for far-right voting by measures of the two time dimensions of perceived social mobility – besides a series of other relevant factors. I employ logistic regressions with country fixed effects as well a matching method to evaluate these empirical models. For the analysis I implement data from the *welfarepriorities*-dataset collected in the context of a large research project in distributive policy preferences across Western Europe. My results are in accordance with my conceptual framework and indicate that both past perceived and future anticipated downward social mobility are relevant factors explaining voting for far-right parties. A further result is that also 'mixed' constellations of perceptions of social mobility, namely having simultaneously positive past view and negative

future expectation with respect to social mobility and vice versa, influence significantly the propensity to support for-right parties.

This study is structured as following: section 2 discusses the related empirical literature and describes the implemented definition for far-right parties. Section 3 depicts the research questions of this working paper in more detail and its relevance to the field. Section 4 covers the theoretical argument together with the hypotheses. Section 5 concentrates on the data and the operationalization carried out in this study. In section 6 I introduce the relevant method and my estimation strategies. The results are presented in section 7 together with a series of robustness checks as well as the findings obtained with the matching method. Finally, the results of my analysis are discussed in section 8 together with an outlook of possible future studies and concluding remarks are offered in section 9.

2 Literature review

Before I dive into the vast literature in regard to populist radical right parties or more broadly *far-right parties*, I think it is crucial to address the terminology including a definition and how I will refer to this particular party group in the remainder of this study.

2.1 Far-right definition and terminology

I will apply the term *far right* specified in Mudde's (2019: 5-8) new book the "*The far right today*" to define the scope of the analysis. Mudde focuses purposefully on parties of the right that are to some extent anti-systemic and primarily hostile towards liberal democracy. He identifies two broad subgroups that are summarized under the description 'far-right', firstly, the *extreme right* that rejects even the essence of democracy. And secondly, the *radical right* that accepts the essence of democracy but dismisses fundamental constituents of liberal democracy such as the rights of minorities, the separation of powers as well as the rule of law. *Fascism* is the most notable example for the subgroup *extreme right*, which brought to power the German *Führer* Adolf Hitler along with the Italian *Duce* Benito Mussolini and consequently led to the most destructive war in modern history. Famous populist radical

right parties like the *National Front* (FN) in France or the Austrian *Freedom Party* (FPÖ) are convenient examples for the subgroup of the radical right.

Considering the importance of the phenomenon *populism* it is essential to depict the link between populism and far right. To this end, Mudde defines populism as an ideology that considers society divided between the *pure people* and the *corrupt elite*. Populist parties are in theory for (some kind of) democracy but against liberal democracy. Also relevant for the characterisation of populist parties is the often-general claim of them to be "*the voice of the people*". Müller (2016: 20- 23) emphasises this aspect because if these parties would claim to be the voice of only a certain part of "the people" they could be classified as 'protest parties' (as these parties often like to call themselves) that actually want to represent a certain group of society and not the entire society. Further, Müller and states that proclaiming to be the voice of an abstract 'total' ('the people!') is an unmasking factor, which reveals the underlying anti-liberal democratic attitudes of these parties. Mudde (2019: 5-8) argues further that the extreme right is, by definition, not populist, while the radical right in the 21st century is predominantly populist, therefore the famous name '*populist radical right*' parties. Mudde (2007: 20-23) applies a combination of three ideological features to define these populist radical right parties: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. He considers nativism to be the primary feature, this ideology combines nationalism and xenophobia and states that non-native elements are threatening the nation-state. The second ideology, authoritarianism, stands for positive attitudes towards authoritarian personalities, also towards punishment of outgroup individuals based on moral authority. The third feature is populism.

It is interesting to mention that even though most of the definitions and descriptions of these party families were produced mostly by academics, journalists, etc. and not the far right itself, far right parties do care about terminology. For example, leaders of the FN and the FPÖ sued journalists for calling them fascist and both parties make an effort not to be linked to the fascist past of the first half of the 20th century (Mudde 2019: 5).

In summary, I employ in this working paper the term *far right*, which captures both the extreme right as well as the radical right, populist radical right parties are a subgroup of the latter. I will consider in my empirical analysis all parties belonging to the far right and will hence call them *far-right parties* throughout this working paper.

2.2 Why does the support for the far-right increase?

The broad consent that the increasing success of the far right poses a potential threat to modern democracy and its institutions (Kaltwasser 2012: 184-185, Burgoon et al. 2019: 52) led to an incredible amount of research on the topic. A large part of the academic literature concentrates on the definition of populism, far right and the respective originating party family (e.g., Akkerman et al. 2014, Albertazzi and McDonnel 2008, Mudde 2007, Mudde 2019, Mueller 2016, Rooduijn et al. 2019), while other authors tried to detect the reasons for the support of far-right parties (e.g., Arzheimer 2009, Betz 1993, Gidron and Hall 2017, Golder 2003, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010, Jackman and Volpert 1996, Lucassen and Lubers 2012, Magni 2018). In general, there is much consensus regarding different definitions of far-right parties or in more detail populist radical right parties as well as the description of the 4 waves of the post-war far right, but there is much less agreement among scholars as to *why* far-right parties are so successful (Mudde 2019: 10-23). An outstanding feature of this very wide academic literature about the far right is the existence of frequent differing, often each other opposing findings.

Scholars identified four main structural changes as factors that could explain the support and the success of the far right: features of specific party systems, changing media sphere in Europe, socio-cultural aspects and economic changes (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008: 219). Other important factors are decreasing trust in democracy or the institutions, general political apathy and of course negative attitudes toward immigration and other cultures in general (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010).

Theoretical frameworks explaining the electoral success of the far right can be grouped into

theories of the *demand-side* and theories of the *supply-side*. Theories of the supply-side concentrate on far-right parties themselves and analyse questions about the leadership structure or the organizational build-up of such parties. The demand-side combines factors that reflect far-reaching transformation in society affecting citizens' economic status or socio-cultural identity (Georgiadou et al. 2018: 103).

Two well established theories of the demand-side are the *economic insecurity theory* and the *cultural backlash theory*, and the literature is often still divided between the two theories and their implication for the success of far-right parties. The *economic insecurity theory* explains the success of far-right parties as a consequence of the stagnation of the middle class, resentments among the losers of globalization and loss of faith in the capacity of the mainstream parties to respond to these problems. The *cultural backlash theory* argues that the success of far-right parties is due to a reaction of a group of the voters against post-industrial ideas, seeking for traditional values and retro norms. Hostility or intolerance towards migrants or ethnic minorities (especially against Muslims) are expected to be an important source of resentment and are linked to this reaction (Inglehart & Norris 2016: 2-12).

Even though it is evident that far right party voters are over-proportionally low-educated and employed in manual occupations, predictors of their voting behaviour like absolute income and unemployment appear to be rather weak in empirical studies (Häuserman et al. 2019: 2). Besides economic positions and claims, far right parties adopt xenophobic and racist positions, thus recent literature argues that economy and culture cannot simply be unrelated to each other. Further, the consideration of economic insecurity should not focus on individuals but on households, because ignoring spillover effects within households may result to considerable underestimation of the role economic risk plays in supporting far right parties (Abou-Chadi and Kurer 2020: 1-3).

2.3 Beyond the dichotomy of cultural and economic factors

In an effort to go beyond this dichotomy of cultural and economic factors and to further advocate political-economic explanations a new strand of studies on the demand-side started to investigate other explanations than absolute or objective socio-economic status or risks (Häusermann et al. 2019: 2). I want to highlight here several of these new studies in more detail and try to group them under the following three lines of studies: (1) relative socio-economic positions, (2) nostalgia and future opportunities and (3) income inequality and social mobility.

2.3.1 Relative socio-economic positions

In order to resolve some of the contradictions in previous investigations that were focusing on absolute measures such as income and unemployment, a new line of research focus on *relative* economic disadvantage. For example, Payne et al. (2017: 4643–4644) finds that perception of economic need is not only influenced by real material resources but also by subjective factors and - most important – by comparisons to other individuals. Individuals may either compare themselves upwards (to those with more income) or downwards (to those with less income). Upwards comparisons would generally lead people to feel that they need more income to be satisfied and vice versa. According to Payne et al. people appear to tend stronger to upwards comparison and therefore focus more on increases of income of the wealthier people and neglect the situation of poorer groups in society. Income inequality, for example, may hence be perceived as a relative disadvantage (only in comparison to others) and this even when the individual's own position has in fact not changed. Thus, individuals with identical resources (e.g., income) at a certain point of time may show different perceptions of inequality

Burgoon et al. (2019: 52-55) assert in their study that *positional deprivation* (a situation where the increase of an individual's income is lower relative to the growth in income of other groups) leads to higher support for radical parties. The authors combine dynamic (a feeling of losing out compared with one's own past) and positional (compared with other groups in society) experiences of an individual and develop the concept of *positional deprivation.* They

demonstrate further that positional deprivation relative to higher income groups increases support for the radical left and positional deprivation relative to low-income groups increases support for the radical right. Finally, they conclude that the combination of dynamic and positional economic misfortune is only partially captured by established measures of income, unemployment or inequality. Most of other studies along this line highlight either dynamic or positional disadvantage but not both simultaneously.

Kurer (2020:1-4) finds that maintaining a routine worker job in an increasingly vulnerable occupational environment leads to status anxiety, which makes far right parties more appealing, whereas the actual loss of a routine job reduces far right party support. Gidron and Hall (2017: 57-58) also detect that lower levels of subjective social status are associated with stronger support for far-right parties.

2.3.2 Nostalgia and future opportunities

The concept of nostalgia is closely connected to the ideology of far-right parties (Gest et al. 2018: 1894-1696). Feelings of nostalgia are often triggered by negative moods or insecurity about the present and nostalgia is defined as a feeling that the world used to be a better place or as a feeling that something good about the past has been lost (De Vries and Hoffmann 2018: 7). For example, Steenvoorden and Harteveld (2018: 28-30) point out that the nostalgia-driven characteristics of many far-right parties attract especially societal-pessimistic voters. They find that the highest level of societal pessimism is indeed observed among far-right voters, but that societal pessimism is distributed in the form of a tilted U-curve with the second highest level observed among radical left voters.

Gest et al. (2018: 1695-1695) view far-right support as the product of a latent psychological phenomenon of a feeling of disadvantage – especially in relation to an individuals' perceived past. The authors call this '*nostalgic deprivation*' and contend that it may be understood (1) in social terms, for instance a perceived shift of individual social position to the bottom of society –i.e. a perceived decline of the social position, (2) in economic terms such as perceived

income inequality or (3) in political terms, like the feeling of disempowerment.

Building on the work described in the last two sections, which share the common focus on how voters take account of the past and present into their political decisions, Häusermann et al. (2019) examine how voters' perception about their economic future as well as social opportunities might influence their voting behaviour. They base their study on the concept of 'aspirational voters' introduced by Iversen and Soskice (2019) and find that positive evaluations of social as well as economic opportunities seem to mitigate radical party success.

Iversen and Soskice (2019: 4-21) state that advanced capitalist democracies will remain resilient vis-à-vis present instabilities and/or social problems. Their core argument is that a majority of society will support governments that are more in favour of capitalism because this would be the rational choice in order to ensure stability. This majority would constitute of the middle class (consisting of the large skilled workforce of the advanced sectors of the economy) and the 'aspirational voters' (who are not yet direct beneficiaries of this advanced sectors but seek to join them).

Häusermann et al. (2019: 6-7) explore the possibility of applying the 'aspirational voters' argument also for other groups of individuals in society. The authors state that also high-educated individuals with high income and prestigious jobs could lose confidence in the capacity of political economic order to ensure prosperity for them or their children. They test how voters' evaluation of future opportunities combined with their present socio-economic status influence electoral preferences.

2.3.3 Income inequality and social mobility

Almost every advanced industrial society has experienced a significant rise in economic inequality in the last three decades (Jedinger and Burgert 2019: 560). Han (2016: 54) shows that the average Gini coefficient increased by 20 percent between 1980 and 2010 and argues that increasing economic inequality has a significant impact on political issues in general. Despite the fact that at the same time far right parties gained on average 7.5 percent of

the vote in EU member states (Mudde 2019: 19-21), only few studies explore the linkages between income inequality and propensity to far right parties.

The results of empirical research examining the relationship between income inequality and increasing support for far-right parties are rather inconclusive. Engler and Weisstanner (2020: 1-2) postulate that rising income inequality is an important factor explaining support for far-right parties not only for individuals that have socially fallen back, but also for individuals higher up in social hierarchy that could be faced with potential decline in society. The authors find (excluding respondents voting for radical left parties or abstaining from voting) that ascending income inequality increases far right party support – especially among individuals with high subjective social status along with lower-middle-incomes. On the other hand, Winkler (2019: 1-3) finds that increasing inequality leads on average to political polarization, however his findings support a stronger increase of far-left parties with increasing inequality. The effect in favour of far-right parties is statistically significant only for older people. Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018: 1727-1730) derive an opposite effect based on relative deprivation theories and hypothesize that in the context of well-performing economies (measured also by income equality), those who are less well-off might well be more inclined to vote for far-right parties because they perceive themselves to be relatively even stronger deprived. Based on the notion of risk aversion concludes that individuals experiencing hardships support far-right parties only in countries, for which no economic threats are expected, because then the individuals consider the risky choice of far-right parties to be "safe".

Encouraged by these ambiguous results Starmans et al. (2017: 1-3) focus on a contradicting phenomenon, namely, that even though a desire for equal distributions of goods is apparent in many different cultures, people actually prefer unequal societies. The authors argue that this paradox finds its explanation in the fact that people are not actually bothered by economic inequality itself but by 'economic unfairness'. They measure the rather abstract term 'economic unfairness' with individuals' opinions towards social mobility. Day and Fiske (2017) show further that if individuals perceive upward social mobility to be possibly in a

given system, they tend to be more motivated to defend the status quo in a political system. They do not focus on social mobility measured through income comparison between parent and individual but focus on the individual perception of social mobility.

Protzer (2019) goes so far to declare that inequality is a poor predictor of political discontent and suggests further that social mobility is a more crucial factor explaining far right party success. In his paper he estimates several models over different samples and finds that low social mobility correlates much stronger with higher far right party support than inequality or shares of immigrants of a respective country population at country level. In his study he measures social mobility with intergenerational income mobility. Hout (2015: 27-28) proposes that the conditions and circumstances of early life constraining adult success are more relevant than who is moving up or down. The focus on origins keeps the focus on issues with regard of had chances and fairness. He sees these social origins to be the crucial point of social mobility.

3 Research question and its relevance

Following the discussion in subsection 2.3.2, social mobility emerged as a crucial factor of explaining far-right party success. However, given the relevance of people's subjective experience and perception as established in subsection 2.3.1, I will focus in this working paper on perceived social mobility (e.g., beliefs about the likelihood of people moving up and down the socioeconomic ladder) and not on income elasticity measured on country level over time. Further, I argue that an individual's perception of social mobility can refer to different time horizons. Individuals can evaluate their possibility for social mobility in comparing what they believe to have had in the past, or what chances of social mobility they expect to have in the future. I outlined this core conceptual framework with the following two definitions: (1) *Perception of past social mobility*: individuals can compare their present situation with the past. How did their economic situation developed in comparison with the past, do they have a better status in society than their parents or did they perceive a decline of their social

position? Here I like to build on the literature (subsection 2.3.2) with regard to nostalgia and especially on *nostalgic deprivation* introduced by Gest et al. (2018). (2) *Perception of future social mobility*: how do people evaluate their chance of upwards social mobility? Do they believe their future opportunities to be good or bad? Again, I would like to build on the literature analysing perceived future opportunities discussed in subsection (2.3.2).

Based on these concepts, I formulate the following research question: *How do different constellations of social mobility in two perceived dimensions of time, namely perceived past social mobility (nostalgic deprivation) and perceived future social mobility (future economic opportunities) affect an individual's propensity to support far-right parties?*

Analysing perceived social mobility in different dimensions of time allows me to combine different explanatory factors of far-right party in a comprehensive framework. Further, it sheds light on an, to the best of my knowledge, existing gap in the literature: what if different perceptions over dimensions of time *simultaneously* influence overall political attitudes of individuals? Based on the discussion of the literature in subsection 2.3.2, I can summarize that individuals with perception of negative past social mobility (*nostalgic deprivation*) are more likely to be in favour of far-right parties and that individuals with perception of positive future social mobility (*future opportunity*) are less likely to vote for far-right parties. However, it is not clear whether an individual can be pessimistic as to the past but optimistic as to the future at the same time. Could an individual perceive high levels of *nostalgic deprivation*, while simultaneously be optimistic about *future opportunities*? The literature predicts for this group of individuals contradicting results and it is not clear how this would influence the vote decision of individuals. Thus, analysing the combination of these two perception constellations seems to be a promising topic. Previous studies sometime compared the size of the effects of the two concepts but to my knowledge there are no studies analysing the combined effect of perceptions of past and future social mobility.

4 Theoretical argument, hypotheses and conceptual framework

This section is divided in two parts: first, I present hypotheses 1 and 2 corresponding to figure 1 that depict the separate effects of the two perceived time dimension of social mobility and second, I introduce the conceptual framework referring to hypotheses 3a to 3d about the combination of the perceived past and future view of social mobility.

4.1 Perceived time dimensions of social mobility

Figure 1: Conceptual framework - perceived time dimensions of social mobility



In figure 1 I illustrate all expected relations and effects of the first conceptual model of this study. I expect different effects at the individual level for both of the two perceived time dimensions of social mobility (*perceived past social mobility (nostalgic deprivation)* and p*erceived future social mobility (future opportunity)*) on the preferences towards far-right parties (*Voted for far-right party*) depicted with the two arrows. Based on this framework, I formulate the following two hypotheses:

> **Hypothesis 1:** *Individuals perceiving negative past social mobility (high levels of nostalgic deprivation) are more likely to vote for far-right parties.*

Here I take into consideration the concept of nostalgic deprivation introduced by Gest et al. (2018). As discussed in subsection 2.3.2 the authors conclude that a perceived decline of the social position especially in relation to an individual's past social position increases far-right

party support. This feeling of disadvantage and the presumed social decline is viewed to be an important factor to explain far-right party support in the literature with regard to nostalgia. The presumption that nostalgic deprivation could be an important predictor for far-right party support is grounded on the fact that one of the most important messages of most far-right party is that society should change back to what it (presumably) used to be before the social changes that have occurred in recent decades (Steenvoorden and Herteveld 2018: 29) and it goes along with the argument of globalization "losers" being strong supporters of far-right parties (Inglehart and Norris 2016). The so called "losers" of the globalization are viewed in this part of the literature to be against post-modern values and favour in-group solidarity and rejection of outsiders (immigrants), due to a feeling of disadvantage and social decline. Burgoon et al. (2019: 57-58) argue that people who have seen their household income stagnate as compared to income of others might assign the cause of this stagnation to past governments of mainstream parties and their policies (European Union, immigration, globalization). Betz (1993: 423-424) explains that voters tend to be driven by diffuse fears and by increasing bitterness over the fact that they feel abandoned by society and can't change their situation. Far-right parties are attractive for these people, because this party family campaigns against both of these perceived causes of deprivation and also provide easy scapegoats like immigrants, native minorities, native top 1% of rich persons or the "welfare-cheating" poor (Burgoon et al. 2019: 57-58). The perceived past view of social mobility is capturing this perceived decline of the social position and this feeling of perceived downward social mobility in the past view in general is assumed to have a strong positive effect on far-right party support.

Protzer (2019) employs four macro level regression with different units of analysis: the first estimation considers US counties and the vote share for Donald Trump, in the second regression he focusses on vote share of Marine Le Pen's Front National party in French departments, then he regresses vote share of far-right parties in European Union countries on social mobility and last, he estimates a large sample of country distributed over the world and regresses

political stability as an indicator for far-right party on social mobility. He measures social mobility with income elasticity and intergenerational income mobility at the level of the respective units and his findings show a consistent narrative of far-right party success taking root in locations with low social mobility. I am not fully convinced that the political stability variable is a sufficient proxy for far-right support, still, the results from the other three models are significant for the baseline of all hypotheses of this working paper with regard to the two perceived time dimensions of social mobility – downward social mobility seems to increase far-right party success.

In this study I focus on perceived social mobility and in order to better understand the hypothesized effect of perceived social mobility we need to go down to the individual level, i.e., deeper than the macro level.

Day and Fiske (2017: 269-272) focus in their study at the individual level on perceived social mobility and find that exposure to low social mobility reduced people's willingness to defend the current political status quo. They asked respondents of their survey whether it is difficult for people to change their position in society and also asked respondents about their perceived socioeconomic status. Needless to say, the authors do not examine far-right party support, but the willingness to defend the political status quo. Still, I argue that it is reasonable to assume that low levels of perceived social mobility could increase the probability to vote for far-right parties. The far-right party family consistently attacks the political status quo and the political system in general, therefore lower willingness to defend the political system could be also reflected in voting for parties that assault the status quo.

> **Hypothesis 2:** *Individuals perceiving positive future social mobility (high levels of future opportunities) are less likely to support far-right parties.*

Hypothesis 2 summarizes the expected relationship between the positive evaluation of future chances and far-right voting. Following the logic of the above discussed theory, it is only well-grounded to assume that a positive outlook on social mobility might decrease the

probability to vote for far-right parties. The core argument of Iversen and Soskice (2019) is that a majority of society will support governments that are more in favour of capitalism because this would be the rational choice in order to ensure stability, thus, it seems justifiable to assume that (similar to the argument for the perceived present view of social mobility) individuals with positive perception of future opportunities are less likely to vote for far-right parties.

Häusermann et al. (2019) explore how individual perception of future opportunities in combination with high social status of an individual can reduce the support for radical parties (both radical right and left). In other words, individuals with a perceived positive outlook on future social mobility are expected to be more likely to vote for parties that are not attacking the status quo, because these individuals do not see the reason to threaten their perceived chances of a positive future.

4.2 The combination of perceived past and future of social mobility

In hypothesis (1) I combine the assumption of the literature with regard to social mobility and nostalgia and in hypothesis (2) I summarize the expected effect resulting from theory with regard to future opportunities. The new question now is, what if individuals have *asymmetric* perceptions of social mobility with respect to past and future? When assessing an individual's perception of nostalgic deprivation, we so far ignored whether the same individual could have positive or negative perception of future opportunities, what could influence his/her voting behaviour. What if an individual reports high levels of nostalgic deprivation and at the same time evaluates future opportunities to be good? Or in reverse, what if individuals are not experiencing nostalgic deprivation but do not expect a positive output with regard to job security in the future?

Figure 2: Conceptual framework - quadrants: perceived past and future view



In figure 2 I show 4 possible combinations of perceived past and future social mobility in a quadrant diagram. For each quadrant I formulated a hypothesis to test the implications of this combined approach. Individuals belonging to the first quadrant (Q1) simultaneously perceive high levels of nostalgic deprivation and have negative assessments of future opportunities. Individuals belonging in the second quadrant (Q2) have also high levels of nostalgic deprivation but at the same time perception of positive future opportunities. The third quadrant (Q3) refers to individuals that have simultaneously low levels of nostalgic deprivation and perception of negative future opportunities, Finally, the group of individuals belonging to the fourth quadrant (Q4) has simultaneously low levels of nostalgic deprivation and perception of positive future opportunities.

> **Hypothesis 3a (Q1):** *Individuals that are simultaneously perceiving high levels of nostalgic deprivation and negative future economic opportunities are more probable to vote for far-right parties.*

Hypothesis 3a is straightforward, perceptions of past and future social mobility show in the same direction (symmetric perceptions). Both lines of the literature would assume that these

individuals are more likely to be in favour of far-right parties. Thus, I expect this effect to be very strong because the two perceptions are assumed to strengthen each other.

> **Hypothesis 3b (Q2):** *Individual that are simultaneously perceiving high levels of nostalgic deprivation and positive future economic opportunities are more probable to vote for far-right parties; but this effect is expected to be weaker than in hypothesis 3a.*

In hypothesis 3b I touch the first possible implication of an asymmetry of past and future perceptions. Without consideration of both time dimensions of perception, one part of the literature predicts that these individuals are more probable to vote for far-right party (considering only nostalgic deprivation), while the other part of the literature concludes that these individuals are less likely to vote for far-right parties (considering only future opportunities). I consider the perception of nostalgic deprivation to be more abstract and broader, which probably implies stronger blurred perceptions or even stronger romanticizing of the past than the assessment of economic opportunities, which possibly leaves less room for fantasies and confronts many people with hard truths. As a consequence, I assume that perceived past social mobility would be the stronger predictor for far-right parties, but perceived positive future opportunities would have a dampening influence on this strong effect of high levels of nostalgic deprivation.

> **Hypothesis 3c (Q3):** *Individual that are simultaneously perceiving low levels of nostalgic deprivation and negative future economic opportunities are less probable to vote for far-right parties; this effect is expected to be weaker than in hypothesis 3d.*

Hypothesis 3c refers to the second possible perception asymmetry. The literature with regard to nostalgic deprivation expect this group of people to be less in favour of far-right parties, while the literature with regard to future opportunity predicts a higher far-right party support. Similar as before I assume that the effect of low nostalgic deprivation would be stronger

than the future opportunities effect. Thus, individuals of this group would be expected not to support far-right parties, but this effect would be dampened by the future opportunities effect and would be weaker than the one in hypothesis 3d.

> **Hypothesis 3d (Q4):** *Individuals that are simultaneously perceiving low levels of nostalgic deprivation and positive future economic opportunities are less probable to vote for far-right parties; this effect is expected to be stronger than that in hypothesis 3c.*

Similar to hypothesis 3a, there is no perception asymmetry, past and future perceptions show in the same direction. The individuals in the fourth quadrant have positive levels of perceived past and future social mobility and both lines of literature would expect these individuals to be less in favour of far-right parties. This overall effect is assumed to be stronger than the one postulated in hypothesis 3c, because both effects are assumed to go into the same direction and therefore strengthen each other.

Additionally, a further interesting analysis would be to compare the socio-economic characteristics (income, education level, gender, etc.) of the individuals in the four quadrants and evaluate whether they are related in any way with the hypothesized voting behaviour, particularly in case of asymmetric perceptions. For example, do we clearly see that individuals with perception of positive future opportunities are all high-educated or is the composition of the groups more heterogeneous? Of course, the main focus of this working paper is to determine whether perceived downwards social mobility over two perceived time dimensions is a relevant driver for far-right voting and how asymmetric perceptions of past and future social mobility influence voting behaviour, still this supplementary assessment might strengthen the analysis of asymmetric perceptions and allow for more differentiated results. I will present the analysis of several socio-economic characteristics of the groups of individuals in the four quadrants in subsection 5.2.5.

5 Data and operationalization

5.1 Data

All variables are directly measured at the individual level and I employ data from the *welfarepriorities*-dataset in order to estimate the models for the hypotheses of this working paper. The data was collected in the context of a large research project in distributive policy preferences across Western Europe. The *welfarepriorities*-dataset on distributive policy preferences based on a survey of individuals contains information for 8 West-European counties (Denmark, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) with a total of 12'506 observations. The dataset is based on a sampling strategy by quota for age, gender and education, drawn from national census figures. At the beginning of the survey respondents were asked the quota-relevant socio-demographic questions and respondents belonging to already oversampled quotas were exulted from the dataset (Häusermann et al. 2019). This dataset is based on survey questions that allow to measure attitudes towards nostalgia, future opportunities, social mobility and many other relevant items. I will start in the next subsection with the operationalization of the variables used in this working paper.

5.2 Operationalization

5.2.1 Dependent variable: far-right support

I apply a similar approach to measure increasing far-right party success like Lucassen and Lubbers (2012: 556-558) and Inglehart and Norris (2016: S.19). In both articles the authors considered questions regarding the respondents vote during the last national election and the respondents' party affiliations. The two dependent variables in the *welfarepriorities*-dataset are *Voted for far-right party* that records the respondents vote during the last national election and *Far-right party vote intension* that records the respondents vote intentions if the respective country would hold elections next week. Respondents that voted for a far-right party in the last election get a value of 1 and a value 0 if they voted for any other party and similarly with regard to the vote intension. I use the *Voted for far-right party* as the main

dependent variable and *Far-right party vote intension* for a series of robustness checks

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Voted for far-right party	10,364	0.130	0.337	0.000	1.000
Far-right party vote intension	10,736	0.153	0.360	0.000	1.000
Nostalgic deprivation	12,465	5.681	2.586	1.000	10.000
Nostalgic deprivation (10 years)	12,396	6.523	2.621	1.000	11.000
Intergenerational social mobility	12,484	1.843	0.773	1.000	3.000
Future opportunity	9,304	6.746	2.490	1.000	11.000
Future (economic) opportunity	9,465	6.513	2.964	1.000	11.000
Age	12,501	48.678	16.615	18	108
Female	12,501	0.516	0.500	0	1
Income	12,157	5.351	2.864	1.000	10.000
Education	12,501	4.942	1.777	1	8
Unemployment	12,501	0.068	0.252	0	1
Attitudes towards immigration	12,429	2.635	1.065	1.000	4.000
Attitudes towards inequality	12,455	2.885	0.842	1.000	4.000

in section 7. Lucassen and Lubbers (2012) used the classification for populist radical right parties provided by Mudde (2007) and based this classification on further scales measuring party policy and other characteristics determining whether a party is populist radical right or not. Given the later time period of the employed dataset I base my categorisation of the parties on Rooduijn et al. (2019). Their list consists of European parties that can be classified as either far-right, far-left, populist and/or Eurosceptic. For this analysis I consider all far-right parties. Their list contains only parties that obtained at least 2% of the vote in at least one national parliamentary election since 1998. Additionally, I compare my final far-right party selection with the one implemented in the paper of Häusermann et al. (2019) as well as with the one used in the paper of Steenvoorden and Hartevel (2018). The final classification of far-right parties is summarized in table A2 in the appendix.

Figure 3: Histogram of dependent variables



As we can see in figure 3 both variables are very similar distributed, *Voted for far-right party* reports a lower count for 1 than *Far-right party vote intension*, this could be an indicator of the increasing success of far-right party in Europe. We can confirm this in table 1, V*oted for far-right party* has a mean of 0.13 which is lower than the mean of 0.153 of *Far-right party vote intension*.

5.2.2 Independent variables: nostalgic deprivation and future opportunities

The *welfarepriorities*-dataset contains a set of variables for both nostalgic deprivation and future opportunities. I identified for both concepts a main variable but take also into consideration other applicable variables for separate robustness tests. The hypotheses 3a to 3d are tested based on data of the *welfarepriorities*-dataset (see table 1 for the descriptive statistics and figure A1 for the correlation matrix of all variables; the definition of all variables is found in table A1 in the appendix).

The main variable to measure perception of past social mobility is *Nostalgic deprivation* and the variable refers to the answers to the question 'whether respondents think that the life in a respective country became worse or better in the last 30 years' (measured on a 10-point scale from *1*= became worse to *10*= became better). Also, in this case I reversed the variables (**1**= became better to **10**= became worse). Table 1 shows a mean of 5.681, which indicates slightly more answers in the direction of 'life became worse'. When looking at figure 4 it is compelling that almost 1'500 of the 12'465 respondents (over 10% of all interviewed individuals) chose

the answer category 10, thus stating that they believe life has become much worse in the last 30 years. N*ostalgic deprivation (10)* is the first variable I employ for robustness checks; it measures whether respondents think their economic standard of life has become worse or better compared to 10 years ago (measured on a 10-point scale from *1*= became worse to *10*= became better). I also reversed this variable (*1*= became better to *10*= became worse). This variable seems more or less normal distributed. The second variable I plan to use for robustness checks as well as for the matching method is an ordinal variable *Intergenerational social mobility* (ranging from 1 to 3). This variable considers whether respondents think that their 'position in society is lower (=*1*), the same (=*2*) or higher (=*3*) than that of their parents when they had the same age as the respondent now'. For this working paper I also reversed this variable, thus, *1*=higher, *2*=same and *3*=lower. For the use of this variable as a treatment variable in the matching method estimations I recoded it to a dichotomous variable with 0= same or higher position than parents and 1= lower position then parents. In this case I am interested in the effect of social decline and as a consequence I put the values 1 and 2 of the original variable together. In figure 4 we can see that about a quarter of the respondents think that their position in society is lower than that of their parents. This data constellation shows that a large control group is available that can be matched on the treatment group.

Figure 4: Histogram of independent variables (unique dataset)



The main variable to assess the perception of future social mobility is *Future opportunity* and the variable is based on answers to the question 'how they evaluate their chance for a secure and fulfilled life in general' (measured on a 11-point scale from *1*= bad to *11*= good). Figure 4 reveals a slightly left-skewed distribution of *Future opportunity*, the mean of this variable is 6.7 (see table 1). Thus, we get the information that on the whole individuals assess their chance for a secure and fulfilled life to be good. The variable *Future (economic) opportunity* is very similar to the main variable but focuses on employment. Respondents are asked 'how they evaluate their chance for a good and secure employment situation until retirement' (measured on a 11-point scale from *1*= bad to *11*= good). Figure 4 depicts a similar distribution for this variable, noticeable are the two peaks on both ends of the scale which are almost identical. When focusing mainly on employment the answers seem to be

more polarized.

Figure A1 in the appendix describes the correlations between all the independent variables, we see a strong correlation between N*ostalgic deprivation* and *Future opportunity* (-0.49) as well as between *Nostalgic deprivation* and *Future (economic) opportunity* (-0.39). We further see that *Income* as well as *Education* also correlates with *Nostalgic deprivation* (-0.22 and -0.17) and *Future opportunity* (0.34 and 0.21). So far, the argument to analysis the effect of the past and the future view together was based on a theoretical debate but looking at figure A1 we could very well experience problems with the estimations due to multicollinearity. Thus, a combination of the two concepts and the corresponding variables seems to be reasonable also from an empirical point of view.

5.2.3 Independent variables: control variables

As control variables I include a series of standard socio-economic factors explaining far-right voting as well as a set of variables that cover further concepts of the literature that explains far-right voting, in order to test whether the independent variable of interest is indeed a factor of influence beyond these established factors in the literature (see table 1 for the descriptive statistics and figure A1 for the correlation matrix of all variables; the definition of all variables is found in table A1 in the appendix).

A first group of control variables refers to standard socio-economic factors like age, gender, household total net income and education These variables are all considered to influence the propensity to support far-right parties. Older persons as well as low-educated individuals are thought to be more likely to vote for far-right parties (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012: 561). The gender gap with respect to support for far-right parties is also well established in the literature, male individuals are more in favour of far-right parties (Arzheimer 2009: 263). Further, I expect that higher income levels are negative correlated with far-right support. Because individuals with high income seem to be beneficial of the political status quo.

A second group of control variables tries to capture relevant concepts of the literature

analysing the success of far-right parties. I therefore intend to include two variables illustrating the famous *cultural vs. economic factors* debate as well as a variable that measures attitudes towards *income inequality* as this is a relevant factor in newer studies.

Unemployment is a dichotomous variable (*1*= unemployed, *0*= employed) indicating whether a respondent is employed at the moment or not. Under the assumption of the *economic insecurity theory* (Inglehart Norris 2016, Lucassen and Lubers 2012), I conclude that individuals that are unemployed are more likely to favour far-right parties, because they experienced economic insecurity. *Attitudes towards immigration* is an additive index (ordinal four-point scale; *1*= do not agree at all, *4*= fully agree) based on two variables. The first variable measures 'whether respondents perceive immigration to be a treat to the respective national cultural' and the second variable 'whether respondents perceive immigration to be a treat for the respective national job market'. A mean score of this index of 2.6 shows that many of the respondents view immigration as a treat to their country (culturally and economically). Further, figure 4 shows that almost a quarter of all respondents fully agree that immigration is a threat to their respective country. The variable *Attitudes towards inequality* is also an ordinal variable with the same structure as the variables referring to immigration. Respondents are asked 'whether a fair society should not have high income differences. In table 1 we detect a mean of almost 2.9, thus many respondents in this dataset think a fair society should have low levels of income inequality. In figure 4 we can also see this graphically, almost half of the respondents of the dataset chose value 3 on a four-point scale. I assume that individuals that are more for equality are less likely to support far-right parties.

5.2.4 Independent variables: combination of perceptions of past and future social mobility

I use the two main variables *Nostalgic deprivation* and *Future opportunity* to create the four variables representing the four groups considering simultaneously perceived past and future social mobility. The resulting variables are simply named *Quadrant 1, Quadrant 2, Quadrant 3 and Quadrant 4*. In order to create the quadrant variables, I first recoded

the two main variables into dichotomous variables and then combined them into the four quadrant variables. The variable *Nostalgic deprivation* is measured on a 10-point scale. In order to construct the respective dichotomous variable, I chose to cut off in the middle of the scale, thus 1-5 received the value 1 and 6-10 received the value 0. Thus, the value *1* of the dichotomous variable measures high levels of nostalgia, while the value *0* measures low levels of nostalgia. Likewise, the dichotomous variable for *Future opportunity* reports a *1* when respondents evaluates their chance to live a secure and fulfilled life to be bad and vice versa. *Future opportunity* is a 11-point ordinal variable, and I chose the cut-off so that 1-5 received the value *1* (low expected opportunities) for the respective dichotomous variable 1 and 6-11 the value *0* (high expected opportunities). As I will discuss further in section 7, I coded a second version of the dichotomous *Future (economic) opportunity* variable, for which I changed the cut off so that 1-6 receive the value *1* and 7-11 the value *0* and used this variable to create a second version of the quadrant variables to see whether the applied cut-off affects my results. I also coded the same quadrants for a combination of further version of *Nostalgic deprivation* and *Future (economic) opportunity*, all estimations for these variables are in the appendix and I will discuss these results in section 7.

The variable *Quadrant 1* takes the value *1* for individuals that simultaneously perceive high levels of *Nostalgic deprivation* (value *1* of the respective dichotomous variable) and low levels of *Future opportunity* (value *1* of the respective dichotomous variable). Thus, *Quadrant 1* refers to individuals that (a) feel that life became worse in their country in the last 30 years and at the same time (b) assess their chance for a good life in the future to be bad. Quadrant takes the value 0 for all other individuals in the sample. As I discussed in section 4.2 both perceptions are linked to higher far-right support, hence I expect a positive correlation between *Quadrant 1* and the dependent variable *Voted for far-right party*.

The variable *Quadrant 2* takes the value *1* for individuals that simultaneously perceive high levels of *Nostalgic deprivation* (value *1* of the respective dichotomous variable) and high levels of *Future opportunity* (value *0* of the respective dichotomous variable). Thus, *Quadrant 2*

refers to individuals that (a) feel that life became worse in their country in the last 30 years and at the same time (b) assess their chance for a good life in the future to be good. *Quadrant 2* takes the value *0* for all other individuals in the sample. *Quadrant 2* represents a first category of individuals with asymmetric perceptions with respect to past and future social mobility. As discussed in section 4.2 the effect of nostalgic deprivation is expected to be stronger than the effect of future opportunities so that on the whole also these individuals show the tendency to support far-right parties, but this tendency is weaker than in the case of the individuals in *Quadrant 1*.

The variable *Quadrant 3* takes the value *1* for individuals that simultaneously perceive low levels of *Nostalgic deprivation* (value *0* of the respective dichotomous variable) and low levels of *Future opportunity* (value *1* of the respective dichotomous variable). Thus, *Quadrant 3* refers to individuals that (a) feel that life became better in their country in the last 30 years and at the same time (b) assess their chance for a good life in the future to be bad. *Quadrant 3* takes the value *0* for all other individuals in the sample. *Quadrant 3* represents a second category of individuals with asymmetric perceptions with respect to past and future. I expect a negative correlation between *Quadrant 3* and the dependent variable *Voted for far-right party*, but this effect is expected to be weaker than the effect of *Quadrant 4* (see below).

The variable *Quadrant 4* takes the value *1* for individuals that simultaneously perceive low levels of *Nostalgic deprivation* (value *0* of the respective dichotomous variable) and high levels of *Future opportunity* (value *0* of the respective dichotomous variable). Thus, *Quadrant 4* refers to individuals that (a) feel that life became better in their country in the last 30 years and at the same time (b) assess their chance for a good life in the future to be good. *Quadrant 4* takes the value *0* for all other individuals in the sample. Both perceptions show in the same direction, hence I assume a negative correlation between *Quadrant 4* and the dependent variable *Voted for far-right party*.

Looking at figure A2 in the appendix we see that problems due to multicollinearity seem to be

less probable: The correlations between the quadrant variables is less strong then between the variables measuring the past or the future view and we also see that *Income* and *Education* report lower correlation values than in figure A1. Therefore, from a statistical point of view, the variables resulting from the combination of the two variables for the past and future view seem to be a good choice.

5.2.5 Descriptive analysis of the Quadrant variables

Figure 5 depicts the distribution of respondents over the four quadrant variables. 1907 (20.6%) individuals in the *welfarepriorities*-dataset belong to the first quadrant, 2960 (31.9%) individuals belong the second quadrant, only 494 (5.3%) belong to the third quadrant and 3916 (42.2%) individuals belong to the fourth quadrant. Notably a total of 3454 (37.2%) individuals belong to either *Quadrant 2* or *Quadrant 3*, thus more than a third of all respondents reported answers to the variables measuring *Nostalgic deprivation* and *Future opportunity* that are assumed to have opposing effects on far-right voting (asymmetric perceptions with respect to past and future social mobility). This shows that the proposed working paper tackles a real problem that is empirically visible and thus goes beyond a gap in the theoretical concepts.

Figure 5: Distribution of the qudrants



Table A3 in the appendix reports the means for a set of socio-economic variables as well as

the variables for employment status and for attitudes towards immigration for each quadrant. I additionally conducted a series of t-tests between all the quadrants for each variable and most differences in the mean are statistically significant with some exceptions: the difference of the means of the variables for females as well as for age in the second and third quadrant, also the difference of the means of the variable for attitudes towards immigration as well as of age in the third and fourth quadrant, and finally the difference of the mean of age in the first and third quadrant are not statistically significant. Figure A3 in the appendix shows the distribution of all the variables from table A3 over the quadrants and helps to better understand the differences between the quadrants visually.

In summary, the first quadrant features the lowest level of education and income, the highest shares of females as well as the highest rate of persons that are unemployed, which is in accordance with negative perceptions of both past and future of the individuals in this group. The first and second quadrant display very negative attitudes towards immigration, not surprisingly the first even more negative than the second quadrant; the fourth quadrant shows the lowest rate of females. Table A4 depicts logistic regressions with country fixed effects with the four Quadrant variables as dependent variables and the socio-economic variables plus *Unemployment* and *Attitude towards immigration* as independent variables that confirm the descriptive findings presented above.

Because all these findings are difficult to grasp, I illustrate them in figure 6. Noticeably, there seems to be two key distinctions between the quadrants: (1) individuals with high levels of *Nostalgic deprivation* (first and second quadrant) seem to have higher levels of negative *Attitudes towards immigration* than individuals with low levels of *Nostalgic deprivation* (third and fourth quadrant). (2) individuals with low levels of *Future (economic) opportunity* (first and third quadrant) seem to have lower levels in *Education* and *Income* as well as a higher unemployment rate, than individuals with high levels of *Future (economic) opportunity* (second and fourth quadrant). When looking at table A5 in the appendix, we note that the percentages of individuals working in the government and working in the public sector for

the second and fourth quadrants are nearly twice as high as for the first and third quadrant. The differences between the other job sectors are not very strong. I will discuss the implication of these descriptive statistics of the quadrants together with the results in section 8.

Figure 6: Summary of quadrant composition



6 Method and identification strategies

Given the nature of my research questions, my hypotheses, the structure of the dataset and the dichotomous nature of my dependent variables I intend to apply logistic regression including fixed effects for countries (country fixed effects) to better control for any country-specific effects. Even though the individual level data is clustered in countries, I will not estimate the models with multilevel logistic regressions, because multilevel analysis should not be used for data that is clustered in hierarchal structure with less than circa 20 higher levels (Stegmueller 2013: 758-759).

As mentionned in section 1, I implement a matching design to provide further evidence for the first hypothesis of the working paper. One of the applicable variables to measure the past view *Intergenerational social mobility* seems suitable for this method. One of the crucial benefits of randomized experiments for estimating causal effects over the implementation of regressions with observational data is that the treated and control groups are guaranteed to be only randomly different from each other with respect to all background covariates, both observed and unobserved (Stuart 2010: 1). Thus, randomized experiments are the optimal research designs to establish causation (Arceneaux et al. 2006: 37).

Simply put, the main goal of the matching method is the endeavour to replicate a randomized experiment as much as possible for observational (therefore nonrandomized) data. Based on such a quasi-experiment, scholars try to provide a stronger foundation for causal inference and argue that this method is more adequate for dealing with problems of endogeneity with observational data (Stuart 2010: 1).

Needless to say, there is also a part of the literature that warns not to overestimate the possibilities of the matching method. Studies showed that matching can very well fail to eliminate bias and offer little improvement over standard OLS regression (Arceneaux et al. 2006: 55-56). Hence, I would like to emphasize that is not my ambition to argue for casual inference. Given that there is an increasing line of literature analysing the effect of downward social mobility on far-right support, I thought it would be interesting to analyse this effect with additional methods in order to strengthen the argument that the findings in this working paper with regard to hypothesis 1 are quite robust.

The matching method can broadly be defined as an attempt to balance the distribution of covariates in the treated and control group from a dataset in order to be able to estimate the treatment effect (Stuart 2010: 1). There is a variety of algorithms for multivariate matching including 'nearest neighbour matching' and 'genetic matching'.

'Nearest neighbour matching' involves running through the list of treated units and selecting

the closest eligible control unit to be paired with each treated unit. The distance measure to define which control unite is the closest to each treated unite is propensity score difference (Stuart 2010: 8-9). Genetic matching tries to find a set of weights for each covariate to achieve the optimal balance (Ho et a. 2011: 12). Genetic matching uses an algorithm, which is an optimization routine used for non-differentiable objective functions, to find scaling factors for each variable in a generalized Mahalanobis distance formula (Diamond and Sekhon 2013: 932-934). Sekhon (2011: 1-5) argues that Near neighbour matching is often creating worse balance across measured potential cofounders. Thus, I implement both nearest neighbour matching and genetic matching in this working paper to see whether I can find similar results and further evidence supporting the first hypothesis.

7 Results

The analysis of the results as well as robustness tests is split in three subsections, in the first two subsections I present all the results for the perceived past and future view of social mobility (hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2) with the corresponding robustness checks as well as the results for the matching method design. In the last section I will discuss the results for the combination of the perceived past and future view of social mobility (H3a-3d) along with the corresponding robustness checks.

7.1 Perception of past social mobility (H1)

7.1.1 Main logistic regression estimates

Main results

In table 2 I present all findings with regard to the perceived past social mobility (hypothesis 1). The structure of table 2 is as follows: Model 1 is the baseline model containing only the focal variable *Nostalgic deprivation* to estimate the direct effect of the past view of social mobility on far-right support, model 2 adds socio-economic control variables, model 3 includes control variables with respect to other relevant factors explaining far-right support and model 4 depicts the full model along with country fixed effects.

The effect of *Nostalgic deprivation* on *Voted for far-right party* is robust over all four models, is highly statistically significant at the 0.001%-test level and has the theoretically hypothesized sign. Thus, we find that individuals perceiving high levels of nostalgic deprivation are more likely to vote for far-right parties keeping all other variables constant. The effect for the socio-economic control variables *Female* and *Education* remain robust throughout table 2 according to the assumption stated in section 5. *Income* is only statistically significant (at the 0.05%-test level) in model 2 (opposed to the assumed sign) and *Age* only in model 3. *Unemployment* is only statistically significant in model 3 and loses its significance in the complete model. Rather unexpected, the result in model 3 would indicate that unemployed individuals are less likely to vote for far-right parties ceteris paribus. *Attitudes towards immigration* is highly statistically significant (at the 0.001%-test level) in model 3 and model 4. Individuals perceiving immigration as a threat for the respective country are more probable to vote for far-right parties ceteris paribus. *Attitudes towards inequality* remains also fairly stable and is statistically significant (at the 0.001%-test level in model 7 and the 0.05%-test level in model 4. Individuals more in favour of income equality tend to vote less often for far-right parties ceteris paribus.

In order to better qualify these findings from the statistical point of view, we can look at the predicted probabilities for N*ostalgic deprivation*, *Attitudes towards immigration* and *Attitudes towards income inequality* (figure 7). In figure 7 we can see that the effect of higher levels of nostalgic deprivation is rather strong. Moving from 1 to 10 increases the probability to be more supportive of far-right parties by almost 10 percentage points. Therefore, I can reject the null-hypotheses and find strong evidence for the first hypothesis of this working paper. Interesting but not surprising is the strong effect of viewing immigration to be a threat for the respective country. Going from 1 to 4 increases the probability to be more in favour of far-right parties by almost 40 percentage points. The effect of *Attitudes towards income inequality* is rather weak. Going from 1 to 4 decreases the probability to be more supportive of far-right parties by less than 3 percentage points and even though the effect is statistically

Table 2: Regression results: Nostalgic deprivation

	Dependent variable:			
	Voted for far-right party			
	logistic			
	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)
Intercept	−3.081***	−2.168***	−4.659***	−4.912***
	(0.083)	(0.176)	(0.265)	(0.289)
Nostalgic deprivation	0.199***	0.190***	0.118***	0.112***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Age		−0.003	−0.005*	−0.003
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female		−0.296***	−0.197**	−0.175*
		(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.070)
Income		0.028*	−0.001	−0.013
		(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Education		−0.153***	−0.097***	−0.079***
		(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Unemployment			−0.269*	−0.198
			(0.136)	(0.152)
Attitudes towards immigration			1.117***	1.239***
			(0.044)	(0.048)
Attitudes towards inequality			−0.201***	−0.102*
			(0.038)	(0.042)
Country fixed effects	*no*	*no*	*no*	*yes*
Observations	10,028	9,753	9,684	9,684
Log Likelihood	−3,840.768	−3,702.190	−3,203.917	−2,683.131
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,685.536	7,416.379	6,425.835	5,398.261

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. SE in parentheses. M1-M4 Logistic regressions, M4 also with country fixed effects.

significant, we can see that the confidence intervals are overlapping and very big signifying a high uncertainty in this effect.

Figure 7: Predicted probabilities of far-right party support (M4)



Robustness tests

I estimated the same models again for the dependent variable *Far-right vote intension* as a first robustness test. The regression results are displayed in table A6 in the appendix and the calculated predicted probabilities are illustrated in figure A4 (also in the appendix). Because the results are very similar for the second dependent variable, we can conclude that the findings for *Nostalgic deprivation* are very robust over both dependent variables.

Table A7 in the appendix shows the results for both dependent variables and for the second focal independent variable *Nostalgic deprivation (10 years)* and the table structure is similar as before. We can again observe a relatively robust effect for all variables in the table. The coefficients of *Nostalgic deprivation (10 years)* show in every model the hypothesized positive sign and are highly statistically significant at the 0.001%-test level, with the exception of model R7 at the 0.05%-test level. Thus, individuals that perceive their economic standard of life has become worse compared to 10 years ago are more likely to support far-right parties then individuals that think their standard of life has become better ceteris paribus. I illustrated the predicted probabilities for both dependent variables in figure A5 in the appendix and we see that the effect of *Nostalgic deprivation (10 years)* is weaker than for the first focal variable *Nostalgic deprivation*. Moving from 1 to 11 increases the probability to vote for far-right parties by less than 7 percentage points for the first dependent variables and by less than 4 percentage points for the second dependent variable. The size of the effect of *Attitude towards immigration* remains the same. In summary, the effects for the control variables remain also fairly the same as in the estimations with the main variable of interest for perceived past social mobility *Nostalgic deprivation*.

Finally, table A8 in the appendix reports the results for the independent variable *Intergenerational social mobility*. The results support the previous findings in this subsection and we again find a robust effect for the variable of interest. All coefficients report the hypothesized sign and are all statistically significant (complete models at the 0.05%-test level, all others at the 0.001%-test level). Individuals thinking that their position in society is lower

in comparison to their parents are more likely to vote for far-right party ceteris paribus. The findings for the control variables are also robust and similar to the previous models. The effect for *Age* is no longer significant when estimating the regression with *Intergenerational social mobility*. As we can see in figure A6 in the appendix the effect of *Intergenerational social mobility* is even weaker than that of *Nostalgic deprivation (10 years)*. Going from 1 to 3 decreases the probability to support far-right parties by less than 2 percentage points. The size of the effect of *Attitude towards immigration* remains the same.

Overall, the results seem to support the hypothesis 1 of this working paper and they seem to be very robust across all different models. I will continue the discussion of these findings in section 8.

7.1.2 Results based on matching methods

In this subsection I present the results of the matching design analysis for hypothesis 1 using a dichotomous version (treatment) of the variable *Intergenerational social mobility*. The idea is to match the treatment group (individuals that have lower status than their parents in society) on the control group (individuals that have the same or a higher status than their parents in society) using different variables from the dataset (cofounders). These variables measure socio-economic factors (age, gender, income, education and employment status) and other factors that are viewed as relevant for explaining far-right support (attitudes towards immigration, attitudes towards inequality, attitudes towards homosexuality, attitudes towards gender equality, attitude towards European Union, self left-right placement, social trust and political trust). One core methodological assumption is that the variation in the treatment variable is exogenous to the general live situation of the individuals in the matched subsample (Stuart 2010). For most of the implemented cofounders this seems to be accurate, but I have troubles to make a strong argument for the assumption for cofounders like education and income. The level of education as well as the income of an individual seem to be affected by the variation of the treatment variable.

Results - Nearest Neighbour matching

I conducted the matching method in accordance with the rest of this working paper with both dependent variables to see whether the result remains robust. Before discussing the results from the nearest neighbour matching, we need to analyse the matched data to see whether the matching was successful from the statistical point of view.

The dataset sampled for the dependent variable *Voted for far-right party* contains 9'803 observation, 2'260 individuals belong to the treatment group (thus they perceive their social position to be lower than their parents) and 7'543 belong to the control group (thus they perceive their social position to be the same or higher than their parents). In the sample size of the of the matched data every treated individual was matched with a control group individual that was most fitting. The dataset sampled for the second dependent variable *Far-right vote intension* contains a total of 10'152 observation, now with 2'294 individuals belonging to the treatment group and 7'858 belonging to the control group.

Table 3: Nearest Neighbor matching - summary of balance for matched data

	Voted for far-right party			**Far-right party vote intension**		
	Mean (T)	**Mean (C)**	**Mean diff**	**Mean (T)**	**Mean (C)**	**Mean diff**
Distance	0.33	0.32	0.01	0.32	0.31	0.01
Age	46.58	46.83	-0.26	46.28	45.69	0.59
Female	0.54	0.53	0.00	0.52	0.51	0.01
Income	4.14	4.14	0.00	4.11	4.16	-0.05
Education	4.68	4.71	-0.03	4.71	4.73	-0.02
Unemployment	0.13	0.10	0.03	0.14	0.11	0.03
Attitudes towards immigration	2.72	2.70	0.03	2.70	2.67	0.03
Attitudes towards inequality	3.08	3.06	0.03	3.07	3.03	0.03
Attitudes towards homosexuality	2.99	3.00	-0.01	2.98	2.96	0.02
Attitudes towards gender equality	2.34	2.32	0.02	2.33	2.32	0.01
Attitudes towards European Union	2.85	2.82	0.03	2.82	2.78	0.04
Self left-right placement	5.83	5.77	0.07	5.88	5.86	0.02
Social trust	4.89	4.96	-0.07	4.93	4.98	-0.05
Political trust	3.09	3.15	-0.06	3.16	3.23	-0.07

In table 3 we can observe the summary of balance for the matched data for both dependent variable data samples. As we can see the balance in the two samples for either dependent

variable is very similar and it seems like we were able to create rather balanced groups.

In a next step I performed a paired t-test on the matched data for the depended variable *Voted for far-right party* in order to examine whether the difference between the means of the dependent variables of in the treatment and the control group is statistically significant at the usual test levels. I calculated a mean of 0.158 of the dependent variable *Voted for far-right party* in the treatment group and a mean of 0.137 for the control group. The difference of the means of the two groups I amounts to 0.021 and is statically significant with a p-value of 0.04 (based on a t-test). This means that the propensity of voting for far-right pries is significantly higher in the treatment group than in the control group by about 2 percentage points.

I calculated a mean of 0.187 of the second dependent variable *Far-right vote intension* in the treatment group and a mean of 0.153 for the control group. For the dependent variable Far-right vote intension the difference of the means between the two groups amounts to 0.033 and is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.003 (based on a t-test). In this case the intension for far-right vote is significantly higher in the treatment group than in the control group by about 3 percentage points.

Even though the effects are rather small we find further evidence for the first hypothesis when conducting nearest neighbour matching.

Results - Genetic matching

Due to the different matching algorithms, in genetic matching we receive a different distribution of observations in the matched data sample for the first dependent variable *Voted for far-right party*: the 2'260 treated individuals are now matched to the 1'666 individuals belonging to the control group using a set of weights for each covariate to achieve the optimal balance. In the matched data sample for the second dependent variable *Far-right vote intension* 2'294 treated individuals are matched to 1'704 individuals belonging to the control group.

In table 4 I display again the summary of balance for the matched data for both dependent variable data samples. As we can see the balance in the two samples for either dependent variable is again very similar, but we see that the mean difference between treated and control for all cofounders is now smaller when applying genetic matching. Thus, we have more balance in the matched data for both dependent variables than before.

Table 4: Genetic matching - summary of balance for matched data

	Voted for far-right party			**Far-right party vote intension**		
	Voted for far-right party			**Far-right party vote intension**		
	Mean (T)	**Mean (C)**	**Mean diff**	**Mean (T)**	**Mean (C)**	**Mean diff**
Distance	0.33	0.33	0.00	0.32	0.32	0.00
Age	46.58	46.81	-0.23	46.28	46.20	0.07
Female	0.54	0.56	-0.02	0.52	0.52	0.00
Income	4.14	4.18	-0.04	4.11	4.14	-0.03
Education	4.68	4.65	0.02	4.71	4.69	0.02
Unemployment	0.13	0.13	0.00	0.14	0.14	0.00
Attitudes towards immigration	2.72	2.75	-0.03	2.70	2.72	-0.01
Attitudes towards inequality	2.72	2.75	-0.03	3.07	3.07	0.00
Attitudes towards homosexuality	2.99	3.03	-0.04	2.98	2.98	0.00
Attitudes towards gender equality	2.34	2.34	0.00	2.33	2.33	0.00
Attitudes towards European Union	2.85	2.86	-0.02	2.82	2.85	-0.03
Self left-right placement	5.83	5.82	0.01	5.88	5.91	-0.02
Social trust	4.89	4.93	-0.04	4.93	4.96	-0.03
Political trust	3.09	3.10	0.00	3.16	3.16	0.00

Because the matched data for both variables is no longer containing the same number of treated and controlled individuals, I'm not able to estimate a two paired t-test. Hence, I estimate the treatment effects implementing again a *Welch two sample t-test* and find a mean of 0.158 for the dependent variable *Voted for far-right party* in the treatment group and a mean of 0.143 for the control group. Unfortunately, this effect is now smaller than in the sample above and with a p-value of 0.18 no longer statically significant. Contrary, the treatment effect for the second dependent variable *Far-right vote intension* depicts a mean of 0.187 in the treatment group and mean of 0.145 for the control group and this effect is again statically significant (with a p-value of 0.0004).

In summary, I was able to create more balanced groups applying genetic matching but found

only statically significant effects of the treatment variable in the sample containing the second dependent variable. Still, 3 of four treatment effects over different matching methods support the findings of the first hypothesis.

7.2 Perception of future social mobility (H2)

7.2.1 Main logistic regression estimates

Table 5: Regression results: Future opportunities

	Dependent variable:			
	Voted for far-right party			
	logistic			
	(M5)	(M6)	(M7)	(M8)
Intercept	-1.221^{***}	-0.332	-3.599^{***}	-3.939^{***}
	(0.092)	(0.181)	(0.317)	(0.359)
Future opportunity	-0.096^{***}	-0.087^{***}	-0.059^{***}	-0.071^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Age		-0.004	-0.008^{**}	-0.002
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female		-0.238^{***}	-0.170^{*}	-0.157
		(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.082)
Income		0.035^{*}	0.006	-0.011
		(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Education		-0.177^{***}	-0.108^{***}	-0.098^{***}
		(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.028)
Unemployment			-0.168	-0.121
			(0.140)	(0.155)
Attitudes towards immigration			1.172^{***}	1.277^{***}
			(0.051)	(0.056)
Attitudes towards inequality			-0.208^{***}	-0.104^{*}
			(0.044)	(0.049)
Country fixed effects	*no*	*no*	*no*	*yes*
Observations	7,434	7,285	7,244	7,244
Log Likelihood	$-2,828.688$	$-2,744.126$	$-2,332.028$	$-1,941.216$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,661.376	5,500.252	4,682.056	3,914.432

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. SE in parentheses. M5-M8 Logistic regressions, M8 also with country fixed effects.

The findings for hypothesis 2 are found in table 5. The structure of this table is identical to that of table 2 in the subsection 7.1 and we can observe that the effects of the control variables are similar to those found in the estimates in subsection 7.1 in accordance with the respective assumptions discussed in subsection 5.2.3. The coefficients of the variable *Future opportunity* are in all four estimations in table 5 highly statistically significant at the 0.001%-test level with the hypothesized sign, thus individuals that evaluate their chance for a secure and fulfilled life to be good are less likely to vote for far-right parties keeping all other variables

constant. To better quantify this effect, I illustrated the predicted probabilities for model 8 in figure 8. The effect of the variable *Future opportunity* is not as strong as N*ostalgic deprivation* depicted in figure 7, but nevertheless we see that moving from level 1 to 11 decreases the probability by 7 percentage points. To better understand this effect in context I also show the effect for the two control variables capturing effects for anti-immigration attitudes and attitudes towards inequality, respectively. Like in the previous models we see the very strong effect of anti-immigration attitudes and the weak and rather uncertain effect of attitudes towards inequality.

Figure 8: Predicted probabilities of far-right party support (M8)



7.2.2 Robustness tests

In the appendix I present a series of robustness tests to examine whether the findings hold over different estimations. First, in table A9 we can find the results for the second dependent variable *Far-right party vote intension*. The effects are very robust, and we find further support for the hypothesis 2. Looking at the predicted probabilities in figure A7 of model R24 in table A9, we depict that the effect of *Future opportunity* is slightly stronger in the estimates with the second dependent variable.

Second, in table A10 I report the findings for both dependent variables and the second independent variable *Future (economic) opportunity*. The findings for the control variables remain mostly robust over all eight models. Both complete models (R28 and R32) report

no statistically significant effects for *Attitudes towards inequality*. For the main dependent variable (*Voted for far-right party*) we find only in the baseline model (R25) support for hypothesis 2, the remaining estimations do not show statistically significant effects for *Future (economic) opportunity*. The models (R29-R32) estimated with the second dependent variable (*Far-right party vote intension*) present similar findings, but the effect of *Future (economic) opportunity* is statistically significant not only in the baseline model but also in the model containing the socio-economic control variables (R30). It is further important to notice that also the coefficient of the focal variable in model R32 is almost significant at the 0.1-test level: the t-statistic calculated from the standard error 0.014 and the coefficient -0.025 of *Future (economic) opportunity* is -1.78, this is equal to a p-value of 0.07.

In summary, the effects for the second focal independent variable are not as robust as for the main independent variable, but they still support, at least partially, hypothesis 2. I conclude that I am able to reject the null-hypotheses and find convincing evidence for hypothesis 2 of this working paper. I will continue the discussion of these findings in section 8.

7.3 Perception of past and future social mobility: quadrant analysis (H3a-3d)

7.3.1 Main logistic regression estimates

In table 6 I present the estimates of the models (M9-M13) with the main dependent variable *Voted for far-right party* and the four quadrant variables (*Quadrant 1* to *Quadrant 4*) based on the original variables *Nostalgic deprivation* (see subsection 7.1) and *Future opportunity* (see subsection 7.2). All models (M9-M13) are estimated with country fixed effects and contain all control variables. Hypotheses 3a to 3d are tested based on these models.

I begin with a summary of the results for the control variables, which are quite similar in all 5 models. *Age* does not display the assumed sign but is not statistically significant in all the models. Being female is only statistically significant (at the 0.05%-test level) in model 13 and shows the assumed sign. *Income* is also not statistically significant displays a

negative coefficient; thus, higher income levels would decrease the probability to vote for far-right parties ceteris paribus. *Education* is robust over all models and depicts a statistically significant effect at the 0.001%-test level with the assumed sign. Whether an individual is unemployed reports no statistically significant effects, but the signs are not in accordance with my assumption. A*ttitudes towards immigration* is highly statistically significant (at the 0.001%-test level) over all estimations with the assumed sign. *Attitudes towards inequality* is statistically significant (at the 0.05%-test level) with the assumed sign in three models (M9, M10 and M13). Thus, individuals that are in favour of more income equality are less likely to vote for far-right parties.

Table 6: Regression results: quadrant analysis

	Dependent variable:				
	Voted for far-right party				
			logistic		
	(M9)	(M10)	(M11)	(M12)	(M13)
Intercept	−4.502***	−4.484***	−4.509***	−4.474***	−4.180***
	(0.331)	(0.330)	(0.330)	(0.330)	(0.338)
Quadrant 1	0.597***	0.426***			
	(0.119)	(0.101)			
Quadrant 2	0.321**		0.094		
	(0.100)		(0.085)		
Quadrant 3	−0.202			−0.491*	
	(0.238)			(0.230)	
Quadrant 4					−0.368***
					(0.093)
Age	−0.003	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	−0.168*	−0.158	−0.140	−0.141	−0.157
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Income	−0.010	−0.014	−0.027	−0.028	−0.017
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Education	−0.100***	−0.099***	−0.105***	−0.106***	−0.102***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Unemployment	−0.126	−0.113	−0.042	−0.044	−0.089
	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.154)
Attitudes towards immigration	1.251***	1.275***	1.296***	1.300***	1.264***
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Attitudes towards inequality	−0.105*	−0.097*	−0.083	−0.083	−0.097*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Country fixed effects	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*
Observations	6,967	6,967	6,967	6,967	6,967
Log Likelihood	−1,923.947	−1,930.564	−1,937.342	−1,936.387	−1,929.819
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,883.895	3,893.127	3,906.683	3,904.775	3,891.637

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. SE in parentheses. M13-M17 Logistic regressions with country fixed effects.

In model 9, which contains all four quadrant variables, we see that *Quadrant 4* (low levels of *Nostalgic deprivation* and at the same time high levels of *Future opportunities*) serves as

the reference category for the other 3 quadrant variables. *Quadrant 1* shows a positive and statistically significant effect at the 0.001%-test level in the complete model (M9). Individuals assigned to *Quadrant 1* (high levels of *Nostalgic deprivation* and low levels of *Future opportunity*) are more likely to vote for far-right parties ceteris paribus as compared to the individuals in *Quadrant 4*. The coefficient of *Quadrant 2* (high levels of *Nostalgic deprivation* and high levels of *Future opportunity*; asymmetric perceptions) is also positive and statistically significant (at the 0.01%-test level), but it is smaller than that of *Quadrant 1*, thus indicating that individuals of this group also tend to support far-right parties but to a smaller extent than individuals in the group of *Quadrant 1*. We will illustrate this below in more detail with predicted probabilities. *Quadrant 3* (low levels of *Nostalgic deprivation* and low levels of *Future opportunity*; asymmetric perceptions) shows a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient, thus indicating a tendency of not supporting far-right parties. However, in model 9 it is unclear how strong this effect is.

Due to the fact that there is a rather strong correlation between the quadrant variables (see figure A2 in the appendix) I also estimated separate models for each quadrant variable. In model 10 the coefficient of *Quadrant 1* is as expected positive and highly statistically significant. In model 11 *Quadrant 2* is as expected positive but no longer statistically significant (as in model 9) and smaller than that of *Quadrant 1*. I will discuss this below in more detail discussing the predicted probabilities for all quadrant variables. The coefficient of *Quadrant 3* in model 12 is negative but now statistically significant at the 0.05%-test level. Individuals belonging to *Quadrant 3* (low levels of *Nostalgic deprivation* and low levels of *Future opportunity*) are less likely to vote for far-right parties ceteris paribus. In model 13 we can now see a negative and highly statistically significant effect (at the 0.001%-test level) of *Quadrant 4*. Therefore, individuals with low levels of *Nostalgic deprivation* and high levels of *Future opportunity* are less likely to vote for far-right parties keeping all other variables constant.

Figure 9: Predicted probabilities of far-right party support - quadrant analysis



I illustrated the predicted probabilities for all quadrant variables in figure 9. This information about the relative size of the effects of the quadrant variables is crucial for the discussion of hypotheses 3a-3d. In figure 9 we see that the effect of *Quadrant 1* is stronger than for *Quadrant 2*. This could support hypothesis 3b that the view of positive future social mobility has a dampening effect on the strong effect of perceived negative past social mobility. Interesting are the predicted probabilities for *Quadrant 3* and *Quadrant 4*. For both variables I hypothesized a negative correlation with far-right support, but this effect should be stronger for *Quadrant 4*, as these individuals have both positive perception of past social mobility (low levels of Nostalgic deprivation) and positive perception of future social mobility (high levels of Future opportunity). Individuals belonging to *Quadrant 3* only have positive perception of past social mobility (low levels of *Nostalgic deprivation*) but a negative perception of future social mobility (low levels of *Future opportunity*). The findings in figure 9 do only partly support hypotheses 3a-3d, in the left corner we see that going from 0 to 1 (thus, belonging to *Quadrant 3*) decreases the probability to vote for far-right parties by 3% and in the right corner we observe that going from 0 to 1 (thus, belonging to *Quadrant 4*) decreases the probability to vote for far-right parties by 2%.

7.3.2 Robustness tests

For a first robustness test I estimated the quadrant models once more with the second dependent variable *Far-right vote intension*. The results are found in table A11 in the appendix. The effects of the quadrants are similar to those in table 6. Looking at figure A8 we see similar size effects as figure 9. In summary, the effects for the quadrant variables based on *Nostalgic deprivation* as well as on *Future opportunity* remain robust in the estimates for both dependent variables, this indicating also for this case partly supporting evidence for my hypotheses 3a-3d.

As we can see most of the effects of the control variables remain the same. *Female* reports now statistically significant (at the 0.01% and 0.001%-test level) effects with the assumed sign. Thus, being female reduces the probability to vote for far-right parties ceteris paribus.

As I mentioned in subsection 5.2.4, I also coded a second version of quadrant variables using again *Nostalgic deprivation* for perceived past social mobility but now implementing the variable *Future (economic) opportunity* for perceived future social mobility. Individuals belonging to the quadrants of this second version have similar characteristics with respect to income, education, etc. to the individuals belonging to the quadrants of the first main version. In the tables A13-A14 as well as in the figures A10-11 in the appendix I present descriptive statistics for the socio-economic characteristics of the individuals in the quadrants of the second version. The only significant difference between first and second version of the quadrants is that the third quadrant consists of 773 individuals instead of only 494 in the main version.

In Table A12 in the appendix I present the results for the second version of quadrants for both dependent variables. When comparing the findings in this table for the dependent variable *Voted for far-right parties* with the findings in table 6, we see that the effects for the control variables have slightly changed. *Female* depicts now statistically significant effects (at the 0.05%-test level) for three models and *Attitudes towards inequality* is no longer statistically

significant.

Interestingly, all quadrant variables in the full model R38 display statistically significant effects (at the 0.01%- respective 0.05%-test level). The separate models for each quadrant show now statistically significant effects with the hypothesized sign. The first row in figure A9 displays the predicted probabilities for *Voted for far-right parties*. The effects of *Quadrant 1 (v2)* and *Quadrant 2 (v2)* are almost identical and of comparable magnitude with the effects of the quadrant variables in table 6; the effect of *Quadrant 3 (v2)* is stronger than the effect of *Quadrant 4 (v2)*.

The results for the second dependent variable *Far-right party vote intension* depict very robust effects for all control variables (compare with table A11). In the complete model R43 the coefficients of *Quadrant 1 (v2)* and *Quadrant 2 (v2)* are statistically significant and show the hypothesized sign. Additionally, it is very impressive that the models (R44-R47) depict all statistically significant effects for every quadrant variable for itself. The second row in figure A9 illustrates the size effects for the second dependent variable: the effect of *Quadrant 1 (v2)* is stronger than the effect of *Quadrant 2 (v2)* which supports hypothesis 3b. The effect of *Quadrant 3 (v2)* is still slightly stronger than the effect of *Quadrant 4 (v2)*.

In table A16 I present the results for the third version of the quadrant variables that are based on the above-discussed second version but coded with a different cut-off of the underlying original variables for nostalgia and future opportunities. The results for the control variables remain almost identical to table A12. What we can see is that in model R48 and R53 the effect of *Quadrant 3 (r1)* is no longer statistically significant, and we can observe that models R50 and R55 depicting the effects for *Quadrant 2 (r1)* on its own is also no longer statistically significant. Still, we can see that the coefficients remain very similar and that all the quadrant variables show the hypothesized sign. Thus, also when varying the cut-off for the variables the results remain very robust. I will continue the discussion of these findings in section 8.

8 Discussion, implications and outlook

8.1 Discussion of results to hypothesis 1

With regard to my first hypothesis, in the logistic regression estimates I detect strong correlations of all three measures of perceived negative social mobility (high levels of two versions of nostalgic deprivation, low levels of intergenerational social mobility) with both measures of the propensity to support far-right parties. The results of the matching method implemented as an alternative estimation strategy supplementary to the standard logistic regressions – with both dependent variables as outcome variables – provide additional support to hypothesis 1. The analysis of the outcomes shows that individuals perceiving to have a lower social status than their parents, thus perceiving to have experienced downwards social mobility, are more likely to vote for far-right parties.

The big size of the effect size of the nostalgic deprivation variable is quite remarkable, particularly if one takes into consideration that this variable is based on the answers of the respondents of the survey to the question asking respondents to assess the development of living conditions in their country over the last thirty years. The distribution of age indicates that many respondents compare the present with their perception of early adult life or even of their childhood. This seems to confirm the part of the literature proposing that the conditions and circumstances of early life constraining adult success are more crucial than the perception of who is moving up or down the social ladder to understand the effect of downward social mobility (Hout 2015: 27-28).

8.2 Discussion of results to hypothesis 2

Likewise, I find strong evidence for the second hypothesis of this working paper. Positive perception of the future view of social mobility seems to decrease the propensity to vote for far-right parties. The effects hold not quite as robust as for the first hypothesis, still I was able to provide convincing results over different estimations that future opportunity is correlated with far-right voting. Interestingly, the effect for future opportunity was even stronger in

the models considering vote intension. This second dependent variable measured whether respondents would vote for far-right parties next week and we can see in figure 3 that more respondent repot to vote for far-right party now as they actually voted in the last election. Thus, when looking at party affiliation the effect of the perceived future view of social mobility seem to become more important. In subsection 4.1 I formulated the assumption that the effect of perceived past view of social mobility should be stronger than the perceived future view of social mobility. I also find supporting evidence for this assumption, perceived downward social mobility considering one's past seems to be a stronger effect than future opportunity. However, it is important to mention that this assumption holds only for the variable nostalgic deprivation, the other two variables considering the perceived past view of social mobility do not report stronger effects than future opportunity. Thus, I can underline with the findings of this working paper the importance to focus on both perceptions.

8.3 Discussion of the results to hypotheses 3a-3d

I was able to find sufficient evidence to support most of the remaining hypotheses (3a-3d) with regard to the combined perceived past and future view. The effects for these hypotheses are rather robust over both dependent variables and both versions of the quadrant variables. Only the effect of the variable *Quadrant 2* (individuals that simultaneously have high levels of nostalgic deprivation and perceptions of high levels of future opportunity) is not statistically significant in the estimations applying the first version of the quadrant variables. But even this effect is very close to the empirical cut off 0.05%-test level of statistical significance. Further, contrary to hypothesis 3c, the effect of the variable *Quadrant 3* (individuals that simultaneously have low levels of nostalgic deprivation and low levels of levels of future opportunity perceptions) is slightly stronger than the effect of the variable *Quadrant 4* (individuals that simultaneously have low levels of nostalgic deprivation and high levels of levels of future opportunity perceptions). The size of the effects of the quadrant variables is smaller than that of the effects of the perception variables for hypothesis 1 and 2.

The number of observations for individuals belonging to the third quadrant group was especially in the first version of the quadrant variables rather low. In the second quadrant version we observe almost twice as many individuals in this group and the effect size becomes smaller. This could be an indication to treat the findings for the effect size in regard to the third quadrant variable with some caution, because due to the small number of individuals in this subsample, we might overestimate the effect of the respective variable.

The quadrant analysis showed that we have different socio-economic groups of individuals in each of the four quadrants. The analysis of the results of the estimates of the effects of the four quadrant groups demonstrates that individuals may have asymmetric perceptions of past and future social mobility and that these asymmetric perceptions might lead to nuances of voting behaviour beyond the extremes of fully supporting and fully refusing far-right parties. This might have important political implications.

8.4 Additional insights and outlook

Overall, I was able to find convincing evidence that perceived downwards social mobility over two perceived time dimensions (perceptions of past and future social mobility) is a crucial explanatory factor of far-right party support. Furthermore, the results with respect to the quadrant analysis demonstrate that in further studies investigating individuals' perceptions with regard to social mobility as explanatory factors for far-right party it would be worthy to concentrate on possible asymmetric perceptions of individuals. It would also be interesting for future studies to test the effect of the quadrant variables beyond the analysis of exclusively the far-right party family, this could provide more nuanced effects that could help to better understand the implications of this approach.

Although my findings support many of my hypotheses, I need to acknowledge that the effect of 'anti-immigration attitudes' on far-right voting was by far the largest effect size. Thus, the most robust finding in this study is the remarkable large effect of this variable. I find a difference of almost 40 percentage points for the variable of far-right voting between the

lowest and highest value of this variable. In figure 6 we see that the difference in level of anti-immigration attitudes between individuals belonging to the first quadrant (individuals that simultaneously have high levels of nostalgic deprivation and low levels of future opportunity perceptions) and the second quadrant (individuals that simultaneously have high levels of nostalgic deprivation and high levels of future opportunity perceptions) is not statistically significant. According to our analysis individuals in both of these groups are more probable to vote for far-right parties and they show high levels of anti-immigration attitudes. Thus, resentments towards immigration are highly correlated with far-right support and seems to be somehow connected to the perceived negative past social mobility. Better understanding the relationship between social decline and anti-immigration attitude seems relevant for explaining far-right party support.

In terms of implications, if perceived downward social mobility over at least two perceived time dimensions is a relevant factor in explaining far-right parties we need to ask ourselves what conditions foster these perceptions and whether there are possible policies that might negate this effect?

With regard to the first question, Magni (2018: 2) states that economic inequality reduces the perspective of possible upward social mobility, which in turn increases the attitude of in-group favouritism, which then results in anti-immigration attitudes. The author argues that the perceived lack of opportunity to improve one's individual situation causes individuals to support increase of discrimination through the prioritization of the distribution of welfare state resources. People tend to reserve welfare state resources for natives, because they view themselves as the rightfully deserving recipients of scarce resources. The author refers in particular to the policy concept 'welfare chauvinism', but the same concept could be occurring with regard to far-right support in general. I base this assumption on the fact that far-right parties are mostly related to adapt welfare chauvinistic attitudes as a strategy to combine anti-immigration attitudes with pro-welfare protectionism (De Lang 2007: 411-413). Studies show that far-right parties are successfully blaming the elites and mostly immigrants for

various welfare state concerns (Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016: 309). This proposed idea also incorporates the strong anti-immigration feeling that far-right supporter seem to have, which makes Magnis assumption even more interesting with regard to the implications of this study.

A further investigation of raising income inequality as a possible precondition for perceived downwards social mobility is also an intriguing task, because (as I stated in subsection 2.3.2) newer literature trying to explain far-right support is investigating the effect of inequality on far-right support, while simultaneously we are able to observe an increasing income inequality since the 1980s. Further, analysing the seemingly entangled concepts of social mobility and income inequality as factors explaining far-right support seems to be a promising next step. In this study we mainly focus on perception of social mobility but in all models, I implemented a variable considering attitudes towards income inequality and even though the size of the respective effect was rather moderate, many models reported a statistically significant effect for this variable. Obviously, we did not investigate how income inequality at the country level affects far-right support, but in a model containing different socio-economic variables as well as other factors explaining far-right support, I find a significant effect of a variable for attitudes with regard to income inequality on far-right support. This establishes that respondents' perception of income inequality matters also for explaining far-right support.

8.5 Policy implications

Pinpointing policies that could actually prevent perception of downwards social mobility or might help to stop the increasing success of far-right parties is a rather difficult undertaking. Policies that encourage open education systems and higher levels of social investment come to mind that could help negate perceptions of downwards social mobility (Häusermann et al. 2019: 22). However, Gingrich (2019: 7-8) argue that studies have shown that social investments are less important for mitigating the political consequences of structural eco-

nomic pressures. Even though social programs are considered to be able to prevent much radicalization, compensating the "losers" of change may not be enough to prevent far-right party support. The author concludes further that we instead need to consider policies that make more people "winners" in the new economic environment. Because the research in this working paper showed that positive perception of future social mobility has a dampening effect on nostalgic deprivation, creating "winners" with an optimistic perception of future social mobility based on really existing opportunities for an improvement of individuals' social position might mitigate further far-right party support.

Unfortunately, I am not able to identify a more concrete policy suggestion that might avert the emergence of perceptions of downward social mobility or the feeling of social decline. Even Mudde (2019: 129-130) admits that after studying the far-right for over two decades, he still does not have the answer to what can prevent far-right party success. Still, I like to think that I was able to uncover at least a small part of how different perceptions towards social mobility and their combinations might affect far-right voting and how future studies could examine this relationship in more detail.

9 Concluding remarks

Encouraged by the threat that far-right parties impose on our institutions and modern democracy in general (Kaltwasser 2012: 184-185) this study began with the simple question why individuals support far-right party. Given the remarkable amount of literature related to this topic it is fascinating how findings explaining the phenomena are still frequently differing and even opposing to each other. In the core argument of this thesis, I thus tried to incorporate several new features of the literature explaining far-right success and group them into two with each other related time dimensions of perceived social mobility: the perception past and future social mobility. Based on this I formulated the main question for this study: how different constellations of perceived social mobility over two time dimensions might affect far-right voting. My results suggest that downward social mobility is an applicable predictor of

far-right party success over both of the assumed time dimensions (perceived past and future social mobility). These results are fairly robust over the two different estimation strategies, standard logistic regressions with country fixed effects and matching method, implemented in this working paper. The effect of the perceived past social mobility was throughout stronger than the effect of the perceived future social mobility. This was the case particularly for variables measuring how individuals compare their present situation with thirty years ago (nostalgic deprivation). This supports the assumption in the literature that conditions and circumstances of early life constraining adult success are most important when investigating perceived social mobility (Hout 2015: 27-28). Individuals feeling that their life became worse in the last thirty years report overall higher levels of anti-immigration attitude and are more likely to support far-right parties. This could be because the feeling of social decline might foster in-group favouritism in order to protect one's position (Magni 2018: 2), while at the same time far-right parties provide a pseudo solution by simply declaring immigrants, native minorities, the corrupt elite, etc. to be the reason for the perceived social decline of their voters (Burgoon et al. 2019: 57-58). We also see that individuals with positive perception of future social mobility tend to be less likely to support far right parties. This supports the assumption that individuals might defend political status quo, if they believe to have future opportunities for upwards social mobility (Day and Fiske 2017: 269-272, Iversen and Soskice 2019: 4-21). Additionally, I was able to establish that some individuals have asymmetric perceptions of social mobility, meaning that they simultaneously perceive that their life became worse in the last thirty years and still believe that they might have positive future opportunities and vice versa. Therefore, just because someone might have negative perception about the past view of social mobility does not mean that this person also needs to have negative perception about the future view of social mobility (and vice versa). The findings of this working paper further support the idea that different combinations of these perceptions result in different levels of far-right support.

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A Appendix

Figure A1: Correlation matrix



Figure A2: Correlation matrix with quadrant variables



Table A1: Data overview - variables, descriptions and sources

Variable	**Description**	**Source**
Voted for far-right party	Dichotomous variable: score 1 if respondent feels close to far-right party and score 0 if respondent feels close to every other party	*X5_4* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Far-right party vote intension	Dichotomous variable; score 1 if respondent would vote for far-right party next week and 0 for every other party	*X5_1* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Nostalgic deprivation	Ordinal variable: 1= became worse, 10= became better. Asking respondents whether life became better or worse in the last 30 years	*X4_12* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Nostalgic deprivation (10 years)	Ordinal variable: 1= became worse, 11= became better. Asking respondents whether their economic situation became better or worse in the last 10 years	*X4_8* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Intergenerational social mobility	Ordinal variable: 1=lower, 2= equal, 3= higher. Social position compated to parents	*X4_11* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Future opportunity	Ordinal variable: 1= bad, 11= good. Asking respondents how they evaluate their chance of secure life in future	*X8_18* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Future (economic) opportunity	Ordinal variable: 1= bad, 11= good. Asking respondents how they evaluate their chance of secure job until retirement	*X8_17* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Age	Age of respondents	*age* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Female	Dichotomous variable; score 1 for female and 0 for male	*sex* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Education	Highest level of education (1-8)	*educ* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Income	Household's total net income (1-10)	*X8_35* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Unemployment	Dichotomous variable. 1= unemployed, 0= employed	*X8_8* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Attitudes towards immigration	Ordinal index (1= don't agree at all, 4= agree at all) based on 2 variables asking respondents whether immigration is threat for culture or job market	*X4_1_5, X4_1_8* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Attitudes towards inequality	Ordinal variable: 1= don't agree at all, 4= agree at all. Asking respondents whether society is fair if income inequality is low	*X4_1_1* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Attitudes towards homosexuality	Ordinal variable: 1= don't agree at all, 4= agree at all. Asking respondents whether homosexual couples should have same adoption rights as heterosexual couples	*X4_1_6* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Attitudes towards gender equality	Ordinal variable: 1= don't agree at all, 4= agree at all. Asking respondents whether family suffers if the woman works fulltime	*X4_1_7* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Attitudes towards European Union	Ordinal variable: 1= don't agree at all, 4= agree at all. Asking respondents whether European integration has gone too far	*X4_1_9* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Self left-right placement	Ordinal variable: 1= left, 11= right. Asking respondents whether they think they are more left or right	*X4_2* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Social trust	Ordinal variable: 1= no, 10= yes. Asking respondents whether they think they can trust people	*X4_3* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset
Political trust	Ordinal variable: 1= no, 10= yes. Asking respondents whether they think they can trust politician in country	*X4_5* from *welfarepriorities*-dataset

Table A2: Country and far-right party names

Country name	**PRRP name**
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DF)
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)
Spain	-
United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
Ireland	-
Italy	Northern League (LN)
	Brothers of Italy (FdI)
Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)

Note: Source for grouping: Rooduijn, M., Van Kessel, S., Froio, C., Pirro, A., De Lange, S., Halikiopoulou, D., Lewis, P., Mudde, C. & Taggart, P. (2019). The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe. http://www.popu-list.org.

Table A3: Distribution of socio-economic variables over quadrants

Variables	**1st Quadrant**	**2nd Quadrant**	**3rd Quadrant**	**4th Quadrant**
Age	44.79	43.64	43.5	43.38
Female	0.57	0.53	0.51	0.45
Education	4.43	4.99	4.77	5.42
Income	4.05	5.68	4.79	6.50
Unemployment	0.22	0.08	0.18	0.04
Attitudes towards immigration	2.91	2.77	2.53	2.46

Figure A3: Distribution of socio-economic variables over quadrants



Table A4: Regression results - quadrants affinity

	Dependent variable:			
	1st Quadrant	2nd Quadrant	3rd Quadrant	4th Quadrant
	logistic (T1)	*logistic* (T2)	*logistic* (T3)	*logistic* (T4)
Intercept	-2.386^{***}	-1.419^{***}	-2.336^{***}	0.736^{***}
	(0.187)	(0.147)	(0.298)	(0.141)
Age	0.014^{***}	-0.003	0.005	-0.008^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Female	0.214^{***}	0.141^{**}	-0.050	-0.281^{***}
	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.095)	(0.046)
Income	-0.207^{***}	0.013	-0.083^{***}	0.136^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.009)
Education	-0.068^{***}	-0.026	-0.064^{*}	0.084^{***}
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.014)
Unemployment	0.609^{***}	-0.239^{**}	0.406^{**}	-0.717^{***}
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.142)	(0.099)
Attitudes towards immigration	0.302^{***}	0.150^{***}	-0.112^{*}	-0.323^{***}
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.045)	(0.022)
Country fixed effects	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*
Observations	9,032	9,032	9,032	9,032
Log Likelihood	−3,956.973	−5,539.339	−1,830.464	−5,491.854
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,941.947	11,106.680	3,688.927	11,011.710

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
SE in parentheses. T1-T4 Logistic regressions with country fixed effects.

Table A5: Percentages of job sectors in quadrants

	Samples	Government	Public sector	State enterprise	Private Company	Self employed	Other	NA
1	Total	6.6%	15.1%	4.2%	47.1%	7.9%	9.3%	9.9%
2	Q1	3.5%	8.4%	2.3%	47.6%	9.5%	13.4%	15.4%
3	Q2	6.0%	15.4%	3.0%	47.2%	7.6%	9.8%	11.0%
4	Q3	3.6%	7.7%	4.3%	47.8%	8.7%	10.7%	17.2%
5	Q4	6.4%	15.0%	4.1%	48.7%	6.9%	6.1%	12.7%

Table A6: Robustness test - Far-right party vote intension: Nostalgic deprivation

	Dependent variable:			
	Far-right party vote intension			
	logistic			
	(R1)	(R2)	(R3)	(R4)
Intercept	−2.946***	−2.328***	−4.598***	−5.034***
	(0.076)	(0.156)	(0.233)	(0.263)
Nostalgic deprivation	0.211***	0.208***	0.141***	0.115***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Age		0.0001	−0.002	−0.003
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female		−0.335***	−0.236***	−0.255***
		(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.066)
Income		0.048***	0.020	0.012
		(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Education		−0.151***	−0.100***	−0.082***
		(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Unemployment			−0.343**	−0.308*
			(0.127)	(0.145)
Attitudes towards immigration			1.051***	1.234***
			(0.039)	(0.044)
Attitudes towards inequality			−0.180***	−0.129**
			(0.035)	(0.040)
Country fixed effects	*no*	*no*	*no*	*yes*
Observations	10,707	10,432	10,358	10,358
Log Likelihood	−4,384.482	−4,215.213	−3,650.450	−2,995.150
Akaike Inf. Crit.	8,772.964	8,442.427	7,318.900	6,022.299

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. SE in parentheses. R1-R4 Logistic regressions, R4 also with country fixed effects.

Figure A4: Predicted probabilities of far-right party support (R4)



Table A7: Robustness test - Nostalgic deprivation (10 years)

	Dependent variable:							
	Voted for far-right party				Far-right party vote intension			
	logistic				*logistic*			
	(R5)	(R6)	(R7)	(R8)	(R9)	(R10)	(R11)	(R12)
Intercept	−2.363***	−1.135***	−4.262***	−4.750***	−2.204***	−1.292***	−4.173***	−4.848***
	(0.083)	(0.169)	(0.263)	(0.289)	(0.075)	(0.150)	(0.232)	(0.263)
Nostalgic deprivation (10 years)	0.077***	0.066***	0.029*	0.052***	0.082***	0.078***	0.041***	0.052***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Age		−0.005**	−0.006**	−0.004*		−0.002	−0.003	−0.004*
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female		−0.273***	−0.176**	−0.168*		−0.321***	−0.225***	−0.258***
		(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.070)		(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.066)
Income		0.013	−0.010	−0.019		0.031**	0.008	0.004
		(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)		(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Education		−0.177***	−0.109***	−0.083***		−0.170***	−0.110***	−0.084***
		(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.023)		(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Unemployment			−0.177	−0.149			−0.261*	−0.257
			(0.135)	(0.151)			(0.125)	(0.145)
Attitudes towards immigration			1.181***	1.298***			1.124***	1.292***
			(0.044)	(0.048)			(0.039)	(0.044)
Attitudes towards inequality			−0.174***	−0.089*			−0.151***	−0.119**
			(0.038)	(0.042)			(0.035)	(0.040)
Country fixed effects	*no*	*no*	*no*	*yes*	*no*	*no*	*no*	*yes*
Observations	9,983	9,710	9,641	9,641	10,329	10,058	9,985	9,985
Log Likelihood	−3,968.369	−3,809.371	−3,242.729	−2,701.372	−4,550.225	−4,375.571	−3,731.986	−3,016.211
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,940.739	7,630.742	6,503.459	5,434.744	9,104.450	8,763.142	7,481.971	6,064.423

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. SE in parentheses. R5-R12 Logistic regressions, R8 and R12 also with country fixed effects.

Table A8: Robustness test - Intergenerational social mobility

	Dependent variable:							
	Voted for far-right party				Far-right party vote intension			
	logistic				*logistic*			
	(R13)	(R14)	(R15)	(R16)	(R17)	(18)	(R19)	(R20)
Intercept	−2.288***	−1.179***	−4.500***	−4.805***	−2.112***	−1.345***	−4.416***	−4.907***
	(0.078)	(0.182)	(0.277)	(0.302)	(0.072)	(0.161)	(0.244)	(0.275)
Intergenerational social mobility	0.231***	0.196***	0.147***	0.106*	0.237***	0.230***	0.180***	0.102*
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.046)
Age		−0.003	−0.004	−0.003		0.001	−0.001	−0.003
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female		−0.250***	−0.163*	−0.149*		−0.288***	−0.200***	−0.233***
		(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.069)		(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.065)
Income		0.012	−0.007	−0.023		0.030**	0.011	−0.001
		(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)		(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Education		−0.181***	−0.107***	−0.082***		−0.175***	−0.108***	−0.084***
		(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.023)		(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Unemployment			−0.205	−0.135			−0.298*	−0.261
			(0.135)	(0.151)			(0.125)	(0.144)
Attitudes towards immigration			1.189***	1.314***			1.132***	1.306***
			(0.044)	(0.048)			(0.038)	(0.043)
Attitudes towards inequality			−0.172***	−0.078			−0.146***	−0.104**
			(0.038)	(0.042)			(0.035)	(0.039)
Country fixed effects	*no*	*no*	*no*	*yes*	*no*	*no*	*no*	*yes*
Observations	10,039	9,764	9,696	9,696	10,398	10,124	10,052	10,052
Log Likelihood	−3,992.346	−3,830.543	−3,251.729	−2,718.011	−4,588.626	−4,409.629	−3,750.729	−3,042.117
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,988.692	7,673.085	6,521.459	5,468.022	9,181.253	8,831.258	7,519.457	6,116.235

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. SE in parentheses. R13-R20 Logistic regressions, R16 and R20 also with country fixed effects.

Figure A5: Predicted probabilities of far-right party support (R8 and R12)



Figure A6: Predicted probabilities of far-right party support (R16 and R20)



Table A9: Robustness test - Far-right party vote intension: Future opportunities

	Dependent variable:			
	Far-right party vote intension			
	logistic			
	(R21)	(R22)	(R23)	(R24)
Intercept	−0.967***	−0.371*	−3.462***	−4.200***
	(0.085)	(0.161)	(0.278)	(0.324)
Future opportunity	−0.104***	−0.104***	−0.075***	−0.077***
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Age		0.002	−0.003	−0.0004
		(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female		−0.284***	−0.212**	−0.255***
		(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.077)
Income		0.052***	0.023	0.018
		(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Education		−0.173***	−0.111***	−0.102***
		(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Unemployment			−0.309*	−0.287
			(0.129)	(0.149)
Attitudes towards immigration			1.118***	1.278***
			(0.045)	(0.051)
Attitudes towards inequality			−0.166***	−0.103*
			(0.040)	(0.046)
Country fixed effects	*no*	*no*	*no*	*yes*
Observations	7,810	7,660	7,614	7,614
Log Likelihood	−3,306.397	−3,192.164	−2,714.756	−2,187.016
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,616.793	6,396.328	5,447.512	4,406.032

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. SE in parentheses. R21-R24 Logistic regressions, R24 also with country fixed effects

Figure A7: Predicted probabilities of far-right party support (R24)



Table A10: Robustness test - Future economic opportunities

	Dependent variable:							
	Voted for far-right party				Far-right party vote intension			
	logistic				*logistic*			
	(R25)	(R26)	(R27)	(R28)	(R29)	(R30)	(R31)	(R32)
Intercept	−1.637***	−0.636***	−3.993***	−4.426***	−1.402***	−0.737***	−3.878***	−4.612***
	(0.079)	(0.177)	(0.309)	(0.345)	(0.073)	(0.156)	(0.269)	(0.310)
Future (economic) opportunity	−0.035**	−0.021	−0.011	−0.019	−0.040***	−0.032**	−0.020	−0.025
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Age		−0.004	−0.008**	−0.003		0.002	−0.002	−0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female		−0.236***	−0.165*	−0.153		−0.274***	−0.203**	−0.248**
		(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.081)		(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.076)
Income		0.016	−0.005	−0.021		0.031*	0.008	0.006
		(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)		(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Education		−0.186***	−0.112***	−0.100***		−0.178***	−0.113***	−0.102***
		(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.028)		(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Unemployment			−0.124	−0.095			−0.271*	−0.259
			(0.139)	(0.155)			(0.129)	(0.148)
Attitudes towards immigration			1.186***	1.293***			1.133***	1.290***
			(0.051)	(0.055)			(0.044)	(0.050)
Attitudes towards inequality			−0.175***	−0.070			−0.142***	−0.085
			(0.044)	(0.048)			(0.040)	(0.045)
Country fixed effects	*no*	*no*	*no*	*yes*	*no*	*no*	*no*	*yes*
Observations	7,282	7,133	7,091	7,091	7,656	7,503	7,456	7,456
Log Likelihood	−2,871.351	−2,783.386	−2,367.061	−1,970.663	−3,380.407	−3,271.351	−2,783.011	−2,234.404
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,746.701	5,578.772	4,752.122	3,973.327	6,764.814	6,554.701	5,584.023	4,500.808

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. SE in parentheses. R25-R32 Logistic regressions, R28 and R32 also with country fixed effects.

Table A11: Robustness test - Far-right party vote intension: quadrant analysis

	Dependent variable:				
	Far-right party vote intension				
			logistic		
	(R33)	(R34)	(R35)	(R36)	(R37)
Intercept	−4.796***	−4.780***	−4.799***	−4.765***	−4.500***
	(0.298)	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.304)
Quadrant 1	0.590***	0.443***			
	(0.112)	(0.097)			
Quadrant 2	0.284**		0.077		
	(0.092)		(0.079)		
Quadrant 3	−0.151			−0.414*	
	(0.215)			(0.209)	
Quadrant 4					−0.341***
					(0.085)
Age	−0.001	−0.001	0.00001	−0.00005	−0.0004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	−0.261***	−0.254***	−0.237**	−0.238**	−0.250**
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Income	0.019	0.015	0.001	0.0002	0.011
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Education	−0.105***	−0.105***	−0.110***	−0.110***	−0.107***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Unemployment	−0.280	−0.277	−0.203	−0.208	−0.237
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.147)
Attitudes towards immigration	1.256***	1.276***	1.296***	1.299***	1.267***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Attitudes towards inequality	−0.101*	−0.095*	−0.082	−0.083	−0.093*
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Country fixed effects	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*
Observations	7,322	7,322	7,322	7,322	7,322
Log Likelihood	−2,182.167	−2,187.751	−2,196.159	−2,195.224	−2,188.697
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,400.334	4,407.502	4,424.318	4,422.448	4,409.394

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. SE in parentheses. R33-R37 Logistic regressions with country fixed effects.

Figure A8: Predicted probabilities of far-right party support quadrant analysis



Figure A9: Predicted probabilities of far-right party support quadrant analysis (v2)



Table A12: Robustness test - quadrant analysis (v2)

	Dependent variable:									
	Voted for far-right party					Far-right party vote intension				
			logistic					*logistic*		
	(R38)	(R39)	(R40)	(R41)	(R42)	(R43)	(R44)	(R45)	(R46)	(R47)
Intercept	−4.530***	−4.527***	−4.577***	−4.486***	−4.332***	−4.786***	−4.770***	−4.795***	−4.746***	−4.535***
	(0.329)	(0.327)	(0.328)	(0.328)	(0.335)	(0.295)	(0.294)	(0.294)	(0.294)	(0.301)
Quadrant 1 (v2)	0.363**	0.230*				0.424***	0.282**			
	(0.120)	(0.101)				(0.112)	(0.096)			
Quadrant 2 (v2)	0.325**		0.218*			0.312***		0.174*		
	(0.102)		(0.085)			(0.094)		(0.080)		
Quadrant 3 (v2)	−0.410*			−0.639***		−0.179			−0.418*	
	(0.197)			(0.186)		(0.172)			(0.162)	
Quadrant 4 (v2)					−0.262**					−0.291***
					(0.094)					(0.086)
Age	−0.002	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002	−0.003	−0.001	−0.001	−0.0003	−0.0001	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	−0.167*	−0.162*	−0.144	−0.148	−0.160*	−0.259***	−0.256***	−0.236**	−0.238**	−0.252***
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Income	−0.018	−0.019	−0.028	−0.028	−0.019	0.011	0.008	−0.002	−0.002	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Education	−0.102***	−0.100***	−0.104***	−0.106***	−0.099***	−0.103***	−0.102***	−0.106***	−0.107***	−0.102***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Unemployment	−0.100	−0.115	−0.029	−0.052	−0.091	−0.262	−0.277	−0.185	−0.207	−0.238
	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)
Attitudes towards immigration	1.258***	1.283***	1.286***	1.291***	1.272***	1.256***	1.281***	1.284***	1.291***	1.267***
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Attitudes towards inequality	−0.081	−0.076	−0.063	−0.067	−0.074	−0.092*	−0.088*	−0.076	−0.077	−0.087
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Country fixed effects	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*
Observations	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,437	7,437	7,437	7,437	7,437
Log Likelihood	−1,955.411	−1,965.753	−1,964.606	−1,961.950	−1,963.947	−2,221.688	−2,228.822	−2,231.087	−2,230.122	−2,227.462
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,946.821	3,963.507	3,961.212	3,955.901	3,959.894	4,479.376	4,489.645	4,494.173	4,492.243	4,486.923

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. SE in parentheses. R38-R47 Logistic regressions with country fixed effects.

Figure A10: Distribution of the qudrants (v2)



Table A13: Distribution of quadrants (v2)

Variables	**1st Quadrant**	**2nd Quadrant**	**3rd Quadrant**	**4th Quadrant**
Age	45.00	43.41	45.08	43.14
Female	0.60	0.50	0.51	0.44
Education	4.43	5.03	4.85	5.44
Income	4.08	5.77	5.00	6.57
Unemployment	0.24	0.06	0.18	0.04
Attitudes towards immigration	2.86	2.80	2.45	2.47

Table A14: Percentages of job sectors in quadrants (v2)

	Samples	Government	Public sector	State enterprise	Private Company	Self employed	Other	NA
1	Total	6.6%	15.1%	4.2%	47.1%	7.9%	9.3%	9.9%
2	Q1	3.5%	8.4%	2.3%	47.6%	9.5%	13.4%	15.4%
3	Q2	6.0%	15.4%	3.0%	47.2%	7.6%	9.8%	11.0%
4	Q3	3.6%	7.7%	4.3%	47.8%	8.7%	10.7%	17.2%
5	Q4	6.4%	15.0%	4.1%	48.7%	6.9%	6.1%	12.7%

Figure A11: Distribution of socio-economic variables over quadrants (v2)



Table A15: Regression results - quadrants affinity (v2)

	Dependent variable:			
	1st Quadrant (v2)	2nd Quadrant (v2)	3rd Quadrant (v2)	4th Quadrant (v2)
	logistic (T5)	*logistic* (T6)	*logistic* (T7)	*logistic* (T8)
Intercept	−2.074***	−1.596***	−2.010***	0.599***
	(0.177)	(0.150)	(0.239)	(0.141)
Age	0.016***	−0.006***	0.016***	−0.013***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Female	0.380***	0.025	0.033	−0.323***
	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.078)	(0.046)
Income	−0.196***	0.016	−0.071***	0.144***
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.009)
Education	−0.089***	−0.008	−0.047	0.088***
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.014)
Unemployment	0.836***	−0.578***	0.417***	−0.851***
	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.119)	(0.105)
Attitudes towards immigration	0.236***	0.192***	−0.206***	−0.285***
	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.022)
Country fixed effects	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*
Observations	9,188	9,188	9,188	9,188
Log Likelihood	−4,231.427	−5,425.718	−2,516.009	−5,475.167
Akaike Inf. Crit.	8,490.853	10,879.440	5,060.018	10,978.330

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. SE in parentheses. T5-T8 Logistic regressions with country fixed effects.

Table A16: Robustness test - quadrant analysis (r1)

	Dependent variable:									
	Voted for far-right party					Far-right party vote intension				
			logistic					*logistic*		
	(R48)	(R49)	(R50)	(R51)	(R52)	(R53)	(R54)	(R55)	(R56)	(R57)
Intercept	−4.545***	−4.577***	−4.544***	−4.441***	−4.372***	−4.797***	−4.818***	−4.774***	−4.698***	−4.599***
	(0.331)	(0.328)	(0.327)	(0.329)	(0.332)	(0.297)	(0.295)	(0.294)	(0.295)	(0.299)
Quadrant 1 (r1)	0.457***	0.374***				0.442***	0.352***			
	(0.113)	(0.092)				(0.105)	(0.087)			
Quadrant 2 (r1)	0.264*		0.079			0.262*		0.086		
	(0.114)		(0.095)			(0.104)		(0.088)		
Quadrant 3 (r1)	−0.158			−0.408**		−0.099			−0.340**	
	(0.155)			(0.140)		(0.140)			(0.127)	
Quadrant 4 (r1)					−0.268**					−0.268**
					(0.096)					(0.088)
Age	−0.003	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002	−0.003	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.0002	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	−0.175*	−0.172*	−0.146	−0.150	−0.159	−0.261***	−0.259***	−0.238**	−0.240**	−0.250**
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Income	−0.012	−0.011	−0.027	−0.027	−0.019	0.014	0.014	−0.002	−0.002	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Education	−0.100***	−0.098***	−0.103***	−0.106***	−0.098***	−0.103***	−0.101***	−0.105***	−0.108***	−0.102***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Unemployment	−0.127	−0.136	−0.051	−0.052	−0.092	−0.260	−0.270	−0.204	−0.202	−0.241
	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)
Attitudes towards immigration	1.255***	1.274***	1.293***	1.287***	1.276***	1.256***	1.275***	1.289***	1.287***	1.273***
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Attitudes towards inequality	−0.089	−0.089	−0.063	−0.069	−0.072	−0.096*	−0.096*	−0.075	−0.079	−0.084
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Country fixed effects	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*
Observations	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,437	7,437	7,437	7,437	7,437
Log Likelihood	−1,955.784	−1,960.622	−1,967.615	−1,963.793	−1,964.066	−2,221.220	−2,225.549	−2,232.676	−2,229.886	−2,228.552
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,947.569	3,953.245	3,967.231	3,959.585	3,960.131	4,478.439	4,483.097	4,497.352	4,491.772	4,489.103

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. SE in parentheses. R48-R57 Logistic regressions with country fixed effects.