

**Welfare Chauvinism – Who
Cares?
Individual-Level Evidence on the
Importance and Politicization of
Immigrants' Welfare Entitlements**

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Abstract

As radical right parties have brought immigrants' welfare rights on the agenda, many studies have documented growing and substantial welfare chauvinist preferences among Western European publics. However, it remains unclear whether people attach a high importance to welfare chauvinism and whether only its proponents care or attitudes are polarized, with opponents prioritizing the defense of welfare entitlements for immigrants over other social policy reforms. This article studies the importance of and priorities concerning welfare chauvinism using original survey data (including conjoint experiments) from eight Western European countries. It shows that immigrants' welfare entitlements are indeed one of the social policy reform issues that the public cares about, more than about unemployment benefits or childcare. The importance of welfare chauvinism is high not only for its proponents but also for its culturally liberal opponents; thus, preferences are strongly polarized between the voters of radical right and (most strongly) green parties. These findings have important implications for both welfare politics and party competition. The strong resistance of welfare chauvinism among left voters refutes the narrative that welfare chauvinist reforms are a viable strategy to increase overall support for the welfare state and that welfare chauvinist stances are a promising electoral strategy for the left.

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Introduction

Welfare chauvinism, or the idea to limit immigrants' access to welfare,¹ has become an increasingly popular topic in academic discourse—and for good reason. Reeskens and van Oorschot (2012) have shown that a majority of Europeans prefer only a conditional access of immigrants to welfare provision, while Cappelen and Midtbø (2016) reveal that up to 60% of Norwegians are upset by immigrants benefitting from welfare. Moreover, the findings of Marx and Naumann (2018) indicate that the massive influx of immigrants resulting from the recent refugee crisis has further strengthened welfare chauvinist preferences among German voters, affecting the preferences of all party electorates. At the party level, welfare chauvinism has become a key aspect of the social policy program of radical right parties such as the Sweden Democrats, the German AfD, and the French Rassemblement National, which have increased their vote shares significantly over the last two decades. This success has led mainstream parties on both the right and the left (such as the Danish Social Democrats recently) to openly advocate welfare cutbacks specifically targeting immigrants. Evidence also suggests that, although limited, the articulation of welfare chauvinist views has led to social policy reforms that are deliberately detrimental to immigrants (Careja *et al.*, 2016; Emmenegger and Careja, 2012; Tyrberg and Dahlström, 2017; Taylor-Gooby *et al.*, 2017). Thus, the welfare rights of immigrants have become an issue in the debate on how to reform the welfare state. This, however, might come as a surprise considering the relatively low share of financial resources that benefits immigrants compared to public spending for the old, the sick, or the unemployed.

Therefore, I first ask whether the issue of welfare chauvinism is indeed also important for the public. When it comes to reforming the welfare state, it ought to be questioned whether voters really care about welfare entitlements for immigrants or whether they care relatively little about what happens to immigrants' entitlements, while their preferences are much more intense if other recipient groups—to which native voters might belong—are affected.

¹ While the term “welfare chauvinism” has also been used to describe a programmatic mix of pro-welfare and anti-immigrant stances, I employ a “thin” conceptualisation of welfare chauvinism, that is, denoting the idea that immigrants should be excluded from the pool of welfare recipients or at least that the welfare state should cater more strongly to natives than non-natives.

Second, I ask *how* the issue of welfare chauvinism is politicized; in other words, *for whom* immigrants' welfare rights matter—for opponents or equally so for proponents of welfare entitlements for immigrants. This is especially interesting on the left side of the political spectrum. While the left played a crucial role in defending immigrants' welfare rights in the twentieth century (Sainsbury, 2012), its role is more contested today. A high share of support for reducing immigrants' welfare rights overall and ample evidence showing the blue-collar working class—a traditional stronghold of the left—as particularly fond of welfare chauvinism (Mewes and Mau, 2012; Heizmann *et al.*, 2018, Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012) has prompted commentators to advise left parties to promote welfare chauvinist positions to keep or win back working-class votes (e.g., Kopyciok and Silver, 2021). This recommendation assumes that either support for immigrants' welfare entitlements among the left is low despite culturally liberal, middle-class voters now undoubtedly representing at least as big of a share of left electorates (Abou-Chadi and Hix, 2021; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018; Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015). Or it assumes that these voters, who principally welcome immigrants' welfare rights, do not care strongly about welfare chauvinist reforms. If they do not care, welfare chauvinism might indeed be an electorally attractive strategy for parties traditionally favoring immigrants' rights. However, if they do care, restricting immigrants' welfare entitlements could be electorally dangerous. Hence, I investigate whether there exists a sizeable part of Western European voters that prioritizes opposition to welfare chauvinism and the preservation of welfare benefits for immigrants. I ask whether these opponents of welfare chauvinism are fervent about their stance as welfare chauvinism's proponents or subordinate their opposition to the rejection of cutbacks for other groups of welfare recipients, such as the unemployed. Moreover, I ask who prioritizes defending immigrants' welfare rights most strongly—traditional supporters of a large welfare state or, rather, the culturally liberal middle classes that are particularly well represented among green and new left parties.

I used novel, individual-level data from eight Western European countries that included different ways to measure not only positions on reducing or defending immigrants' welfare entitlements but also the importance attributed to the support or the opposition of welfare chauvinist reforms, including conjoint experiments, point distribution, and trade-off questions. This data allowed me to measure whether immigrants' welfare rights matter to voters and how this issue is politicized.

My findings make three main contributions. First, I show that the public cares strongly about what happens to immigrants' welfare entitlements, supporting a long line of research arguing that immigration has successfully found its way into the politics of the welfare state. Second, findings from conjoint experiments indicate that while cutting back immigrants' welfare rights is extremely popular among radical right voters, left universalist voters oppose such reforms equally strongly. This makes welfare chauvinism a properly *polarized* issue and highlights the electoral dangers of adopting welfare chauvinist stances, especially for the left. Third, I demonstrate that the prioritization of preserving immigrants' welfare rights is especially strongly correlated with preferences on a second, sociocultural attitudinal dimension than with preferences on the classic, economic dimension of conflict, which is commonly expected to better predict welfare preferences. Accordingly, I find electorates of green parties—more so than other left-party voters—to be the strongest defenders of immigrants' welfare rights and to represent the pole opposing welfare chauvinism.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, I outline the argument that welfare chauvinism can be expected to be important for the public, despite the financial relevance of immigrants' welfare benefits being relatively limited. Second, I develop theoretical expectations about citizens' positions and priorities concerning welfare chauvinism. Then, I present the data and explain the research design before discussing the evidence. The concluding section discusses the implications of the results.

Theory

The Importance of Welfare Chauvinism Relative to Other Social Policy Reforms

First, I ask how much importance the public attributes to expanding or cutting back welfare policies that specifically target immigrants; specifically, I question whether voters in Western European countries care about how much immigrants receive from the welfare state or whether they care more about pensions for the old, public childcare facilities for families or benefits, and services for the unemployed.

For two reasons, one might expect that although welfare chauvinism has received attention both in the scholarly debate and in party political discourses in many countries, welfare benefits for immigrants are a rather minor issue. These are self-interest and the relatively small financial pertinence of immigrants' welfare benefits.

According to a material self-interest approach, the welfare benefits of immigrants should be one of the least popular social policies among natives since no current citizen of a country faces the risk of becoming dependent on benefits for immigrants. Furthermore, this approach would expect people to care most about the preservation or expansion of benefits from which they themselves benefit (such as pensioners from pensions or parents from public childcare services) or most strongly risk becoming dependent on in the future (Rehm, 2009).

Furthermore, despite an important argument raised by proponents of welfare chauvinism that immigration puts high financial pressure on the welfare state and that benefits for immigrants challenge the viability of a generous welfare state, the financial relevancy of immigrants is not as significant as often perceived. This is true for both the inclusion of immigrants in conventional social policies and social policies specifically targeted at the integration of immigrants and refugees. For instance, for a sample of 17 European countries, Spies (2018, p. 88) shows that against conventional wisdom, immigrants have a lower welfare dependence ratio for eight welfare areas but are overrepresented only among the beneficiaries of unemployment benefits. The share of immigrants receiving welfare benefits in areas such as pensions, health care, family policies, or housing is thus lower than the share of recipients among natives. Comparing government spending on integration policies for immigrants with other social policy areas underlines the relatively low financial significance of such policies. According to the OECD (2017, p. 2), in 2015—when the number of asylum seekers has famously peaked—Germany spent about 0.5% of its GDP on measures to integrate immigrants and refugees (including housing, social welfare, education, active labor market policies, and so on). In contrast, in the same year, it spent 8.3% of its GDP on pensions for the old, 2.2% on family policies, 1.2% on tertiary education, and 1.5% of its GDP on the unemployed (OECD Social Expenditure Database, 2019). Moreover, the fiscal impact of labor migration has been shown to be not as bad as often perceived (Ruist 2014; Hjort 2016, p. 4).

Nevertheless, I argue that for two reasons, it makes sense to expect the public to attribute importance to welfare chauvinism and welfare benefits of immigrants: first, the increased salience of second dimension, sociocultural issues such as immigration; and second, recent findings of the deservingness literature, which have shown that identity seems to trump most other welfare deservingness criteria.

Economic issues have been structuring political conflict in Western Europe for most of the twentieth century. Issues such as economic inequality, redistribution, support for a big welfare state, and strong state intervention in the economy have divided left and right based on economic terms. However, most current research agrees that one dimension is not enough to capture the structure of today's political space neither at the party level nor at the level of the mass public (Kitschelt, 1994, Kriesi *et al.*, 2008; Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015). Rather, it is hardly disputed that besides the first economic dimension, including conflict over questions of economic equity and redistribution, at least a second dimension exists. This second dimension divides culturally progressive universalists and conservative particularists on issues such as the rights of women and sexual minorities, supranational integration, or—most prominently—immigration. It has gained importance relative to the classic economic dimension, both on the level of parties and voters (Clark and Lipset, 2001; Rydgren, 2005). Green-Pedersen and Otjes (2017) show that immigration has increasingly gained attention in party manifestos since the 1980s in all Western European countries. Moreover, many studies explaining vote choice have argued that second-dimension issues generally (Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi *et al.*, 2008) and immigration specifically (Finseraas, 2012) have gained importance in predicting party choice. Hence, many voters seem to care more about issues such as immigration than traditional economic topics revolving around the question of redistribution from upper to lower classes.

The salience of immigration is also reflected in the recent contributions of welfare deservingness literature, which has consistently shown that immigrants are perceived as least deserving to receive welfare benefits when compared to other groups of potential welfare state beneficiaries, such as the elderly, the sick, or the unemployed (van Oorschot, 2006; van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007; Ford, 2016). While these findings show that solidarity for immigrants among natives is generally rather low, they say nothing about the *importance* that people attribute to their dislike of welfare benefits for immigrants. More recently, using a vignette experiment, Reeskens and van der Meer (2019) have shown that foreign origin outweighs other deservingness criteria such as need. Thus, when respondents were asked to allocate unemployment provision to fictive persons, immigrants were consistently disadvantaged even if they behaved “better” than native persons concerning other deservingness criteria. The fact that this “immigrant penalty” in welfare deservingness perceptions seems insurmountable supports the expectation that

people care strongly about what immigrants receive or do not receive from the welfare state.

Therefore, I hypothesize that *overall, the public attributes more importance to welfare chauvinism and welfare benefits for immigrants than to reforms affecting other welfare beneficiary groups* (H1).

The Politicization of Welfare Chauvinism: Who Prioritizes Support and Opposition to Welfare Chauvinism?

After outlining why I expect immigrants' welfare entitlements to be a relevant issue to the public, I continue by describing how I expect this issue to be politicized. Specifically, I question *who* should be principally supportive or opposed to immigrants' welfare rights and who is expected to care about this issue more than others.

While many previous studies have been interested in explaining welfare chauvinist preferences focused on socio-structural determinants (e.g., Heizmann *et al.*, 2018; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Kros and Coenders, 2019), I focus on ideological factors such as partisanship and voters' location in the two-dimensional political space introduced above. Rather than making statements about how left or right voters position themselves with regard to immigrants' welfare rights, this allows to identify where on the left or on the right side of the political spectrum the strongest opponents and proponents of welfare chauvinism can be found.

Previous literature has shown that education is a strong predictor of welfare chauvinist attitudes, with low education being correlated with support for welfare chauvinism (van der Waal *et al.*, 2010; Mewes and Mau, 2013). This finding has prompted several studies to investigate why sociodemographic groups that are usually the strongest support constituencies of the welfare state (voters with low education and low income) are so staunchly opposed to immigrants' welfare rights. On the one hand, explanations have focused on interest-related accounts that the most vulnerable are those who perceive the economic threat from immigration to be the highest (Mewes and Mau, 2013). On the other hand, a cultural explanation has gained support, which hints at the fact that the cultural insecurity of the low educated is the strongest driver of their welfare chauvinist attitudes (van der Waal *et al.*, 2010). Such a cultural understanding of welfare chauvinistic

preferences is supported by Häusermann and Kriesi (2015), who show that preferences for welfare chauvinism are more closely related to preferences for non-economic, second-dimension issues rather than to the first, economic-redistributive dimension.

However, this cultural understanding has not remained undisputed. Countering it, Keskinen (2016, p. 321) claims that “welfare chauvinism targeting migrants is part of a broader neoliberal restructuring of the welfare state and of welfare retrenchment.” Moreover, Van Oorschot and Uunk (2007) find that support to reduce inequality is strongly positively correlated with relative concern for the well-being of immigrants. Reeskens and van Oorschot (2012, p. 121) argue that “from a theoretical perspective, it is plausible to assume a direct link between preferences for principles of welfare redistribution and conditioning criteria associated with immigrants’ social rights.” Furthermore, Maggini and Fernández (2019, p. 475) argue that solidarity toward refugees “entails political commitment to both leftist positions on economic issues and to libertarian stances on cultural issues.” This shows that the positions on immigrants’ welfare rights can also have an economic component.

Welfare chauvinist *positions* can have both economic and cultural roots as individuals might oppose entitlements for immigrants because they dislike multiculturalism or because they dislike the welfare state per se. Among the highly educated, opposition to immigration and welfare chauvinism has been found to be strongly positively correlated with opposition to economic redistribution (Bay *et al.*, 2013, p. 202). Going from positions to *priorities*, however—that is, taking into account the extent to which voters care about immigrants’ welfare entitlements—I argue that the predictive power of economic preferences vanishes. While voters opposed to state intervention and redistribution might find welfare retrenchment for immigrants appealing, it should be the culturally particularistic voters who are enthusiastic about depriving immigrants of their welfare rights. Similarly, voters preferring a generous welfare state and redistribution are more likely to favor immigrants’ welfare entitlements than are welfare-sceptics. However, this does not mean that economically left voters necessarily care strongly about immigrants’ welfare rights.

This is because voters’ motivations to have redistributive preferences and thus to be economically left-wing are manifold. Emmenegger and Klemmensen (2013) distinguish between several traits or social preferences that lead voters to favor redistribution, namely self-interest, a liking of strong reciprocity, egalitarianism, and humanitarianism. They

posit that these social preferences moderate whether voters experience tension between redistribution and immigration. In a similar vein, I argue that pro-redistribution preferences that originally stem from *self-interest motivations* might lead such voters to weakly support welfare benefits for immigrants in principle (although they do not have to) since this stance aligns with their general ideology for redistribution and a large welfare state and to prevent cognitive dissonance. If, however, the question turns to prioritizing some benefits over others, we would clearly expect self-interested, pro-redistribution voters to compromise on immigrants' rights relatively quickly to preserve the benefits on which they might depend in the present or in the future. On the contrary, only voters who are economically left-wing on *humanitarian* (who focus on the "truly disadvantaged" [Emmenegger and Klemmensen, 2013]) or *egalitarian* (who strive for equality) grounds might be expected to even prioritize welfare entitlements for immigrants over those of other groups since immigrants are often (perceived as being) in need and among the poorest strata of society. Thus, while all reasons for being economically left-wing are somewhat compatible with supporting immigrants' benefits in general, only some reasons are compatible with prioritizing immigrants if their benefits come at the cost of benefits for other recipient groups.

In a scenario where people can retain welfare benefits only for some groups but must retrench benefits for others—that is, where it really matters whether policies are prioritized or not—I argue, therefore, that voters with strongly libertarian-universalistic attitudes on the second, sociocultural dimension are supportive of immigrants' welfare benefits. Leftist positions on the first, economic-redistributive dimension alone, however, are not enough to oppose the reduction of welfare benefits for immigrants in a scenario where retrenchment is required, at least for some groups.

Therefore, I hypothesize that *positions on welfare chauvinism correlate with attitudes on the first, economic-redistributive as well as on the second, sociocultural dimension, while priorities on welfare chauvinism correlate only with attitudes on the second, non-economic dimension* (H2).

Consequently, I also expect corresponding differences between electorates of party families. I would expect *that positions on welfare chauvinism divide between party electorates of left and right parties, opposing social democratic, radical left, and green voters to conservative, liberal, and most strongly radical right voters* (H3a). These expectations are mostly in line with the findings of de Koster *et al.* (2013) for parties in

the Netherlands. *When it comes to priorities concerning welfare chauvinism, that is, when defending or expanding the welfare benefits of immigrants comes at the cost of reducing other social benefits, I argue that a divide within the left appears* (H3b). I expect voters of green parties, which have been shown to represent the universalist-libertarian pole of the second, sociocultural dimension (Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015; Dolezal, 2010; Bornschieer, 2010) and are the most outspoken on support for immigration (Ennsner, 2012; Langsæther, 2018), to be the strongest opponents of welfare chauvinism. In contrast, most social democratic and radical left parties primarily or at least equally still mobilize their voters on economic grounds and—if Hypothesis 2 holds true—should thus be less enthusiastic about defending immigrants’ welfare benefits compared to defending other benefits such as pensions or unemployment benefits.

Data and Methods

To test my hypotheses, I used data from an original survey that was conducted between October 2018 and February 2019 (Häusermann *et al.*, 2020). While the survey did not have the attitudes toward welfare chauvinism as its core interest, it contained several innovative ways to measure the importance of welfare chauvinist reforms relative to other possible welfare reforms and to understand how welfare chauvinist attitudes are structured.

The survey was conducted in eight Western European countries (Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, UK, Italy, and Spain). The range of countries includes different welfare state regimes (two countries each for the social democratic, conservative, liberal, and southern regimes) and countries where immigration has been linked to the welfare state in the public debate (Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, UK, Germany) as well as countries where the absence of a strong radical right party at the time of the survey has largely prevented a salient debate about welfare chauvinism (especially Ireland; to a certain degree Spain).

The final sample consisted of more than 12,000 completed interviews (about 1,500 in each country), which were recruited from an online panel. Quotas on age and sex (crossed) as well as education should enhance the representativeness of the sample with regard to each country’s adult population. To further alleviate the slight overrepresentation or underrepresentation of certain groups, in all calculations, I applied

weights to adjust for the aforementioned socio-structural characteristics. Since I am not interested in immigrants' own attitudes toward welfare chauvinism (see Degen *et al.*, 2018) but of citizens eligible to vote, I excluded respondents who indicated that they were not citizens of their country of residence.

To test the first hypothesis, I first had to determine how much *importance* citizens attribute to welfare entitlements for immigrants relative to other social policy fields. I measured the importance of different policy fields by combining two questions in which the respondents were asked to allocate 100 points to six different policy fields: old age pensions, childcare, higher education, unemployment benefits, labor market reintegration services, and *services for the social and labor market integration of immigrants*. The respondents were first asked to imagine having spare resources with which they could improve benefits in some but not all social policy fields and to allocate the 100 points according to how important they deemed *benefit improvement* in each of the policy fields. In the second exercise, they had to imagine that cutbacks were inevitable and again allocate 100 points to the same six social policy fields, giving more points to those fields where they found a *reduction of benefits* more acceptable. The combination of these two questions allowed me to measure the *importance* attributed to each of the six social policy fields. I operationalized importance as the absolute difference between points attributed to the priority of expanding and retrenching in a respective policy field. For example, a respondent who distributed 30 points to expanding services for the social and labor market integration of immigrants and 10 points to retrenching such services had an importance value of 20 for welfare chauvinism. If they gave few points to a policy field in both tasks (i.e., did not have a strong preference to expand or retrench in this policy field), with a small difference between the points allocated in the two tasks, they exhibited that they cared relatively less about that policy field. In contrast, if they gave many points to either expanding or retrenching the policy field—thus with a larger difference²—they attributed higher importance to reforms in that policy field. The importance of a policy field ranged from 0 to 100, with 0 representing the lowest importance for respondents who allocated an identical number of points to a policy field in both the expansion and retrenchment

² Giving many points to both expanding and retrenching a policy field (i.e., favouring both) would be an inconsistent preference that occurs only rarely. Less than 4% of respondents, for example allocated more than 20 points to both the expansion and retrenchment of services for immigrants.

point distribution questions. I evaluated H1 descriptively by showing the distribution and the sample mean for each of the six social policy fields to compare the extent to which citizens care about services for the integration of immigrants.

Moreover, I showed the results of a conjoint experiment fielded in the same survey to underline the importance of welfare chauvinism to the Western European public. Conjoint designs allow to assess how different characteristics of an object contribute to the likelihood that respondents choose that object (see other applications in the realm of social policy in Kölln and Wlezien, 2016; Bremer and Buringsser, 2020). More specifically, in the experiment, respondents were confronted five times with a choice between two welfare reform packages, which included measures to cut back different social policies (old age pensions, childcare, tertiary education, unemployment benefits, active labor market policies, and social assistance) either universally or targeted for different groups (e.g., pensions only for future pensioners, childcare for middle- and higher-income families). Importantly, for the purpose of this study, some reform packages included the proposition to *provide fewer active labor market services for immigrants than for natives* and/or to *reduce social assistance benefits for immigrants only*. The respondents had to indicate which of the two reform packages they preferred. Because the specific measures of welfare packages are attributed randomly, conjoint designs allow us to understand how strongly a cutback measure contributes to whether a welfare package is chosen or not (and therefore liked or disliked). If voters did not care about immigrants' welfare rights, then the propositions to cut back active labor market policies and social assistance for immigrants would not have a strong effect on whether packages are chosen. However, if these measures contribute strongly to the likelihood of a welfare reform package being chosen or not, this is another indication of the importance the public attributes to welfare chauvinism. To assess whether welfare chauvinism is polarized, in the sense that it matters strongly not only to its supporters but also to its opponents, I present the conjoint for respondents self-positioning themselves as left (0–4 on a scale from 0 to 10) and right (6–10) as well as separately for voters of six party families (social democrats, radical left, green, liberal, conservative, and radical right).³ In addition to allowing to identify the importance of different reform measures for respondents, conjoint experiments are also well suited to investigate attitudes toward welfare chauvinism because revealing welfare chauvinist attitudes might contradict social norms and be a sensitive issue (Cappelen and

³ For the classification of parties into party families, see Table A1 in the Appendix.

Midtbø, 2016). Nevertheless, conjoint experiments alleviate this potential problem of traditional survey questions since they—like list experiments—allow respondents to hide a specific attitude behind a veil of anonymity.

To test hypotheses 2 and 3 and provide individual-level evidence for how the politics of immigrants' welfare rights are politicized, I measured priorities with the 2-point distribution questions presented above, which imposed opportunity costs on the respondents by not allowing them to expand everything or by forcing them to cut back something.⁴ Furthermore, I drew upon a trade-off question, in which the cost of providing welfare benefits for immigrants became even clearer; it asked the respondents whether they found it acceptable for the government to slightly cut back old age pensions for everyone to provide more services to help migrants find a job.⁵ The respondents had to indicate whether they found this completely unacceptable, rather unacceptable, rather acceptable, or completely acceptable. Since the trade-off question explicitly states that benefits for immigrants come at the cost of everyone, it is well suited to measure whether people are sympathetic enough to support welfare benefits for immigrants even at the cost of their own material self-interest.

While I used these questions (point distribution questions and trade-off questions) to measure priorities for welfare benefits for immigrants, I measured a simple, unconstrained position on welfare chauvinism by asking the respondents whether they agreed that *the government should reduce social assistance benefits only for immigrants*. The respondents had the options to strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree. 43% of respondents indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed with cutbacks for immigrants, while 57% were principally opposed.

As an independent variable for Hypothesis 2, I needed both a measure of first-dimension, economic-redistributive as well as second-dimension, sociocultural attitudes. To do so, I built an index for both attitudinal dimensions based on a battery of two and

⁴Since respondents were restrained to allocate no more than 100 points when asked about where they wanted to expand and were compelled to allocate 100 points when asked about where to retrench, even if they did not want to retrench at all.

⁵Please imagine that the government wants to improve certain social benefits. However, it can only do so by cutting back on other social benefits. To what extent do you find the following cutbacks acceptable in comparison to the improvement they allow?

The government provides more services to help migrants find a job, at a cost of slightly lowering old age pensions for everyone.

five items, respectively. Economic-redistributive attitudes were measured with a classic redistributive statement (*For a society to be fair, income differences should be small*) and with a statement addressing the amount of state intervention and preferred size of the welfare state (*Social benefits and services in [Country] place too great a strain on the economy*). To differentiate universalist and particularistic attitudes, I used two statements on immigration⁶ (*Immigration is a threat to our national culture* and *Immigration is a threat to the national labor market*) and freedom of lifestyles (*Gay and lesbian couples should have the same rights to adopt children as straight couples* and *All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job*) as well as a statement concerning European integration (*European integration has gone too far*). To all these statements, the respondents answered on a 4-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. For both attitudinal dimensions, I computed the unweighted mean of the answers and normalized them. This resulted in a distribution of economic-redistributive attitudes ranging from 0 (*economically right*) to 1 (*economically left*) with a mean of 0.57, a standard deviation of 0.22, and a distribution of sociocultural attitudes ranging from 0 (*particularistic-traditional*) to 1 (*universalist-libertarian*) with a mean of 0.52 and a standard deviation of 0.23.

While I evaluated Hypothesis 1 descriptively and by using evidence from a conjoint experiment, the remaining hypotheses were tested using multivariate regression models. Since both the variable measuring positions toward welfare entitlements for immigrants as well as the trade-off question had an ordinal 4-point scale, in most models, I calculated ordered logit regressions. I ran OLS regressions only when the dependent variable stemmed from the point distribution question (where possible values for priorities ranged from 0 to 100).⁷ In all models, I controlled for age, gender, education, income and included country-fixed effects.

⁶To ensure that the results of whether welfare chauvinist positions and priorities are correlated with the economic or cultural dimensions are not just driven by the two immigration items, I excluded the two for a robustness test.

⁷Table 1, third and fourth column.

Results

How much Importance does the Public Attribute to Immigrants' Welfare Rights relative to Reforms in Other Social Policy Fields?




Figure 1: Distributions and Sample Means of **Importance** for six different social policy fields

The histograms and density plots in Figure 2.1 depict the distributions of importance that people attribute to the six social policy fields: old age pensions, childcare, tertiary education, unemployment benefits, active labor market policy, and welfare services for immigrants. A value of 0 meant that a respondent wanted to expand in this social policy field as much as they wanted to retrench; hence, they did not care whether this policy was

expanded or cut back. This implies that the respondent attributed a very low importance to the policy field. Higher numbers mean that the respondent cared about either expanding or retrenching in a policy field, thereby attributing a higher importance to it.

Considering the distributions of importance, it is clear that welfare for immigrants and old age pensions are the two social policy fields on which people, on average, have the strongest opinions. Compared to the other four issues, there are comparatively few people who do not care at all about welfare benefits for immigrants and even fewer who lack a preference for expanding or retrenching pensions for the elderly. Furthermore, only for these two fields, there exists a noteworthy number of citizens who seem to care exclusively about expanding or retrenching this social policy. This is also reflected in the average importance attributed to each social policy field, indicated by the dashed vertical lines. The average importance attributed to welfare chauvinism (24.0) and old age pensions (22.8) is about 10 points higher on this scale ranging from 0 to 100 than the importance attributed to unemployment benefits (13.2), childcare services (12.5), tertiary education (12.3), and active labor market policy (11.8).⁸

Although there are substantial cross-country differences with regard to the average importance attributed to welfare entitlements for immigrants, services for immigrants and old age pensions emerge in all eight countries as the two most important social policy fields. In five countries (Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain) welfare chauvinism is ranked first, while in the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK, it ranks second behind old age pensions (Figure A1 in the appendix).

⁸ The high average value of welfare chauvinism is partly but not only driven by the respondents with extremely high importance values. Looking at the median rather than the mean, welfare chauvinism (15) appears less important than pensions (20) but still significantly more important than reforms in the other four policy fields (median of 10 each).

Is Welfare Chauvinism Important to Both its Supporters and Opponents?




Figure 2: Retrenchment Conjoint interacting with left-right self-positioning. Left column: citizens with center-left ideology (0–4); Right column: citizens with center-right ideology (6–10).

The finding that people prioritize welfare entitlements for immigrants is also reflected in conjoint experiments, in which the respondents had to decide between two reform packages that included cutbacks but in different social policy fields and targeting different groups. Figure 2.2 shows the results from the conjoint experiment for two subgroups separately: for the respondents self-identifying as center-left (left column) and for those leaning more to the right (right column). If the so-called average marginal component effect (AMCE) of a reform package characteristic (depicted by the point estimates in Figure 2.2) is positive, then this reform measure contributes positively to whether a reform package is chosen. If the AMCE is negative, the reform measure contributes negatively to the likelihood that a reform package containing this measure is chosen (relative to no reform in that policy field).

I now address the two welfare chauvinist reform measures that propose to provide fewer active labor market services to immigrants seeking (re)integration into the workforce and to reduce social assistance benefits to immigrants only (marked in bold in Figure 2.2). Comparing the AMCEs of these two reform proposals to the AMCEs of the other 12 reform proposals, it becomes evident that welfare chauvinist reform measures have an extremely high potential to influence voters' evaluations of welfare reforms and that welfare chauvinism strongly divides the electorate.

People located on the right support retrenchment in immigrants' labor market policies and social assistance more strongly than any other retrenchment measures. No other reform measure seems to be more popular for right-leaning voters than cutting back immigrants' welfare rights—especially their social assistance benefits. On the contrary, people with a center-left-wing ideology, on average, reject the two cutbacks that detrimentally affect immigrants. They dislike them as much as the proposition to cut back pensions only for future pensioners, which is perceived as deeply unfair (more than any other cutback) among the entire sample. Thus, if a welfare state reform package includes welfare chauvinist retrenchment, this *increases* the likelihood of right people choosing this reform most strongly and *decreases* this likelihood very strongly for people on the left of the political spectrum.⁹

A similar picture emerges if the conjoint experiment does not contrast reform proposals to retrench but proposals to expand the welfare state (Figure A4 in the appendix). Two reform measures that aim to improve the welfare rights of nationals while leaving the benefits for immigrants at a lower level are clearly the most popular welfare expansions for respondents with a center-right to right-wing ideology. However, they are among the three most disliked expansionary reform measures for respondents on the left.

This shows that people care about welfare entitlements for immigrants when evaluating a welfare reform package and that the treatment of immigrants in the welfare state is one of the more controversial and polarized issues in welfare politics. Welfare chauvinism is not only important to its supporters but also to its opponents.

⁹ This polarization appears even stronger looking at subgroups based on respondents' attitudes on the second, sociocultural dimension rather than their general left-right ideology (Figures A2 and A3 in the appendix).

Disaggregating the findings from Figure 2.2 by country demonstrates that despite differences in the salience of immigration and welfare regimes, this polarization of welfare chauvinism exists in almost every country (Figure A5 in the appendix). On the right side of the political debate, the most significant exception is Ireland, where welfare chauvinist ideas do not strike a chord with many people who should be more susceptible to it. In the conservative welfare states of Germany and the Netherlands, support for welfare chauvinism confines itself mostly to immigrants' social assistance benefits but spares reductions in ALMP programs attempting to bring immigrants into the labor market. Even more consistent across countries is the opposition of left voters to welfare chauvinism. Despite differences in strength, at least one welfare chauvinist reform proposal negatively and significantly affects left voters' propensity to support a reform in all countries except Denmark, where left opposition to cutbacks of immigrants' welfare rights seems weakest.

Overall, the findings demonstrate that the public in Western European countries cares about welfare chauvinism and that immigrants' welfare rights matter not only for right-wing but also for left-wing voters, making welfare chauvinism a highly polarized issue.

Who Exactly Prioritizes Support and Opposition to Welfare Chauvinism?

Support for Benefits for Immigrants / Opposition to Welfare Chauvinism

	Position	Trade-Off	Expansion Priorities	Retrenchment Priorities
Universalist Attitudes	4.642*** (0.095)	3.093*** (0.094)	13.141*** (0.393)	31.523*** (1.107)
Left Economic Attitudes	1.010*** (0.092)	-0.083 (0.095)	0.616 (0.421)	-5.170*** (1.186)
Education (middle)	-0.079 (0.046)	-0.075 (0.049)	0.004 (0.226)	-1.163 (0.639)
Education (high)	0.043 (0.051)	0.089 (0.053)	0.550* (0.242)	-0.824 (0.682)
Income (middle)	-0.068 (0.043)	-0.073 (0.045)	0.024 (0.206)	-0.405 (0.582)
Income (high)	-0.052 (0.050)	-0.081 (0.052)	0.086 (0.235)	-0.658 (0.662)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.011* (0.005)	-0.011 (0.015)
Male	-0.040 (0.036)	0.257*** (0.038)	0.596*** (0.171)	1.202* (0.483)
(Intercept)			2.240*** (0.487)	56.151*** (1.374)
AIC	25926.087	22679.280		
BIC	26057.529	22810.932		
Log Likelihood	- 12945.044	- 11321.640		
Deviance	25890.087	22643.280		
Num. obs.	10963	11092	11441	11441
R ²			0.127	0.084
Adj. R ²			0.126	0.083
RMSE			9.045	25.503

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Country-fixed effects included in all models.

Table 1: Economic-redistributive and sociocultural attitudes as determinants of positions and priorities for welfare benefits of immigrants (Ref. categories: low income, low education).

The first column of Table 2.1 shows that attitudes on both the economic-redistributive and sociocultural dimensions are significantly related to supporting welfare chauvinism. As expected, both people with universalist values and those who support small income differences but a large welfare state are more sympathetic to granting immigrants welfare entitlements. The remaining columns show the regression results for different

operationalizations of priorities for immigrants' welfare benefits (second: trade-off immigrants vs. pensions; third: number of points to expand welfare entitlements of immigrants; fourth: number of points not to retrench welfare benefits for immigrants). *High values* always correspond to being *in favor of welfare benefits for immigrants* and therefore to preferences *against* welfare chauvinism.

The findings show that, irrespective of the operationalization of priorities, universalist, second-dimension attitudes remain strongly correlated with prioritizing welfare benefits for immigrants. By contrast, if controlled for universalist attitudes, support for redistribution is no longer (significantly) positively related to supporting welfare benefits for immigrants if opportunity costs are introduced. Thus, if expanding welfare benefits for immigrants comes at the cost of reducing other potentially redistributive welfare policies, economically leftists are no longer clearly backing welfare benefits for immigrants and opposing welfare chauvinist cutbacks. On the contrary, when it comes to retrenchment, left economic preferences are even negatively correlated with priorities for immigrants' welfare benefits (when controlled for cultural, second-dimension attitudes). People who support redistribution would, on average, cut back even more on welfare benefits for immigrants than economically right-wing voters when they are forced to cut back either welfare benefits for immigrants or for other groups. These findings support H2; although slightly attenuated, they are robust to the exclusion of all immigration-related questions from the operationalization of the sociocultural dimension (see Table A2 in the appendix). Even though economic attitudes become significant for two of the three priority questions, they remain considerably less important than sociocultural attitudes in explaining priorities concerning welfare chauvinism.

Thus, while people featuring attitudes that are generally connotated with the pro-redistribution left of the political spectrum tend to oppose welfare chauvinism as expected, only culturally liberal individuals also place a relatively high importance on defending immigrants' welfare entitlements. Purely economically leftists tend to care slightly less.

Concerning the control variables, I find that education level is positively associated with support for welfare entitlements for immigrants, in accordance with previous studies (e.g., Heizmann *et al.*, 2018; van der Waal *et al.*, 2010; van der Waal *et al.*, 2013). It should be noted, however, that the effect of education becomes mostly insignificant when attitudinal variables are included, as shown in Table 2.1. Interestingly, the effect of gender

differs between the unconstrained positions and priorities. While women are principally less welfare chauvinist than men, they reduce their support to granting welfare benefits to immigrants more strongly than men when these benefits come at the cost of other social benefits—a finding that echoes observations by Cappelen and Midtbø (2016).

Positions and Priorities of Party Electorates

Table A3 in the appendix and Figure 2.3 explore the welfare chauvinist positions and priorities of party families' electorates. They show that, unsurprisingly, green party voters are the most fervent supporters of immigrants' welfare benefits (significantly more supportive than the social democrats that serve as the reference category in Table A3), while radical right voters are most strongly opposed to granting immigrants generous welfare benefits and mostly in favor of welfare chauvinism. However, against the expectation of H2a, voters of green parties are significantly less welfare chauvinist than the electorates of social democratic parties already concerning positions (horizontal axis in Figure 2.3) and not only concerning priorities; in fact, the pattern is consistent between the positions and priorities. The most notable exception applies to voters of the radical left; while radical left voters are principally the second least welfare chauvinist electorate (behind the greens), radical left opposition to cutbacks for immigrants drops quite dramatically when this opposition comes at the cost of retrenching other social benefits. In a scenario of retrenchment, voters of the radical left seem to be about as willing as conservative voters to give up benefits for immigrants to retain other social benefits such as pensions, childcare, university education, or benefits for the unemployed.




Figure 3: Predicted Positions and Priorities of Party Families.¹⁰

However, two caveats must be implemented with regard to this mildly welfare chauvinist position of the radical left. First, it is important to note that the party family of radical left parties is heterogeneous. Radical left party voters in Scandinavia (the Socialist People’s Party and the Red-Green Alliance in Denmark as well as the Swedish Left Party) and Southern Europe (Podemos in Spain) do not strongly give up their strong opposition to welfare chauvinism when immigrants’ benefits come at a cost. In contrast, the overall result that radical left party electorates prioritize other welfare benefits over immigrants’ benefits is mainly driven by parties in Ireland (Sinn Fein), the Netherlands (Socialist Party), and Germany (the Left). Second, when the conjoint experiments introduced above attempt to determine the priorities of radical left voters, the role of radical left voters looks slightly different.

¹⁰ Positions are based on a linear specification of the model “Position” in Table 2.2 (results do not differ substantially from the ordered logit model shown in Table 2.2). Priorities are based on the model “Retrenchment Priorities” in Table 2.2. Predicted positions and priorities for a woman with middle education, middle income, and average age living in Germany.




Figure 4: Retrenchment Conjoint interacted with party family (vote choice).

Figure 2.4 shows results from the conjoint experiments by voters of different party families. With regard to the radical left, on average, radical left voters tend to punish reforms that include cutbacks for immigrants specifically. The same holds true for voters of the social democrats, especially when welfare chauvinist reforms concern social assistance. The conjoint experiments, though, confirm the special role of the greens as strongest vindicators of immigrants' welfare rights. While for radical left and social democratic voters, welfare chauvinist reforms are two among four to five unpopular reform elements, for green voters, cutbacks concerning immigrants exclusively are the single most decisive factor for retrenching welfare reforms being rejected. While, unsurprisingly, radical right voters cherish the discrimination of immigration, for conservative and liberal voters, welfare chauvinist reform elements are generally less crucial to determine whether these voters support or oppose reform packages.

Conclusion

In this article, I examine whether welfare chauvinism is indeed important to the public, to whom it is important and how the politics of immigrants' welfare rights are politicized. I show that welfare chauvinism is indeed perceived to be an important issue by Western European publics when it comes to reforming the welfare state. The findings indicate that welfare chauvinism is a strongly politicized issue and that voters have stronger opinions about whether welfare benefits for immigrants should be expanded or retrenched compared to several other social policy reform proposals in fields such as childcare, tertiary education, unemployment benefits, or active labor market policies. This is remarkable since the latter fields are at least—if not more—financially relevant.

The findings of conjoint experiments indicate that welfare chauvinist cutbacks are not only popular among the (radical) right but also provoke a nearly equally strong opposition of people on the left of the political spectrum, especially those situated at the universalistic-libertarian pole of a second, socio-cultural issue dimension. This opposition to welfare chauvinism is especially strong among voters of green parties, but also among

social democratic and some radical left parties.¹¹ They prioritize immigrants' welfare benefits over benefits for other needy groups – some even over benefits they might profit from themselves. This finding implies that the emergence of welfare chauvinism as an important issue on the agenda of partisan welfare politics has not necessarily led to a decrease in solidarity with immigrants and a welfare chauvinist shift but rather to a *polarization* of attitudes on whether immigrants should be included in the pool of welfare recipients.

Moreover, these findings imply, first, that the issue of immigration and whether immigrants benefit from social policy has a vast potential to influence how people think about welfare politics and whether they approve certain welfare reform agendas. Second, the findings show that for parties promoting a culturally liberal platform and mobilizing culturally liberal voters (as most Western European left parties do), proposing welfare chauvinist reforms to the welfare state is not an electorally viable strategy since left and even more culturally liberal voters care nearly as much about opposing cutbacks to immigrants' rights as radical right voters care about supporting them. This finding contrasts a study by Schmitt and Teney (2019), who demonstrate that cabinets composed of left-wing parties are particularly reluctant to grant immigrants access to social housing and social protection. This behavior of the left in government is puzzling given the findings of this study. If the strong opposition to welfare chauvinism among left and especially culturally liberal voters was recognized by green and social democratic parties, this finding would alleviate concerns of further, far-reaching welfare chauvinist reforms taking place because of immigrants lacking a strong enough lobby to oppose such measures. However, it might also disappoint those who believe that adopting welfare chauvinist positions might be the solution to again increase the legitimacy of the welfare state and to halt and reverse the electoral decline of social democratic parties. While a welfare chauvinist strategy strongly appeals to voters on the right, left-universalist voters are not ready to compromise on defending immigrants' welfare rights, meaning that a welfare chauvinist strategy is doomed to fail for most social democratic parties.

¹¹ Voters of some radical left parties, in contrast, cannot be expected to defend immigrants' welfare benefits at all costs, even though they are not principally opposed to immigrants receiving welfare benefits.

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Appendix

Party Family	Party (Country)
Radical Left	Red-Green Alliance (Denmark) Socialist People's Party (Denmark) Die Linke (Germany) Sinn Féin (Ireland/UK) Solidarity (Ireland) LeU (Italy) SP (Netherlands) PODEMOS (Spain) V (Sweden)
Social Democrats	Social Democrats (Denmark) SPD (Germany) Labour Party (Ireland) Social Democrats (Ireland) Partito Democratico (Italy) PVDA (Netherlands) PSOE (Spain) SAP (Sweden) Labour (UK) Scottish National Party (UK)
Greens	The Alternative (Denmark) Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Germany) GL (Netherlands) PVDD (Netherlands) MP (Sweden)
Liberals	Danish Social Liberal Party (Denmark) Liberal Alliance (Denmark) Venstre (Denmark) FDP (Germany) 50+ (Netherlands) D66 (Netherlands) VVD (Netherlands) Cs (Spain) L (Sweden) Liberal Democrats (UK)
Conservatives	Conservative People's Party (Denmark) CDU/CSU (Germany) Fianna Fáil (Ireland) Fine Gael (Ireland) FDI (Italy) FI (Italy) CDA (Netherlands) CU (Netherlands) EAJ/PNV (Spain) PDeCAT (Spain) PP (Spain) KD (Sweden) M (Sweden) Conservatives (UK) DUP (UK)
Radical Right	Danish People's Party (Denmark) AfD (Germany) Lega (Italy) PVV (Netherlands) Sweden Democrats (Sweden) UKIP (UK)

Table A1: Classification of Parties in Party Families

Support for benefits for immigrants / Opposition to Welfare Chauvinism

	Position	Trade-Off	Expansion Priorities	Retrenchment Priorities
Universalist Attitudes	3.076*** (0.090)	1.961*** (0.092)	8.964*** (0.427)	21.131*** (1.182)
Redistribution Support	1.495*** (0.090)	0.361*** (0.092)	2.210*** (0.439)	-1.077 (1.216)
Education (middle)	0.009 (0.046)	0.003 (0.049)	0.296 (0.232)	-0.369 (0.642)
Education (high)	0.235*** (0.050)	0.258*** (0.052)	1.268*** (0.253)	1.135 (0.700)
Income (middle)	-0.028 (0.042)	-0.041 (0.044)	0.156 (0.216)	0.025 (0.599)
Income (high)	0.005 (0.049)	-0.038 (0.051)	0.232 (0.249)	-0.044 (0.690)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.014* (0.005)	-0.009 (0.015)
Male	-0.055 (0.035)	0.236*** (0.037)	0.536** (0.181)	1.044* (0.502)
(Intercept)			2.741*** (0.532)	56.630*** (1.475)
AIC	27407.088	23431.135		
BIC	27538.564	23562.821		
Log Likelihood	-13685.544	-11697.568		
Deviance	27371.088	23395.135		
Num. obs.	10984	11113	11109	11109
R ²			0.076	0.046
Adj. R ²			0.075	0.045
RMSE			9.441	26.152

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Country-fixed effects included in all models.





Table A2: Economic-redistributive and sociocultural attitudes (excluding attitudes on immigration) as determinants of positions and priorities for welfare benefits of immigrants (Ref. categories: low income, low education)

Support for Benefits for Immigrants / Opposition to Welfare Chauvinism

	Position	Trade-Off	Expansion Priorities	Retrenchment Priorities
Party (Conservative)	-0.729*** (0.056)	-0.433*** (0.059)	-1.335*** (0.312)	-1.662* (0.824)
Party (Green)	0.348*** (0.094)	0.271** (0.092)	1.693** (0.515)	2.278 (1.360)
Party (Liberal)	-0.703*** (0.068)	-0.288*** (0.070)	-1.201** (0.379)	-3.449*** (0.999)
Party (Radical Right)	-1.800*** (0.069)	-1.260*** (0.076)	-4.463*** (0.369)	-13.478*** (0.974)
Party (Radical Left)	0.078 (0.072)	-0.049 (0.072)	-0.350 (0.395)	-2.196* (1.042)
Education (middle)	0.160** (0.051)	-0.018 (0.054)	-0.114 (0.281)	-0.732 (0.742)
Education (high)	0.422*** (0.055)	0.276*** (0.058)	1.202*** (0.305)	1.665* (0.804)
Income (middle)	-0.135** (0.047)	-0.030 (0.050)	0.217 (0.264)	0.956 (0.696)
Income (high)	-0.068 (0.053)	-0.008 (0.056)	0.200 (0.294)	0.610 (0.775)
Age	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.001)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.053** (0.017)
Male	-0.120** (0.039)	0.274*** (0.041)	0.242 (0.216)	0.959 (0.571)
(Intercept)			11.396*** (0.557)	74.875*** (1.470)
AIC	22940.949	19403.833		
BIC	23090.187	19553.313		
Log Likelihood	-11449.474	-9680.916		
Deviance	22898.949	19361.833		
Num. obs.	9014	9119	8012	8012
R ²			0.057	0.048
Adj. R ²			0.054	0.046
RMSE			10.219	26.962

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Reference: Party (Social Democrats). Country-fixed effects included.

Table A3: Party Families as determinants of positions and priorities for welfare benefits of immigrants (Ref. categories: low income, low education, social democratic party)







Figure A1. Distributions and Sample Means of **Importance** for six different social policy fields, by country



*Figure A2: Retrenchment Conjoint interacted with **attitude on second, sociocultural dimension**. Left column: citizens with particularistic attitudes; Right column: citizens with universalistic attitudes.*




Figure A3: Expansion Conjoint interacted with attitude on second, sociocultural dimension. Left column: citizens with particularistic attitudes; Right column: citizens with universalist attitudes.




Figure A4: Expansion Conjoint interacted with left-right self-positioning. Left column: citizens with center-left ideology (0–4); Right column: citizens with center-right ideology (6–10)




Figure A5a: Retrenchment Conjoint interacted with left-right self-positioning. Left column: citizens with center-left ideology (0–4); citizens with center-right ideology (6–10). By country: Germany and the Netherlands.




Figure A5b: Retrenchment Conjoint interacted with left-right self-positioning. Left column: citizens with center-left ideology (0–4); citizens with center-right ideology (6–10). By country: United Kingdom and Ireland.




Figure A5c: Retrenchment Conjoint interacted with left-right self-positioning. Left column: citizens with center-left ideology (0–4); citizens with center-right ideology (6–10). By country: Sweden and Denmark.




Figure A5d: Retrenchment Conjoint interacted with left-right self-positioning. Left column: citizens with center-left ideology (0–4); citizens with center-right ideology (6–10). By country: Spain and Italy.